Title: Topological manipulators form an ultrafilter
Authors: Lauwers, Luc # ×
Issue Date: Jun-2004
Publisher: Springer-verlag
Series Title: Social choice and welfare vol:22 issue:3 pages:437-445
Abstract: Consider the problem of aggregating preferences. A coalition is manipulative if it is able to force the outcome of the aggregation process. In the framework of topological aggregation (due to Chichilnisky) the family of manipulative coalitions constitutes an ultrafilter. This result holds for finite and for infinite populations, and supports the analogy between the Chichilnisky and the Arrovian aggregation model.
ISSN: 0176-1714
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Econometrics, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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