Title: Asymmetric spillovers and investments in research and development of leaders and followers
Authors: Vandekerckhove, Jan ×
De Bondt, Raymond #
Issue Date: Jan-2008
Publisher: Harwood Academic
Series Title: Economics of Innovation and New Technology vol:17 issue:5 pages:417-433
Abstract: The focus of this paper is on the incentives of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) when sequential
moves are taken into account. Leading firms move before followers in investment and in output choices in a four stage game setting. Leaders may compete or cooperate in R&D with other leaders, given that followers compete. Followers
may compete or cooperate in R&D with other followers given that leaders compete. There may be spillovers between
leaders and between followers and also between these two groups of players. Due to the complexity of the model,
results are obtained by numerical simulations. The impact of symmetric spillovers is similar but not identical to the
tendencies in two stage models with simultaneous R&D moves. A relatively wide set of circumstances is identified
where followers tend to invest more than leaders. Critical spillover values are identified that drive the effects of
cooperation in R&D as is the case in simpler settings. Situations are detailed, where consumer surplus and static
welfare are best served by cooperation of followers rather than cooperation of leaders.
ISSN: 1043-8599
VABB publication type: VABB-1
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

Files in This Item:
File Description Status SizeFormat
2009-01-08 - JVanRDB08.pdf Published 208KbAdobe PDFView/Open Request a copy

These files are only available to some KU Leuven Association staff members


All items in Lirias are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.