

# 1 **China's future food demand and its implications for trade and** 2 **environment**

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27 **Abstract**

28 Satisfying China's food demand without harming the environment is one of the greatest  
29 sustainability challenges for the coming decades. Here we provide a comprehensive forward-  
30 looking assessment of the environmental impacts of China's growing demand on the country  
31 itself and on its trading partners. We find that the increasing food demand, especially for  
32 livestock products (+16%~+30% across all scenarios), would domestically require 3~12 Mha of  
33 additional pasture between 2020 and 2050, resulting -2%~+16% growth in agricultural  
34 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The projected 15%~24% reliance on agricultural imports in  
35 2050 would result in 90~175 Mha of agricultural land area and 88~226 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup> of GHG  
36 emissions virtually imported to China, which account for 26%~46% and 13%~32% of China's  
37 global environmental impacts, respectively. The distribution of the environmental impacts  
38 between China and the rest of world would substantially depend on development of trade  
39 openness. Thus, to limit the negative environmental impacts of its growing food consumption,  
40 besides domestic policies, China needs to also take responsibility in the development of  
41 sustainable international trade.

42

## 43 **Introduction**

44 China has undergone remarkable social and economic development over the past two decades  
45 to become the world's second largest economy. Over the same period, this successful  
46 development has led to a large increase in demand for food, especially for livestock products<sup>1,2</sup>.  
47 The import value of agricultural products has increased by 78% in constant USD<sup>3</sup> while domestic  
48 agricultural value increased by 36% from 2010 to 2018. For soybean products in particular, the  
49 reliance on imports increased from 46% to 83%; for ruminant meat from 2% to 17%, and for  
50 dairy products from 11% to 24%<sup>2</sup>. The increasing demand also presents a great challenge to  
51 achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)<sup>4</sup> in China and worldwide as the  
52 agricultural sector is a key contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (SDG13), air and  
53 water pollution (SDG3 & 6), and biodiversity loss (SDG15).

54 China's domestic crop production increased by 44% between 2000 and 2018. Cropland  
55 expansion (4.9 Mha)<sup>5</sup> contributed 7% of production increase, with the remaining 93% came from  
56 intensification. As a result, the use of nitrogen fertilizer in China today accounts for 32% of  
57 global fertilizer use. Similarly, livestock production also intensified with increased reliance on  
58 concentrate feeds<sup>2</sup>. China's agricultural production is now responsible for 13% of global GHG  
59 emissions<sup>2</sup>. Air and water pollution have reached 4.2 and 2.7 folds of sustainability thresholds<sup>6,7</sup>  
60 defined by PM2.5 and nitrogen discharge, largely due to the agriculture intensification. In  
61 addition, irrigation water use in China represents 13% of global water withdrawals, and the  
62 efficiency (48%) has a significant room for improvement compared to the levels in Europe and  
63 in North America (i.e., 55-71%)<sup>8,9</sup>.

64 Expanding imports are contributing to environmental pressure in exporting countries. Recent  
65 studies showed that displacement of resource use and environmental damage through  
66 international trade in the recent past represented a substantial share of the environmental impacts  
67 of domestic food production<sup>10-12</sup>. The contribution of China's food demand to the challenge of  
68 achieving sustainable development of China's trading partners has also been highlighted. For  
69 instance, 43% of deforestation emissions due to soybean cultivation in Brazil can be attributed to  
70 China's soybean imports in 2017<sup>13</sup>. Also GHG emissions embodied in ruminant products exports  
71 to China accounted for 17% of total New Zealand livestock emissions in 2010<sup>14</sup>.

72 China's food demand is projected to keep increasing in the coming decades with further  
73 increase in the reliance on food and feed imports<sup>15</sup>. It is therefore necessary to assess the impacts  
74 of such growing demand on China's domestic environment as well as the environment of its  
75 trading partners to inform sustainable development policies. However, current forward-looking  
76 assessments (see Supplementary Methods 1) either focused on local impacts only without  
77 considering global market spillovers<sup>14,16,17</sup>, covered only a part of the agricultural sector (e.g.,  
78 bioenergy demand and afforestation<sup>18,19</sup>), or assessed only one or two environmental  
79 dimensions<sup>20–22</sup>. Assessments of future trade patterns mostly present trade with a world pool  
80 market<sup>23,24</sup>, making it hard to track global environmental impacts. An integrated assessment  
81 simultaneously analyzing global agricultural markets and China's bilateral trade, land-use  
82 competition and associated environmental impacts in detail and presenting for China separately  
83 from other regions is still lacking.

84 Here we provide a comprehensive assessment of the global environmental impacts of China's  
85 future food demand by 2030, the milestone in the UN 2030 Agenda, and up to 2050. The  
86 environmental impacts are assessed domestically, and in terms of virtual environmental trade  
87 flows with China's economic partners, looking at four environmental impacts: the use of  
88 agricultural land (crop harvested area and pasture); GHG emissions from agriculture, forestry,  
89 and other land uses (AFOLU); the use of synthetic nitrogen fertilizer; and irrigation water use.  
90 We quantify these environmental impacts using the Global Biosphere Management Model  
91 (GLOBIOM, see [www.globiom.org](http://www.globiom.org)), an agricultural and forest sector model which has been  
92 extensively used for environmental sustainability analysis of the land based sectors over the last  
93 decade<sup>25–29</sup>. For this study, the representation of China's agricultural sector and environmental  
94 dynamics was enhanced in the model (see Methods and Supplementary Methods 2 for details).  
95 The future development assumed in the projections follows the Shared Socio-economic  
96 Pathways (SSP)<sup>30</sup>, middle-of-the-road scenario, representing a continuation of current socio-  
97 economic and technological trends (the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario). To cover the range  
98 of uncertainty in future developments, we also considered two additional socioeconomic  
99 scenarios – a Restricted development (RD) scenario and a High development (HD) scenario –  
100 and provided a comprehensive sensitivity analysis with respect to the role of individual scenario  
101 driver (see Methods for details). This work was conducted as part of the Food, Agriculture,

102 Biodiversity, Land, and Energy (FABLE) Consortium of country teams that develop integrated  
103 pathways towards sustainable land-use and food systems<sup>31</sup>.

