BOOK DISCUSSION

The Exclusion of Chinese Philosophy: “Ten Don’ts,” “Three Represents,” and “Eight Musts”

Carine Defoort

Sinology Research Unit, KU Leuven
marchal@nccu.edu.tw

Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought. By Eric S. Nelson. London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

The legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is a thorny topic that has returned in waves during the last decades. The high tides were 2003 and 2016.¹ While the topic can and has been discussed from a wide variety of points of view, most debates focus on the Chinese side: either on the nature and quality of early Chinese master texts (e.g., “Do they fit the demands of philosophy?”) or on current research at Chinese philosophy departments (e.g., “How should the Chinese intellectual heritage be studied?” “Is it philosophically interesting?”). Such reflections are important and deserve to be continued. However, one side of the issue usually remains out of view: the Western philosophers themselves, who lay the burden of proof almost exclusively with the Chinese masters or scholars. Since when, where, and how have scholars denied Chinese masters the label of “philosophy”? How explicit has the debate been? What were the various views and their historical or intellectual contexts? How did the debate evolve? What are its current implications and future prospects? These historically inspired philosophical questions differ in orientation from the dominant approaches. Even though they may not necessarily solve the disagreement concerning the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy, they do throw a fascinating light on the nature of (Western) philosophy.

1. Nelson’s Tour to the Back Side of the Legitimacy Issue

A fascinating guide to this seldom highlighted side of the legitimacy issue—like the back side of the moon—is Eric Nelson’s recent monograph, *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought*.² It focuses on the European (mostly German) views and assumptions concerning Chinese thought (mostly Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The book not only describes

in detail the historical context that shaped many views, but also evaluates them, traces their influence on later thinkers, and joins the debates in the form of case studies on, for example, the notion of resentment and Confucianism, technology and Daoism, and phenomenology and Buddhism. Nelson's analysis of the larger context and argumentative strategies shows that philosophy has always been comparative and intercultural, a given that the ancient Greeks were fully aware of. Moreover, the exclusive identification of philosophy with Europe is itself a result of cultural interaction or, as he puts it, "a relatively recent modern invention" (p. 13). Far from being the unique offspring of a self-enfolding lineage from its ancient Greek roots into Western (and consequently global) modernity, the European mindset turns out to be a fascinating amalgam of local, complex, connected, and ever changing configurations of thought. With this analysis Nelson tries to liberate Europe from its universal pretensions by granting it a degree of provincialism. In the same move, he hopes to liberate other parts of the world—in *casu* Asia—from the constant humiliations by a self-satisfied continent that is crumbling down.

Nelson illustrates this claim with an astonishing number of well- and lesser-known, mostly European scholars of the last centuries. Given the dominant ethnocentric responses to philosophical challenges from outside Europe, Nelson sees more potential in some of the relatively forgotten and open-minded philosophers (e.g., Popper-Lynkeus, Misch, Driesch, and Buber) than in some recurrent big shots in the philosophy curriculum who reject Chinese philosophy (e.g., Kant, Hegel, and Levinas). Some claims of Western philosophers are remarkably humiliating or racist, and hardly sustained by any knowledge of the Chinese masters. Nelson also analyzes some Western philosophers as complex combinations of die-hard ethnocentrism with the potential for dialogue and revival (e.g., Husserl, Heidegger, and Derrida). Finally, he critically discusses views that appreciate Chinese philosophy and evaluates their potential for future dialogue.

His study therefore not only describes various views relating to the legitimacy question, but also questions the very question, and judges its judges. Nelson's ideal for philosophy lies in intercultural hermeneutics. The interlocutors should exercise "a non-identitarian sympathy and a non-reductive charity in understanding and interpretation to discover the internal rationality in other ways of thinking and living." They should take into consideration "the complex and plural fabric of divergent and conflicting claims, perspectives, and tendencies at work in each lifeworld," engage in "the critical and diagnostic aspects of philosophy," and exercise a hermeneutics of suspicion toward "structurally reproduced pathologies, injustices, and distortions within a lifeworld" (p. 258).

