Author:

Keywords:

conditional agenda setter, european-union, legislative procedures, committee power, decision-making, community, rules, separation, parliament, games, Social Sciences, Political Science, Government & Law, CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTER, EUROPEAN-UNION, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES, COMMITTEE POWER, DECISION-MAKING, COMMUNITY, RULES, SEPARATION, PARLIAMENT, GAMES, 1606 Political Science, Political Science & Public Administration, 4408 Political science

Abstract:

Collective choice bodies throughout the world use a diverse array of codified rules that determine who may exercise procedural rights, and in what order. This paper analyzes several two-stage decision-making models, focusing on one in which the first-moving actor has a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo, i.e., to exercise gatekeeping. Normative analysis using Pareto-dominance criteria reveals that the institution of gatekeeping is inferior to another institutional arrangement within this framework-namely, one in which the same actor is given a traditional veto instead of a gatekeeping right. The analytical results raise an empirical puzzle: when and why would self-organizing collective choice bodies adopt gatekeeping institutions? A qualitative survey of governmental institutions suggests that-contrary to an entrenched modeling norm within political science-empirical instances of codified gatekeeping rights are rare or nonexistent.