## 104 **Results**

105 In this section, we first consider the respective contribution of domestic production and  
106 international trade to satisfying China's future food demand, then we explore the implications for  
107 domestic environment, and implications for the environment by major trading partners are  
108 assessed afterwards. This section concludes with a thorough analysis of the main drivers of the  
109 forward-looking scenarios and their sensitivity analysis.

### 110 **China's food demand increasingly relies on imports**

111 China's total demand for agricultural products, including food, feed, biofuel or other use, is  
112 projected to increase substantially by mid-century (Fig. 1a). This is reflected in a 13% increase in  
113 per-capita calorie demand in 2050 BAU scenario relative to 2010 and a 6% increase relative to  
114 2020 (Supplementary Figure 1). Per-capita demand for animal sourced calories is projected to  
115 increase three times as fast, by +45% compared to 2010 and +23% compared to 2020. Total  
116 demand for ruminant meat and dairy products is projected to almost double, reaching  
117 respectively 19 and 68 Mt in 2050. Pig and poultry products drive livestock demand increases,  
118 although the increase is projected to level off after 2040, because of a progressively saturated  
119 per-capita demand and a projected decrease in population. Nevertheless, they remain 30 Mt  
120 higher in 2050 compared to 2010. The increase in the demand for crop products (34%) is  
121 projected to be driven mainly by the additional feed requirements. In particular, the demand for  
122 oil crops is projected to expand twofold compared to 2010 and reach 200 Mt in 2050, however,  
123 the demand from 2010 to 2020 constituted the major portion (+57%) of the increase. The  
124 demand for cereals is projected to increase from 420 Mt in 2010 to 530 Mt in 2050, mainly  
125 driven by the increase of cereal feed demand (84%). In terms of other crops, the increase in  
126 demand is comparatively slow, only 9% higher than the 2010 level.

127 We project that the increasing demand would largely be satisfied by increasing domestic  
128 production (+25% for cereals, +33% for pig and poultry products, +62% for ruminant meat, and  
129 +38% for dairy products, see second row of Fig. 1a). However, the reliance on imports is also

130 projected to increase. The share of imports in total demand is projected to increase from 7% to  
131 20% for ruminant meat, from 12% to 20% for dairy products, and from 54% to 70% for oil crops  
132 (mostly soybean), between 2010 and 2050. Pig and poultry products rely little on imports, but  
133 significant imports of oil crops are required for feed. Currently, the pig farming industry in China  
134 is influenced by African Swine Fever, causing a 22% deviation from the statistics in 2020. We  
135 find that these temporary fluctuations will not have substantial impact on long term projections  
136 (see quantitative validation in Supplementary Methods 3 and Supplementary Figure 2-6).

137 The patterns of bilateral trade are projected to change in the future. As shown in Fig. 1b,  
138 China's imports of soybean products account for 35% of the global soybean trade with 45 Mt  
139 total imports in 2010, and major trade partners are Brazil and USA which each export similar  
140 amounts of soybean to China (18 Mt). In 2050, China is projected to account for 46% of global  
141 soybean trade, and the import quantity is projected to reach 126 Mt. But the bilateral trade  
142 pattern (53% import from Brazil and 37% import from USA) would differ from that in 2010,  
143 which is in line with current status. Imports of dairy products originate mainly from New  
144 Zealand (2.7 Mt or 40% of total import) and the European Union (1.0 Mt or 20% of total import)  
145 in 2010. By 2050, China is projected to import an additional 8.0 Mt of dairy products, and its  
146 share in global trade would increase from 13% to 20%. New Zealand remains the major dairy  
147 exporter accounting for 71% of China's dairy imports in 2050.

148

#### 149 **Environmental impacts of Chinese food demand**

150 In response to the projected increase in China's food demand between 2010 and 2050, the  
151 domestic and imported agricultural land is projected to expand by 25 and 63 Mha, respectively  
152 (Fig. 2a). Compared with our projections for 2020, the projected increase of imported  
153 agricultural land area (21 Mha) would also significantly higher than that brought into production  
154 domestically (6 Mha) until 2050. In 2050, agricultural imports are projected to represent 41 and  
155 77 Mha of crop harvested area and pasture, respectively (Supplementary Figure 9a). The increase  
156 in virtual crop harvested area imports between 2010 and 2050 is 15 Mha, while the domestic  
157 crop harvested area remains at the same level. The increase in imported crop harvested area is  
158 mainly due to soybean (77%), rapeseed (7.9%) and wheat (3.9%). For pasture, the increase in

159 virtually imported land is 49 Mha between 2010 and 2050, which is twice the domestic increase  
160 (26 Mha).

161 In 2050, the increase in domestic GHG emissions from agricultural production (104 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq  
162 yr<sup>-1</sup>, Fig. 2b), mostly from livestock sector, would be fully compensated by the carbon sink from  
163 China's ambitious afforestation programs (205 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup>, see Supplementary Figure 10 for  
164 detailed information on land transition patterns). This means that net domestic GHG emissions  
165 from the AFOLU sector in 2050 (628 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup>) would be lower than the levels in 2010  
166 (809 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup>). We also estimate that China will be responsible for 123 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup> of  
167 virtually imported GHG emissions in 2050. A total of 86% of these trade-embedded emissions  
168 would be due to the imports of livestock products. Imports of ruminant meat, dairy, and oil  
169 products would create 85, 18, and 12 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup> of direct GHG emissions, respectively.  
170 Agricultural imports would also lead to large emissions from deforestation globally (23 Mt  
171 CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup> in 2050, see Supplementary Figure 11). As the demand for imports levels off after  
172 2030, deforestation in exporting regions decreases and the changes in deforestation emissions  
173 embodied in trade to China become negative by 2050. It is worth noting that GHG emissions  
174 related to China's afforestation programs are included in total AFOLU sector emissions for  
175 completeness. However, for consistency, they should not be included when comparing with  
176 imported effects for consistency, because for imported land-use change emissions, only  
177 deforestation emissions were considered.

