Title: Bonus-malus system or partial coverage to oppose moral hazard problems
Authors: Vandebroek, Martina # ×
Issue Date: Sep-1993
Series Title: Insurance: Mathematics & Economics vol:13 issue:1 pages:1-5
Abstract: The efficiency of bonus-malus systems and partial coverages in preventing moral hazard problems is analyzed by solving a stochastic dynamic programming model. By examining the resulting payoffs of both parties involved it is possible to compare insurance contracts in terms of the level of care they induce. It is shown that the principal reason for taking preventive actions is the partial coverage, the bonus and/or malus involved being far less decisive.
ISSN: 0167-6687
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Research Center for Operations Research and Business Statistics (ORSTAT), Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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