Title: Localized competition, multimarket operation, and collusive behavior
Authors: Verboven, Frank # ×
Issue Date: May-1998
Publisher: Univ penn
Series Title: International economic review vol:39 issue:2 pages:371-398
Abstract: This paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly with localized competition. Private information about the rivals' past actions naturally arises from this market structure. The resulting communication problems imply that firms should adopt strategies with sufficiently lenient punishments. Infinite grim punishments are too severe for large discount factors. The standard stick-and-carrot punishments from the perfect public information model are too severe for all discount factors. Modified stick-and-carrot punishments can be used, although for a smaller range of discount factors than the standard stick-and-carrot punishments under public information.
ISSN: 0020-6598
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Econometrics, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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