178 Increased domestic production requires more inputs and resources: we project a 17% increase  
179 in nitrogen fertilizer use and additional 25 km<sup>3</sup> of irrigation water use in the peak period (2030)  
180 in China (Fig. 2c and 2d). Because China's major import crop, soybean, does not require much  
181 nitrogen and irrigation, the virtually imported fertilizer N and water from trade partners would be  
182 less than 9.0% of overall consumption (Supplementary Figure 9c and 9d), but still higher than  
183 the present level.

184

185 **Environmental challenges for China's main trade partners**

186 Most of China's virtual crop-related trade impact (crop harvested area, nitrogen fertilizer, and  
187 water use) occurs in a few countries with large agricultural sectors, mainly Brazil, the United  
188 States and Canada (Fig. 3). Oil crops are highly traded. For instance, China is projected to import  
189 66 Mt of soybean from Brazil in 2050, which would account for 40% of Brazil's soybean  
190 production, occupying 16 Mha of crop area, and using 0.7 Mt nitrogen fertilizer. Virtual water  
191 trade occurs mainly with the USA, where irrigation is widely used to produce cereals and  
192 oilseeds. Not only crop products, but also crops embodied as feed in livestock product exports to  
193 China, represent additional environmental pressure. In New Zealand, 15% of nitrogen use, and  
194 irrigation water use can be attributed to feed use for livestock products exported to China.

195 The intensity of trade in terms of embodied pasture area depends on the prevalent livestock  
196 production system<sup>32</sup>. For example, Australia is projected to export 0.3 Mt of bovine meat to  
197 China, which would occupy 14 Mha of pasture in 2050. In comparison, the USA export even  
198 higher amount of bovine meat to China (0.5 Mt) but at the expense of 4.0 Mha of pasture in 2050.  
199 Because the intensive grain-based ruminant systems are dominant in the USA and pasture  
200 productivity there is higher than in Australia. With respect to the imports of total virtual GHG  
201 emissions, Brazil, New Zealand, and Australia carry the main burden, with 30, 21 and 20 Mt  
202 CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup>, respectively. Bovine meat export accounts for 77% of virtual trade in GHG  
203 emissions from Brazil to China. For Australia, 5.7 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup> from deforestation emissions  
204 and 10 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup> from ruminant production can be allocated to exports to China. Although  
205 the virtual trade in GHG emissions is highest in Brazil, it represents only 8% of the Brazil's total  
206 AFOLU emissions. In the case of New Zealand, GHG emissions embodied in exports to China,  
207 all due to ruminant products, would account for 33% of the country's total AFOLU emissions in  
208 2050.

209

210 **Alternative futures**

211 Two alternative socioeconomic scenarios, RD (Restricted development) and HD (High  
212 development), and their decomposition by individual driver (e.g., population, GDP, diet,  
213 productivity, trade), provide insights into the robustness of the BAU results in the context of a



214 wide range of alternative plausible futures and to explain the role of each driver. Domestic  
215 impacts are less sensitive to the different scenario assumptions than the trade mediated impacts  
216 (Supplementary Figure 13). The imported impacts in both scenarios differ considerably in  
217 comparison with that of the BAU in terms of agricultural land and GHG emissions (Fig. 4a), but  
218 they represent still substantial impacts on the rest of world. In the RD scenario, the share of  
219 imported land and GHG emissions in China's global environmental impacts reach 26% and 15%,  
220 respectively, and in the HD scenario those numbers could reach 46% and 31%, respectively.  
221 With respect to nitrogen fertilizer and water use, the imported impacts account for less than 10%  
222 of global impacts, except for the HD scenario (around 15% of imported share).

223 Openness of trade is the key determinant to the differences in virtual trade flows, in particular  
224 for agricultural land (Fig. 4b). The total China related agricultural land area is +32% higher in  
225 the HD TRADE scenario and -20% lower in the RD TRADE scenario compared with the BAU  
226 projections. This difference is mostly due to the imported impacts, for example, virtual  
227 agricultural land area import in 2050 HD TRADE scenario reaches 288 Mha, which is more than  
228 twice the BAU value (132 Mha), whereas restricted trade increases the domestic environmental  
229 challenges in China (Supplementary Figure 14). HD TRADE assumption would lead to a  
230 decrease in GHG emissions mainly because of increasing imports from low GHG intensity  
231 regions compared to China (e.g., EU and USA, see Supplementary Table 2). Environmental  
232 impacts are also sensitive to changes in GDP and population growth that varies food  
233 consumption. For GDP growth, RD and HD scenarios differ with the BAU projection on GHG  
234 emissions by -5% and +11%, respectively. Population change has an opposite effect, resulting in  
235 a difference in emissions with the BAU (+4% and -3%). Shifting diets to more livestock  
236 consumption (HD DIET) leads to +7% more agricultural land and GHG emissions and +3%  
237 more of fertilizer N use. An increase in food waste would also increase 3% fertilizer N and water  
238 use as shown in the RD DIET scenario. The impact of changes in productivity (YILD and FEEF)  
239 are less pronounced.

240 As the assessment has been conducted in a global context, understanding the effects from  
241 variations in the socio-economic development trajectory in China in comparison to the ROW is  
242 also important (See Methods). We find that the assumptions on drivers for China dominate the  
243 environmental effects. Thus, changes in the driver assumptions for China only (Supplementary

244 Figure 15a) result in similar environmental effects in comparison to applying them globally (Fig.  
245 4b). Driver changes in the ROW only (i.e., keep the drives for China same as the BAU) have  
246 much less influence on China's global environmental impacts ( $\pm 3.2\%$  in Supplementary Figure  
247 15b).