Finding myself in general agreement with Nelson's diagnosis of the situation and his hope for the future, I refrain from evaluating his specific claims regarding the various figures and philosophical issues. I have no

special expertise in any of the Western philosophers presented in this book nor in many of the Chinese topics such as Chan Buddhism or Neo-Confucianism. But I am particularly fascinated by Nelson's description of the historical back stage, for example how internal theological tensions in Europe forced Christian Wolff to flee in 1723 for having equated Jesus and Confucius (p. 15), how abuses of the *ancient régime* related to Immanuel Kant's racist views (pp. 19–20), or how the intrusion of National Socialism in Edmund Husserl's life made him dream of something uniquely European (pp. 179–182). Equally fascinating are apparent tensions, for example how Martin Heidegger criticized essentialist notions such as conceptual sedimentation and yet firmly believed in “the West” and “the East” (pp. 192–195), or how Jacques Derrida followed him in criticizing the arrogance of the Western metaphysical tradition while also denying other cultures a philosophy (p. 204).

Thanks to Nelson's detailed analysis, many proposed definitions of philosophy made sense to me in their historical context, whether narrow or wide, excluding or including Chinese thought. More importantly, paragons of European philosophy—Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, and so forth—became alive, admirable as well as shameful, fascinating and sometimes repulsive. Like Nelson, I hope and expect that a broader and more inclusive notion of philosophy will become a reality. I think that, just as with the exclusion of Chinese philosophy stemming from the late eighteenth century, its possible inclusions will to some extent and inevitably be for contingent reasons that not only support but also evade purely philosophical arguments. I therefore leave the argumentative scene here and try to highlight the back stage of the debate, especially the habits, attitudes, and tendencies that surround the argumentation—the dark side of the moon.

II. Focusing on the Back Side of the Legitimacy Issue

How can one contribute to the legitimacy-of-Chinese-philosophy issue without adding philosophical arguments? The fact that the debate has remained inconclusive and that Chinese philosophy has been excluded for more than a century is caused by some stubborn defaults in the debates. The second part of this article playfully addresses them in the form of fixed formulations (*tifa* 提法): the “Ten Don'ts” (十不要) are inspired by traffic rules for bikers in the summer of 2018; the “Three Represents” (三个代表) imitate a policy turn initiated by Jiang Zemin in 2000 toward economic, cultural, and political changes in the CCP; and the “Eight Musts” (八个必须) follow an instruction by Xi Jinping when he was chosen Party Secretary in 2012.³

I use the first formulation to warn against deeply ingrained tendencies that have often steered the legitimacy debate and are not innocent. The second formulation allows me to accommodate a threefold typology of

positions rejecting Chinese philosophy. The last slogan insists on eight points that might be more relevant for the study of Chinese masters (and eventually for the future of philosophy) than this very label. This second part allows for three different reading strategies: readers who are convinced by a specific “formulation” can immediately jump to the next one; those who hesitate can read the brief comment; and those who need more arguments are referred to earlier publications. I realize that in both content and style, the present article is taking a somewhat unorthodox turn.

The Ten Don'ts (十不要)

Slogans and posters telling citizens how to think and behave fill the Chinese public sphere. Several of them contain a set of ten instructions on what one should not do in a specific location: a park, a swimming pool, a university campus, et cetera. One poster tells bikers how to get safely through the streets of Beijing: do not burn a red light, do not ride in the opposite direction, do not ride when drunk, do not throw away garbage, do not demolish public bicycles, et cetera. The predictability of their content renders the instructions somewhat ridiculous. Yet, while stating the obvious, these rules are nevertheless constantly broken. The ten instructions that I briefly propose are also taken for granted in academic communication, but are often disregarded in discussions on the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy.

