Title: Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant
Authors: Rousseau, Sandra # ×
Issue Date: Aug-2007
Publisher: Springer
Series Title: Journal of regulatory economics vol:32 issue:1 pages:17-36
Abstract: Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the environmental agency for the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). We distinguish between three types of inspections and use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-random way. Even though the agency solves most environmental problems, it can increase compliance by using the deterrence effect of more stringent inspections and sanctions.
ISSN: 0922-680X
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center of Energy, Transport and Environment, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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