248

## 249 **Discussion**

250 Our study, based on a well-established global model with thorough validation for China and its  
251 bilateral trade flows, provides a medium to long-term perspective on the potential global  
252 environmental impacts of China's increasing food demand. The results have far reaching  
253 implications for China's policies related to food demand, production systems and environmental  
254 and resources management, as well as international trade.

255 **There is potential to reduce meat consumption.** China's per-capita calorie consumption is  
256 projected to increase from 2974 kcal in 2010 to 3376 kcal/day in 2050, where livestock products  
257 share increases from 19% to 22%. The projected increase in demand compares well with  
258 projections in other studies (Supplementary Table 3). The increasing consumption of ruminant  
259 products would require 224 Mha pasture area (59% domestically) and 514 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup> GHG  
260 emission (80% domestically) in 2050. A 10% increase in livestock consumption would result in  
261 7% more land and GHG impacts (Supplementary Figure 16). Therefore, a shift to less meat  
262 intensive but more diversified diet with healthy food and a low environmental footprint, such as  
263 insects, seaweed and plant based protein substitutes, would bring essential nutrients and reduce  
264 the costs for environment<sup>33-35</sup>. Meanwhile, malnourishment needs to be taken into account.  
265 However, changing diets may be a challenge for emerging markets, especially for consumers in  
266 China, as currently there is a lack of awareness of the link between meat consumption, health and  
267 environmental sustainability<sup>36</sup>. China has recently reiterated, through the voice of its president Xi,  
268 its commitment to drastically reduce food waste, which would bring environmental benefits from  
269 the consumer side.

270 **Sustainable livestock production is imperative.** Integrated, long-term, and large-scale  
271 investments have been made in sustainability programs in China, which have had a considerable

272 positive impact on the promotion of cropland quality, grassland ecological protection and  
273 biodiversity conservation<sup>37</sup>. However, the livestock production with high environmental  
274 intensities dominates future sustainability outcomes (Supplementary Figure 9), and it might  
275 require stronger policy interventions. In 2050, 50 Mha of harvested crop area in China is  
276 projected to produce feed for highly productive livestock systems (Supplementary Figure 17). In  
277 addition to the local feed produced in China, domestic livestock production relies heavily on  
278 imported feed crops contributing to environmental degradation and GHG emissions also  
279 domestically. For instance, the large amount of imported feeds results in additional manure that  
280 could become a source of pollutants because of the disconnection between animal and crop  
281 production<sup>38</sup>. Developing marginal land to produce feed and reconnecting livestock production  
282 with land should represent a priority.

283 Our projected livestock production allocation within China follows the current patterns and  
284 thus does not have substantial impact on the future country-level environmental outcomes. But in  
285 reality, because of the heterogeneity of China, spatial allocation may have a substantial effect  
286 which can lead to divergent environmental impacts<sup>39</sup>. Careful spatial planning is therefore  
287 necessary to exploit the environmental efficiency potentials to facilitate sustainable development.  
288 Increasing ruminant productivity, is another promising way for reducing environmental pressure,  
289 since China still has large productivity gaps compared to developed countries (Supplementary  
290 Figure 18). We also find that assumptions about livestock feed efficiency change in the ROW  
291 have an important impact on the agricultural land and GHG emissions footprint of Chinese  
292 consumption (FEEF in Supplementary Figure 15b). China could thus reduce its footprint also by  
293 promoting productivity improvement in its trading partners.

294 **Sourcing agricultural imports sustainably.** Imported environmental impacts vary  
295 considerably not only depending on the openness of trade but also depending on the country of  
296 origin. For instance, milk related GHG emissions intensity of the EU is 0.9 kg CO<sub>2</sub>eq per kg of  
297 product, whereas in New Zealand it is 1.4 kg CO<sub>2</sub>eq per kg (Supplementary Table 2), as shown  
298 also by other studies<sup>40</sup>. Our results show that increasing openness of trade (HD TRADE scenario)  
299 without accompanying measures can lead to both positive as well as negative impacts on the  
300 environment. Higher dairy imports from EU and bovine meat from USA would lead to less GHG  
301 emissions relative to BAU scenario, however this scenario would also lead to increased beef

302 imports from Latin American countries where land footprints are high (Supplementary  
303 Discussion 2). Also the past ban on soybean imports from the US raised concerns about potential  
304 substitution with imports from Brazil and the related impacts on deforestation in the Amazon<sup>41</sup>.  
305 The environmental considerations need to be taken into account next to economic efficiency and  
306 political sensitivities when designing China's trade policies to avoid unintended environmental  
307 consequences.

308 It is also recognized that even within an exporting country, supply chains may widely differ in  
309 their environmental impacts<sup>42</sup>. The environmental performance of specific supply chains is  
310 promoted, among others, by certification schemes such as "Zero Deforestation" beef<sup>43</sup> or  
311 "Fairtrade" labelling<sup>44</sup>. However, the effectiveness of these measures is limited if non-certified  
312 production still finds abundant markets. China, as one of the biggest importers, can play a key  
313 role in promoting adoption of environmentally friendly production systems in exporting  
314 countries by favoring imports of products from certified supply chains and, in general, by  
315 enforcing respect of ambitious environmental standards by its trading partners.

316 In summary, our results show that satisfying China's food demand while achieving  
317 environmental sustainability domestically and in exporting regions is likely one of the biggest  
318 challenges of the coming decades. Carefully designed policies across the whole of China's food  
319 system, including consumers, producers, and international trade, are necessary to ensure that  
320 future demand can be satisfied without destroying the environment. Design of such policies will  
321 require models with high spatial resolution recognizing the heterogeneity of production  
322 conditions as well as environmental impacts in a country of the size of China. Although the role  
323 of international trade is a buffer to shocks on the domestic market, in addition to satisfying part  
324 of food demand as a stable source, potential consequences of global short-term events will need  
325 to be considered. These important aspects would however go beyond the scope of our study.