Rule 1. Do not expect a continuous repetition of previous scholarship. The legitimacy of Chinese philosophy usually does not belong to anybody's expertise. Scholars of Chinese philosophy are often confronted with it as a side issue of their research; scholars of Western philosophy can easily avoid it. But when for whatever reason they start reflecting on the topic, they expect responses at an initial level. For those more acquainted with the topic, this leads to an endless repetition of often heard and refuted arguments. During the last two decades I have occasionally published on this issue and, like every scholar, I enjoy the intellectual thrill of moving on. Therefore, my instructions will be brief, in order to avoid repetition of earlier published reflections.⁴

Rule 2. Do not focus exclusively upon the Chinese masters. An initial expectation on the side of the well-meaning Western philosopher is to solve the issue by simply checking the Chinese candidates against a supposedly settled definition of philosophy. This exercise has been going on for a century and has its merits as long as it does not dominate the whole scene. It has become clear by now that the exclusive reliance on this approach is naive.⁵ A real dialogue between the West and China entails reflection on both partners, their presuppositions, and the contested definition of philosophy.

Rule 3. Do not focus exclusively on philosophical arguments. Even if both partners are willing to reflect on themselves and on the notion of philosophy, we should be aware of the fact that there is always, and to some extent inevitably, a back stage shaping the space of the philosophical debate. This contains non-philosophical—institutional, financial, cultural, geopolitical, or emotional—factors that exclude participants or arguments from the outset. We, admittedly, need a back stage for debates to take place, but its configuration should occasionally be open for reconsideration.

Rule 4. Do not exclusively expect a defense of Chinese philosophy. A natural opposition to the rejection of Chinese philosophy seems to be its acceptance or promotion. The appreciation of the Chinese masters thus easily amounts to a defense of their philosophical status. But this implicitly assumes the universal value of philosophy. Moreover, as a European I prefer to focus on Europe and question its rejection of the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy without necessarily taking up the burden of the defense. Nelson's book provides ample food to focus on the ethnocentrism of the Western side.⁶

Rule 5. Do not totally distinguish the Chinese case from other excluded cultures. Since a major part of the issue relates to European academia and its presuppositions, it is no surprise that other non-European types of philosophy or thinking have been subjected to the same type of rejection. The cases are far from identical in their complexities and interconnections, but they share a condition of having undergone a fair amount of European arrogance. To some extent, this plea for Chinese philosophy therefore also holds for other cultures.

Rule 6. Do not totally distinguish Philosophy from other disciplines. Disciplines may differ from each other in their openness to non-Western information, questions, concerns, or ways of thinking. Anthropology is often the vanguard of self-criticism and cultural interest, while Art, Religion, History, and Political Science also tend to study various regions and cultures in their own language. At my (European) university, all these faculties share an almost total lack of researchers or mandatory courses on regions beyond the West. Hence, this plea for Chinese philosophy in some sense also holds for disciplines other than Philosophy.⁷

Rule 7. Do not totally identify Philosophy with other disciplines. However, the shared disinterest in and ignorance of China at my university (and most other European institutions)⁸ does not preclude important differences between disciplines. Other than philosophers, scholars usually do not question the very existence of such things as Chinese art, literature, religions, history, or politics. And when such questions do arise, they are not

necessarily meant to reject everything Chinese as uninteresting, but rather to reflect on the historicity of these notions, their adoption in other regions, their uncontrollable evolution, and the inevitable hybrid nature of all notions used globally. We have seen little such reflection in Philosophy, which tends to claim the universal scope of the sciences while remaining very provincial in its content.⁹

Rule 8. Do not identify one opponent's views with those of others. Despite all the overlap with other disciplines and other non-Western regions, one should beware of throwing all opposition to Western philosophical ethnocentrism onto one heap. There is a natural tendency to notice and appreciate subtle nuances in the academic field closely centered on one's own research, while views in the periphery are expected to be simple and blurred. In matters concerning the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy, Western colleagues are often impatient with variety and see their opponents as spokespersons of the same syndicate.

