Title: Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence
Authors: Millet, Kobe ×
Dewitte, Siegfried #
Issue Date: Apr-2007
Publisher: Academic press inc elsevier science
Series Title: Journal of Research in Personality vol:41 issue:2 pages:316-326
Abstract: Unconditional altruism is an enduring puzzle for evolutionary approaches to social behavior. In this paper, we argue that costly signaling theory, a well-established framework in biology and economics, may be useful to shed light on the individual differences in human unconditional altruism. Based on costly signaling theory, we propose and show that unconditional altruistic behavior is related to general intelligence. The cost incurred by engaging in unconditional altruism is lower for highly intelligent people than for less intelligent people because they may expect to regain the drained resources. As a result, unconditional altruism can serve as an honest signal of intelligence. Our findings imply that distinguishing altruistic behavior from cooperative behavior in social psychological and economic theories of human behavior might be useful and that costly signaling theory may provide novel insights on various individual difference variables. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN: 0092-6566
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Centre for Marketing and Consumer Science, Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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