326

## 327 **Methods**

328 This section presents the integrated modelling approach adopted, model developments for  
329 enhanced representation of China, and model validation. Then the scenario design and the  
330 methodology used for sensitivity analysis are introduced. Virtual trade flows calculation is  
331 finally described.

332 **Modeling approach.** The quantitative analysis presented in our study relied on the Global  
333 Biosphere Management Model (GLOBIOM), a bottom-up partial equilibrium economic model  
334 designed to represent the key land use sectors, including crops, livestock, forestry, and bioenergy.  
335 GLOBIOM is extensively used for assessment of environmental impacts related to agriculture,  
336 such as sustainable water use<sup>27</sup>, GHG emissions<sup>29</sup>, land use change and related biodiversity  
337 impacts<sup>45</sup>. The model is particularly suitable for forward-looking assessment of environmental  
338 impacts embodied in trade because of its bilateral trade representation<sup>28</sup>. Finally, the model is  
339 flexible enough to allow for a detailed representation of a region of interest, in this case China,  
340 while still keeping it embodied in the global modeling framework<sup>46</sup>.

341 The spatial resolution of the supply side relies on simulation units, which are aggregated from  
342 5 to 30 arcmin pixels belonging to the same altitude, slope, and soil class and the same country.  
343 For the purpose of this study, they were further aggregated to 2 degrees. Commodity markets and  
344 international trade are represented for 37 economic regions in this study. Endogenous  
345 adjustments in market prices lead to balance between supply, demand and trade for each product  
346 and region. The market equilibrium is found through maximization of the sum of consumer and  
347 producer surpluses under constraints, such as land and water use balances. The model is solved  
348 with recursive dynamics in 10-year time steps. Main exogenous drivers of forward-looking  
349 scenarios in GLOBIOM are population and economic growth, technological change, dietary  
350 preferences, and bioenergy demand. Main endogenous variables are market variables, incl.  
351 demand, supply, trade, and prices, and environmental variables. such as land and water use,  
352 GHG emissions and sinks, nutrient balances.

353 Data on agricultural regional market variables including demand and production are for the  
354 base year harmonized with FAOSTAT (<http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/>). The spatially explicit

355 land use allocation is initialized for 2000 with GLC2000<sup>47</sup>. The spatially explicit productivity of  
356 crops, grasslands, forests, and short-rotation tree plantations is estimated together with related  
357 environmental parameters (GHG budgets, nutrient and water balance) at the level of the  
358 simulation units. For crops, yields under different management systems are calculated with the  
359 biophysical Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model<sup>48,49</sup>. For forest parameters,  
360 GLOBIOM relies on the outputs of a dynamic forest management model, the Global Forest  
361 Model (G4M)<sup>50</sup>. Grassland productivity is obtained by combining results from EPIC and  
362 CENTURY<sup>25,51</sup>. Livestock production systems are parameterized with the global database  
363 developed in Herrero et al<sup>52</sup>. A detailed overview of data sources for the environmental  
364 indicators used in this study is presented in Supplementary Methods 4.

365 GLOBIOM represents international trade through net bilateral trade flows, which allow only  
366 one direction of trade flow between two regions. To simulate trade, GLOBIOM uses the Enke–  
367 Samuelson–Takayama–Judge spatial equilibrium approach, assuming homogeneous goods  
368 (imported and domestic products are the same)<sup>53</sup>. Thereby, GLOBIOM represents international  
369 trade through net bilateral trade flows, which allows only one direction of trade flow between  
370 two regions. And region will only import if its domestic price is greater than the price in the  
371 exporting country plus the cost of trade. In equilibrium, the difference in price between the  
372 importer and exporter equals the cost of trade. Compared with other trade assumptions (e.g.,  
373 Armington, trade can occur in both directions and gross trade is represented), this trade  
374 specification allows for new trade flow creation (no observation in the base year) in response to  
375 future prices changes. As China is the largest importer for agricultural products and many  
376 countries strengthen cooperation in promoting trade with China, this approach is more  
377 appropriate for this study. Data on bilateral trade in the base year are from the BACI database<sup>54</sup>,  
378 and data on tariffs between different countries and commodities are from the MAcMap-HS6  
379 database<sup>55</sup>. Additional information about the model can be found on [www.globiom.org](http://www.globiom.org).

380 **GLOBIOM-China.** For this study, we modified the core GLOBIOM model to improve  
381 representation of China. To better capture the recent and future trends in Chinese agriculture, we  
382 included mechanisms mimicking relevant policies in place. One of the key drivers of the land use  
383 in China is afforestation policies initiated in the 1990s. They already led to afforestation of 53  
384 Mha at the cost of cropland, pasture and other land (i.e., unmanaged grass/shrubland, non-

385 /sparsely vegetation). Considering Chinese consumers' preference for monogastric products and  
 386 important structural changes in the sector, we calibrated the shift from smallholder to industrial  
 387 systems for pig and poultry production. Fertilizer use efficiency development was calibrated to  
 388 represent the “zero chemical fertilizer growth by 2020” policy. We also enforced the self-  
 389 sufficiency in three major cereal crops of 95% under the baseline scenario in line with the current  
 390 trade policies. Supplementary Methods 2 and Supplementary Table 4 present the model  
 391 improvements in further detail.

392 **Model calibration and validation.** A careful model calibration was performed for the period  
 393 2000–2020. FAOSTAT data and Chinese national statistical data until 2019/2020, as well as the  
 394 OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook projections for China until 2029 ([http://www.agri-  
 outlook.org/data](http://www.agri-<br/>
  395 outlook.org/data)) were then used to validate the model behavior (Supplementary Figure 2-7).  
 396 The validation focused on the following key variables - crop yield, crop area, per capita food  
 397 consumption, total demand, production, and trade. The performance of the model for the very  
 398 recent past has been quantitatively documented in Supplementary Methods 3. We also provide  
 399 the interpretation of mismatches caused by recent pandemic outbreaks.