Rule 9. Do not exclusively attribute opinions to negative emotions. Emotions are part of life and hence also of academe. Some scholarly views may be inspired by what they perceive as an unfair division of funding, attention, acceptance in journals, hiring conditions, et cetera. One can denounce these implicit and institutionally sanctioned biases without necessarily being driven exclusively by emotions. Nor should we reduce philosophers' opinions exclusively to ethnocentrism, arrogance, and egoism. Emotions are interesting and deserve our patient attention.

Rule 10. Do not keep repeating that we are slowly getting there. As in race- or gender-related matters, defenders of non-Western philosophy are often silenced with the argument that things are getting better. At my university, the almost exclusively male staff of the philosophy department began hiring female colleagues in 2011. This is indeed an improvement, however belated and incomplete. As for cultural diversity, there are plans to make one course on non-Western thought mandatory in the academic year 2019–2020, so that every philosophy major has at least an inkling of some non-Western thought. This is also an improvement. However, as long as no specialists of non-Western philosophies are hired, the default will remain Western in teaching, research, and funding decisions.

This collection of ten traffic rules for academic communications may not seem as important as a decent philosophical argument proving the value of Zhuangzi's sparkling insights or Zhu Xi's profound reflections. Nor do they seem very relevant, stating the obvious in normal academic interactions. The reasons why the rules are nevertheless constantly broken when discussing the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is because such an issue does not fit within the frame of an acknowledged academic niche. It is not only

multidisciplinary (possibly involving philosophy, religion, art, politics, or anthropology), but, more importantly, multicultural or transregional (involving China and other non-Western areas). The disagreement is not just *within* but *about* the dominant frame.

The Three Represents (三个代表)

President Jiang Zemin promoted his guiding theory of the “Three Represents” in 2000 (ratified at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002) to encourage the Communist Party of China to adapt to the country’s new realities. Three items had to be represented: the social productive forces, the progressive course of Chinese culture, and the fundamental interests of the majority. I paraphrase this formulation to construct a threefold typology of the opposition to Chinese philosophy. Despite some overlap and overlooked nuances, this typology allows for variation among those voices who only reluctantly join the debate.

Item 1. Philosophy is universal in its scope but local in its origin. The default position, at least since the modern period studied by Nelson, is that philosophy is a rational pursuit of truth or a universally interested sense of wonder. Born in ancient Greece, it bloomed into a modern Western discipline that has now spread across the globe. It did not include the ancient Chinese masters. This is the default narrative at European philosophy departments, along with its twin narrative about the global success of modern “science.” Due to its universal pretensions, this notion of philosophy tends to be actively uninterested in the local contingencies by which it is shaped. This default represents the majority view in the legitimacy issue, often (but not always) in an implicit or hardly developed version.

Item 2. Philosophy is a parochial and valuable Western cultural item. A minority and often more reflected view is that philosophy is a culturally particular phenomenon of which Europe is deservedly proud and concerned. Such was Derrida’s claim when he assured his Chinese hosts in Shanghai that there was no shame for traditional China in not having had philosophy.¹⁰ Heidegger’s view as presented by Nelson also belongs here: philosophy is “being and its forgetting in beings” (p. 195). Rooted in ancient Greece and exploded in the technological epoch, it is essentially a Western concern, despite its current global dimension. However inspiring they were for Heidegger, Daoist masters were not philosophers since Chinese culture was never “infected” by the oblivion of being.

Item 3. Philosophy is a parochial and undefined item to which we are attached. A last position, in line with the previous one, admits that philosophy is shaped by a host of historically contingent factors and cannot distinctively define itself. There is a degree of vagueness and sensitivity that we cannot

totally avoid. In some sense, philosophy is the family to which philosophers belong and for which they have mixed feelings: enthusiasm and pride for its long tradition of sparkling insights and ingenious theories but embarrassment for its racist, misogynist, and ethnocentric reflexes. Resistance toward non-Western thought may not be entirely rational, but is understandable.¹¹

Even though I have yet to meet an explicit defender of this last view, its humility would animate my mildness: we all thrive in a contingent context that we may be unwilling to change for a variety of good (e.g., prudent) or bad (e.g., egoistic) reasons. To some extent, I also sympathize with the second position, which makes European philosophy concrete and endearing in its particularity. While the first position, representing the large majority, can differ widely between implicit superficiality and elaborate arguments, I find it least appealing. The eight instructions collected below addresses mostly, but not exclusively, this large majority.

