Title: On the structure of takeover models, and insider outsider conflicts in negotiated takeovers
Authors: Sercu, Piet ×
Van Hulle, Cynthia #
Issue Date: Apr-1995
Publisher: Elsevier science bv
Series Title: Journal of banking & finance vol:19 issue:1 pages:11-44
Abstract: We model a takeover game where the players can bid or bargain without the traditional exogenous constraints on the order, length, and number of alternating stages. In our ('European') setting, dominant shareholders can appoint and dismiss management, implying that we have an insider-outsider conflict rather than a management-shareholder agency problem and that the distribution of (sizeable) private benefits is a crucial issue. The bargaining solution determines the price even if no explicit negotiations are observed, while bargaining strength and scope for exclusion determine the type of takeover (pre-negotiated or not, discriminatory or not).
ISSN: 0378-4266
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center International Finance, Leuven
Research Center Finance, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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