Title: On the design of stable joint ventures
Authors: Veugelers, Reinhilde ×
Kesteloot, Katrien #
Issue Date: Dec-1994
Publisher: Elsevier science bv
Series Title: European economic review vol:38 issue:9 pages:1799-1815
Abstract: An analytical model is developed to study the problem of designing stable joint ventures aimed at jointly developing and supplying a new technology. The analysis focuses on the extent to which traditional motives for joint ventures like cost sharing, synergy effects or technological spillovers may shape the incentives for firms to cheat on the arrangement and hence despite larger cooperative benefits, endanger the formation of a stable agreement. The cheating firm, although supplying the contractually specified inputs to the venture, manages to keep its know-how proprietary while benefiting from the loyal partner's know-how through spillovers from the venture.
ISSN: 0014-2921
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Academic Centre for Nursing and Midwifery
Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), Leuven
Department of Public Health miscellaneous
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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