ITEM METADATA RECORD
Title: Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems
Authors: Spinnewijn, Johannes
Spinnewyn, Frans
Issue Date: 2008
Publisher: KULeuven CES
Series Title: CES - Discussion paper series 08.32 pages:1-34
Abstract: We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Players start by making claims and accept a compromise only if they cannot gain by pursuing their claim in an ultimatum. The player offering the lowest resistance to his opponent’s claim can propose a compromise. The unique solution depends on the extent to which claims can be revised. If no revisions are allowed, compatible claims implement the Nash solution. If all revisions are allowed, maximal claims implement the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IR
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Econometrics, Leuven

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