Author:

Keywords:

Competition, Market, Order, Strategy

Abstract:

We present a dynamic microstructure model where a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) interact. We consider sequentially arriving agents having different valuations for an asset. Agents maximize their profits by either trading at a DM or by submitting an order for (possibly) uncertain execution at a CN. We develop the analysis for three different informational settings: transparency, “complete” opaqueness of all order flow, and “partial” opaqueness (with observable DM trades). We find that a CN and a DM cater for different types of traders. Investors with a high eagerness to trade are more likely to prefer a DM. The introduction of a CN increases overall order flow by attracting traders who would not otherwise submit orders (“order creation”). It also diverts trades from the DM. The transparency and “partial” opaqueness settings generate systematic patterns in order flow. With transparency, the probability of observing a CN order at the same side of the market is smaller after such an order than if it was not. Buy (sell) orders at a CN are also less likely to attract subsequent sell (buy) orders at the DM.