Title: Reputation as a mechanism alleviating opportunistic host government behavior against mnes
Authors: Veugelers, Reinhilde # ×
Issue Date: Mar-1993
Publisher: Blackwell publ ltd
Series Title: Journal of industrial economics vol:41 issue:1 pages:1-17
Abstract: The strategic options available to MNEs and host governments, when the first contemplate investment in the latter's country, are marked by the possibility that no entry eventually will take place as a response to opportunistic behavior on the part of the host government. This article examines under which circumstances and how in a dynamic world with asymmetric information, reputation building by the host government can credibly alleviate this opportunistic behavior, leaving a safer climate for MNE investment.
ISSN: 0022-1821
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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