ITEM METADATA RECORD
Title: Strategic incentives for multinational operations
Authors: Veugelers, Reinhilde # ×
Issue Date: 1995
Publisher: Heyden & Son
Series Title: Managerial and Decision Economics vol:16 issue:1 (Jan/Feb) pages:47-57
Abstract: A simple game-theoretic model is set up to analyze when strategic considerations may dominate and possibly counteract the traditional motives for multinational operations such as locational and firm-specific advantages. Firms can choose to operate internationally out of defensive considerations to avoid a worse outcome where they would have to compete with rival multinational corporations while not enjoying the cost advantages associated with multinational operations. The model further specifies when the timing of the decision to become a multinational corporation may entail strategic advantages, with the first mover restricting the multinational expansion of its rival
ISSN: 0143-6570
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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