Title: Institutional reform and co-decision in the European Union
Authors: Crombez, Christophe # ×
Issue Date: 2000
Publisher: Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University
Series Title: Constitutional political economy vol:11 issue:1 pages:41-57
Abstract: This paper studies the Treaty of Amsterdam's reform of the co-decision procedure in the European Union. The paper presents spatial models of the procedure, and examines whether the Treaty significantly alters it. The theory analyzes the implications of the Treaty for the equilibrium EU policies and the institutions' powers. It characterizes sets of policies the Commission can successfully propose under the old procedure, and sets of policies the Council and the Parliament can successfully propose as joint texts under the new procedure. The paper concludes that the new procedure does not lead to a further increase in the Parliament's powers, as intended by the drafters of the Treaty. Rather it finds that the Treaty eliminates the Commission's power under co-decision and may increase indecision
ISSN: 1043-4062
VABB publication type: VABB-1
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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