Title: Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing
Authors: Facchini, Giovanni ×
Van Biesebroeck, Jo
Willmann, Gerald #
Issue Date: Aug-2006
Series Title: The Canadian Journal of Economics vol:39 issue:3 pages:845-873
Abstract: Grossman and Helpman (1994) explain tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying process. In most empirical implementations of this framework protection is instead measured using non-tariff barriers. Since tariffs allow the government to fully capture the rents from protection, while non-tariff barriers do not, the existing parameter estimates of the protection for sale model are likely to be biased. To address this problem, we augment the framework by considering instruments that allow partial capturing. Our specification is supported by the data, where we find that only 72–75% of the rent from protection is appropriated by the government.
ISSN: 0008-4085
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Department of Economics, Leuven - miscellaneous
Research Center of International Economics, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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