Title: Strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers
Authors: De Bondt, Raymond ×
Henriques, I #
Issue Date: Aug-1995
Publisher: Univ toronto press inc
Series Title: Canadian journal of economics-revue canadienne d economique vol:28 issue:3 pages:656-674
Abstract: This paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay-offs. A unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader/follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other, at most, is able to receive only small spillovers. The leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the large spillovers. Other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in research and development do not affect this outcome.
ISSN: 0008-4085
Publication status: published
KU Leuven publication type: IT
Appears in Collections:Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), Leuven
× corresponding author
# (joint) last author

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