400 Bilateral trade calibration is of vital importance for this study. In GLOBIOM, future trade  
 401 flows are determined by commodity prices, trade costs. Trade costs include tariffs, transport  
 402 costs, and a nonlinear trade expansion cost that reflect persistency in trade patterns. Tariffs and  
 403 transport costs are kept same as base year. The trade expansion costs are used in GLOBIOM to  
 404 represent the capacity constraints slowing down expansion of trade flows in the short term. They  
 405 can be regarded as investments necessary to expand trading infrastructure. GLOBIOM allows for  
 406 appearance of new trade flows, which were not observed in the base year. Exponential function  
 407 represents the trade cost (1) when trade flows are observed in the base year, for new trade flows  
 408 a quadratic trade cost function (2) is used:

$$Trade\ cost_t = \frac{\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon} \times \frac{Tariff + Transport\ cost}{Shipment_{t-1}^{1/\varepsilon}} \times Shipment_t^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon} + 1} \quad (1)$$

$$Trade\ cost_t = Intercept \times Shipment_t + 0.5 \times slope \times Shipment_t^2 \quad (2)$$

409 Trade costs in period  $t$  are calculated with  $\varepsilon$  and  $slope$  reflecting the elasticity of trade costs to  
 410 traded quantity in the respective equations. The intercept is equal to either the tariff plus

411 transport cost The bilateral trade flows between China and other countries until 2020 were  
412 calibrated to match the recent FAO trade matrix statistics<sup>2</sup> by manipulating the elasticities and  
413 slopes in the trade cost equations. The bilateral trade validation of major commodities is shown  
414 in Supplementary Figure 7. Calibration work also benefited from feedback by seven country  
415 teams of the FABLE Consortium.

416 **Scenario design.** The aim of this study is to provide medium to long-term ex-ante assessment  
417 of a global business-as-usual scenario aligned with current socio-economic trends. We  
418 complemented this scenario with two variants with contrasted assumptions on future drivers and  
419 decompose those drivers to explore the range of results uncertainty. Development of such  
420 scenarios at the global level, with consistency across all sectors and regions, is a non-trivial task.  
421 Therefore, we decided to rely on the well-established framework of the Shared Socioeconomic  
422 Pathways (SSPs) which provide a set of narratives and quantified drivers designed to analyze  
423 global trajectories of future development<sup>30</sup>. These pathways represent the backbone of the  
424 climate related scenario analysis within IPCC<sup>56</sup> and have recently been used also for forward-  
425 looking biodiversity assessment in the context of IPBES<sup>57</sup>. We acknowledge that some outbreaks  
426 (like the US-China trade war in 2018, or COVID-19) may cause shocks and obstruct  
427 development of trade. However, in general these shocks are short-term disruptions<sup>58</sup>, and our  
428 scenarios can cover these large uncertainties.

429 A business-as-usual scenario (BAU) following SSP2<sup>59</sup> that mostly continues recent trends in  
430 consumption and technological developments was used as baseline in this study. The two  
431 alternative scenarios including (1) the Restricted development (RD) scenario following SSP3  
432 assumption<sup>60</sup> where the population in China increases faster, and growth in the GDP is slower,  
433 which leads to lower total food demand, in particular for lower demand for livestock products  
434 compared to BAU. In this scenario, international trade becomes more restricted and fragmented,  
435 reflecting lower international cooperation. And (2) the High development (HD) scenario follows  
436 SSP5 assumption<sup>61</sup> and orients toward high economic growth but limited resource efficiency,  
437 leading to inclusive development but at the expense of the environment. International trade  
438 expands rapidly in globalized markets in this scenario. All these scenarios make the assumption  
439 of a diverse development trajectory of different regions following their economic growth in per



440 capita (see <https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb>), which are primary drivers for diet shifts and  
441 agricultural productivity changes.

442 As the food demand patterns has been aggregated at country level, income per capita drives  
443 changes in food diets<sup>62</sup>. Food prices are also important drivers for food consumption patterns  
444 changes, and are determined by demand price elasticities of food products<sup>63</sup>. The crop yield  
445 trends are estimated based on estimation of correlation between yield and scenario-specific GDP  
446 growth assumed in the SSPs<sup>64</sup>. In addition, re-allocation of cropland and shift of crop systems  
447 endogenously modelled also affect crop yield. For livestock systems, technical change is applied  
448 through exogenous assumption on feed conversion efficiencies estimated based on historical  
449 trends for the BAU scenario and differentiated for the alternative scenarios based on the average  
450 projected crop yield growth<sup>65,66</sup>. Trade assumption is one of the key differences among scenarios.  
451 Elasticity or slope of trade costs are varied depending on whether trade flow is observed in the  
452 base year or not. The trade liberalization or restrictiveness<sup>28</sup> across scenarios reflecting  
453 infrastructure, non-tariff trade barriers and regional factors changes determine elasticities (slopes)  
454 are multiplied or divided by 10. More information on GLOBIOM trade specification can be  
455 found in Janssens et al.<sup>28</sup>. The values of key scenario drivers for China are provided in  
456 Supplementary Table 5 and detailed description of alternative results can be found in  
457 Supplementary Discussion 1.

458 Considering that our assumptions of future changes (i.e., BAU, RD, HD scenarios) are based  
459 on a set of drivers (demographic and economic development, dietary preferences, agricultural  
460 productivity growth, and international trade policies), we conducted a sensitivity analysis in  
461 which the impact of individual elements in the RD and HD scenarios is decomposed following  
462 the approach by Stehfest et al.<sup>67</sup>. The decomposition was implemented at the (1) global level, (2)  
463 rest of the world (ROW) and (3) China level only. This makes it possible to assess the individual  
464 impact of the above-mentioned. Demographic development (population, POP) mainly affects  
465 future demand volumes adjusted by price effects. Economic development (gross domestic  
466 production, GDP) affects income and associated food demand. Dietary preference (DIET)  
467 presents differences in dietary patterns between scenarios. Regarding to this dimension, diet  
468 shifts and food waste are both included. Crop productivity (YILD) is characterized by a different  
469 speed of technological changes. Livestock feeds conversion efficiency (FEEF), is another key

470 component on the supply side, determining future livestock productivity. Trade development  
 471 (TRADE) represents the level of integration among global regions. The detailed results of the  
 472 sensitivity analysis are presented in Supplementary Discussion 1 and Supplementary Figure 14-  
 473 16.

474 **Calculating virtual trade flows in environmental impacts.** Virtual trade flows refer to  
 475 resources or pollution embodied in international trade. We focus our analysis about four  
 476 environmental aspects (land, GHG, irrigation water, and nitrogen) on seven major trading  
 477 partners of China: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the  
 478 European Union, which account for more than 80% of the value of China agricultural imports  
 479 (Supplementary Table 6). With respect to China trade flows, we also calculated the export effects  
 480 (Supplementary Table 7), however, due to the imports dominate the overall trade pattern of  
 481 China, we allocated the export impacts into domestic production side. To calculate trade impact,  
 482 we assume the same environmental intensity of products for domestic consumption and for  
 483 export in a country. This is the assumption commonly used in many previous studies on virtual  
 484 trade in water<sup>68</sup>, land<sup>69</sup>, GHG<sup>10</sup> and nitrogen<sup>70</sup>. The environmental intensity in a resource for a  
 485 specific product  $P$  in exporting regions  $R$  and specific year  $T$  is defined as:

$$Virtual\_area_{R,P,T} = BilateralT_{R,P,T} \times Land\_intensity_{R,P,T} = BilateralT_{R,P,T} \times \frac{AREA_{R,P,T}}{PROD_{R,P,T}} \quad (3)$$

$$Virtual\_N_{R,P,T} = BilateralT_{R,P,T} \times N\_intensity_{R,P,T} = BilateralT_{R,P,T} \times \frac{N_{input}_{R,P,T}}{PROD_{R,P,T}} \quad (4)$$

$$Virtual\_water_{R,P,T} = BilateralT_{R,P,T} \times Water\_intensity_{R,P,T} = BilateralT_{R,P,T} \times \frac{Water_{R,P,T}}{PROD_{R,P,T}} \quad (5)$$

$$Virtual\_Agri\_GHG_{R,P,T} = BilateralT_{R,P,T} \times Agri\_GHG\_intensity_{R,P,T} = BilateralT_{R,P,T} \times \frac{Agri\_GHG_{R,P,T}}{PROD_{R,P,T}} \quad (6)$$

486 Where  $BilateralT_{R,P,T}$  is the net bilateral trade quantity (Mt) of product  $P$  exported to China  
 487 from region  $R$  in year  $T$ .  $PROD_{R,P,T}$  is total production (Mt) of product  $P$  of exporting region  $R$   
 488 in year in the year  $T$ .  $AREA_{R,P,T}$  is total harvested area (Mha) of product  $P$  in exporting region  $R$ .

489 Virtual nitrogen (N) and water calculations follow the same logic - see Equation 4 and 5 -  
 490 where  $N_{input_{R,P,T}}$  represents synthetic fertilizer use (Mt), and  $Water_{R,P,T}$  represents irrigation  
 491 water use (km<sup>3</sup>) for product  $P$  of exporting region  $R$  in year  $T$ . For nitrogen and irrigation water,  
 492 we used crop-specific resource intensity informed by EPIC model calculations.

493 Equation 6 was used to calculate virtual agricultural related GHG emissions (Mt CO<sub>2</sub> eq yr<sup>-1</sup>).  
 494 Fertilizer nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O) emissions and methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) from rice paddies were considered  
 495 as direct crop related GHG emissions. N<sub>2</sub>O was calculated based on N fertilizer consumption and  
 496 IPCC emission coefficients<sup>71</sup> while rice CH<sub>4</sub> based on FAOSTAT average emission factors  
 497 (<http://www.fao.org/fao-stat/en/#data/GR>). For livestock products, we used emissions intensity  
 498 parameters for CH<sub>4</sub> from enteric fermentation, and CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O from manure management,  
 499 manure dropped on pastures, rangelands and paddocks, and from the global livestock production  
 500 systems database<sup>52</sup>.

501 To calculate emissions from deforestation, we rely on a top-down indirect allocation  
 502 approach<sup>72</sup>. We first determined forest losses in exporting regions based on the G4M model  
 503 calculations<sup>50</sup>, and then attributed the deforestation attributable to cropland and pasture  
 504 expansion based on Curtis et al.<sup>73</sup>. Then we allocated the cropland deforestation emissions to  
 505 individual crops based on their contribution to the total cropland area expansion. The pasture  
 506 related deforestation was distributed between ruminant products based on the pasture area  
 507 necessary to cover the grass feed requirements of each livestock production system. Finally, we  
 508 calculated the share of China's virtual land import within the total area of each agricultural  
 509 product. The deforestation emissions related to crop or pasture expansion are then calculated  
 510 based on the following equations:

$$Virtual\_deforemission_{R,T} = Deforemis\_crop_{R,T} \times \frac{\Delta Crop\_area_{R,P,T}}{\sum_{P=1}^P \Delta Crop\_area_{R,P,T}} \times \frac{Virtual\_Crop\_area_{R,P,T}}{Crop\_area_{R,P,T}}$$

,  $\forall \Delta Crop\_area_{R,P,T} > 0$  (7)

$$Virtual\_deforemission_{R,T} = Deforemis\_live_{R,T} \times \frac{\Delta Pasture_{R,P,T}}{\sum_{P=1}^P \Delta Pasture_{R,P,T}} \times \frac{Virtual\_Pasture_{R,P,T}}{Pasture_{R,P,T}}$$

,  $\forall \Delta Pasture_{R,P,T} > 0$  (8)

511 where  $Deforemis\_crop_{R,T}$  and  $Deforemis\_live_{R,T}$  are deforestation emissions (Mt CO<sub>2</sub> eq  
512 yr<sup>-1</sup>) caused by cropland and pasture expansion in region  $R$  and year  $T$ , respectively; only the  
513 expanded area is accounted for in  $\Delta Crop\_area_{R,P,T}$ ;  $\frac{Virtual\_Crop\_area_{R,P,T}}{Crop\_area_{R,P,T}}$  indicates the virtual  
514 crop area embodied in trade, which is presented in equation (3) and divided by  $Crop\_area_{R,P,T}$ ,  
515 to calculate the share of virtual land import. Similarly, deforestation caused by virtual pasture  
516 trade can be derived from equation (8).

517 Environmental impacts due to feed production are included in the virtual trade flows related to  
518 livestock products. For this purpose, we used the specific feed requirements of the regional  
519 livestock production specific feed requirements from Herrero et al<sup>52</sup>. We calculated the total feed  
520 use and the related domestic environmental impacts for different livestock products and the  
521 related domestic environmental impacts and allocated them proportionally based on the  
522 quantities of the bilateral trade to the environmental impacts imported by China. For feed crops  
523 embodied in the trade of livestock products, we took into account only locally produced feed.  
524 This may lead to minor underestimation of the global impact of China's imports, but this should  
525 remain minor as many livestock products exporters to China are not major feed crop importers.

## 526 **Data availability**

527 The main data supporting the results of this study can be found in Supplementary Information  
528 and other relevant data are available in the IIASA DARE repository (<https://dare.iiasa.ac.at/126/>).

## 529 **Code availability**

530 The authors declare that the code used to present the results in this study is available from the  
531 corresponding author upon request.

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## 543 **Author contributions**

544 H.Z., P.H. and L.M. designed the study. H.Z., J.C., P.H., M.v.D. and H.V. contributed the data  
545 analysis. H.Z., J.C. and P.H. wrote the manuscript with contributions from H.V. and C.J. All  
546 authors contributed to the interpretation of the results and commented on the manuscript.

## 547 **Competing interests**

548 The authors declare no competing interests.

## 549 **Figure captions:**

550

551 Fig. 1. Trends in demand, production, and trade of agricultural products in China under the BAU  
552 scenario. (a), Demand and production patterns. The demand is further decomposed into food,  
553 feed, and biofuel/other use (the first row), while the second row represents domestic production  
554 of agricultural products. The dots show the historical data from FAOSTAT<sup>2</sup> averaged for the  
555 period 2009–2011 for 2010, and the most recent data for 2020 from OECD-FAO Agricultural  
556 Outlook<sup>74</sup>. And error bars represent the ranges of RD and HD results. Detailed results for  
557 individual product categories see Supplementary Table 1. (b), The plots on the left show the  
558 trends of net import quantity for dairy and soybean products (See Supplementary Figure 7 and 8  
559 for more commodities and scenarios). The circular plots in the center and on the right represent  
560 the bilateral trade between China and its major partners in 2010 and 2050, respectively. Each  
561 arrow represents the volume of products coming from the exporting region to the importing  
562 region and has the same color as the exporting region.

563

564 Fig. 2. Projected changes in the domestic and imported environmental impacts between 2010 and  
565 2030/2050 for agricultural land (crop harvested area and pasture) (a), GHG emissions (b),  
566 nitrogen fertilizer use (c), and irrigation water use (d). The stacked bars represent the  
567 decomposed effects by different agricultural products from the BAU scenario, and the markers  
568 represent the total effects from the three scenarios (BAU, RD and HD). Detailed environmental  
569 impacts from the two alternatives scenarios (RD and HD) can be found in Supplementary Figure  
570 11-13 and Supplementary Discussion 1. For imported land-use change emissions, only  
571 deforestation emissions were considered. See Methods for further details on the calculation of  
572 the virtual trade flows.

573

574 Fig. 3. Virtual trade flows of environmental impacts due to China's agricultural imports in terms  
575 of the agricultural land (crop harvested area and pasture) (a), GHG emissions (b), nitrogen  
576 fertilizer use (c), and irrigation water use (d) for the major trading partners and the rest of the  
577 world (ROW). The impacts are for 2050 under the BAU scenario. The environmental impacts in  
578 the exporting regions are shown on the left, and the sources of environmental impacts by  
579 commodity are shown on the right. The numbers in the brackets represent the impacts due to the  
580 exports to China as a share of the total environmental impacts of domestic production in the  
581 exporting regions. For example, virtual agricultural area imports by China from Argentina  
582 account for 9.3% of Argentina's total agricultural area use.

583

584 Fig. 4. Comparison of the global environmental impacts of China's food demand under different  
585 scenarios by 2050. (a), Environmental impacts in terms of agricultural land (crop harvested area  
586 and pasture), GHG emissions, nitrogen use, and irrigation water use in the BAU and two  
587 alternative scenarios (RD and HD). (b) The sensitivity of global environmental impacts to  
588 changes in six key drivers. The sensitivity is presented as the relative change of environmental  
589 impacts compared to the BAU level due to the changes in the individual key drivers  
590 implemented globally. The six key drivers are population (POP), economic development  
591 (expressed as GDP), consumption preference (DIET), crop productivity growth (YILD),  
592 livestock productivity growth (FEEF), and the level of trade integration (TRADE). See Methods  
593 section "Scenario design" for details on the implementation of the sensitivity tests.

594

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

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






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Trade partners

Trade commodities

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