The Eight Musts (八个必须)

The last fixed formulation is a policy set by Xi Jinping when chosen as the General Secretary of the CCP in the fall of 2012. It contains eight points that Party members must insist upon, such as the importance of the people, the development of social productive forces, the continuation of the reform and opening-up, et cetera. Analogous to them, I suggest eight points that we should insist upon, not necessarily to legitimize Chinese philosophy, but to salvage the masters and perhaps also the future of philosophy.

Point 1. Insist upon the open-ended definition of philosophy. Philosophy differs from other disciplines in that its core interest concerns its own nature and identity. “What is philosophy?” is the philosophical question *par excellence*. An easy and quick answer, whether in favor of or against Chinese philosophy, usually does not signal philosophical depth. The relative absence of this question at institutions indicates a degree of superficiality in the ongoing philosophical reflection.

Point 2. Call attention to inconsistent applications of the definition. Homemade definitions of philosophy are easily used as a tool to exclude Chinese masters from the curriculum. Such definitions might be applied consistently within the course that introduces them. But usually they are not applied rigidly to consistently exclude colleagues from one’s own department (e.g., scholars of Parmenides or Heraclitus) that clearly fit the definition less than some Chinese masters (e.g., Zhu Xi or Wang Yangming).

Point 3. Insist on the relevance of self-knowledge for its own sake. In the field of philosophy, knowledge of oneself is an unending pursuit accompanying the study of specific research topics. Therefore, one would expect on the part of every philosophy scholar some eagerness to deconstruct the

dominant narratives, to study the historical contours of current views, and to analyze portrayals of “the other” as the counterpart of the presumed “self.”

Point 4. Insist on non-philosophical matters in the debate. Some aspects of a philosopher’s self-knowledge reach beyond the limits of his own discipline and its history. Sociological research could perhaps explain the stubbornness of the currently dominant view. Psychology could clarify the resistance of the privileged to long overdue changes. Rhetoric could describe the linguistic strategies of frontier keeping in the field. Each discipline could focus on such variables as race, gender, age, affiliation, connections, class, and wealth.

Point 5. Insist on the ignorance underlying the rejection of Chinese thought. The exclusion of Chinese philosophy largely happens on the basis of ignorance. Admittedly, only a portion of the masters’ writing has been translated into Western languages. Moreover, these very translations remain a topic of controversy among scholars of Chinese philosophy, since the choice of terms carries assumptions and implications that are not philosophically innocent. Western scholars of philosophy lack the training, expertise, interest, and language skills to judge most Chinese texts. This ignorance is understandable and harmless when accompanied by caution in judging others.

Point 6. Beware of sedimentation. As Nelson’s book convincingly shows, notions of philosophy are contingent creations of living human beings. They can be brilliant, and sometimes even endearing in their limitation, but they should not solidify and become unquestioned. Newly proposed visions of philosophy, even though biased, have enriched the field of philosophy (e.g., Heidegger’s view in the twentieth century). But their thoughtless repetition and institutional solidification is a threat to the philosophical spirit. Therefore, philosophers should pay particular attention to the growth of clichés and hoaxes in the field.

Point 7. Insist on the need for institutional space and financial support. Even if philosophers conclude that Chinese thought is not philosophy and therefore should not be lodged at their departments, there remain some important questions to be answered: Is Chinese thought worth studying? If yes, should it then be lodged at another, perhaps newly created department? Who can choose its name? How about “philosophoo” as distinct from “philosophy”? How would it relate to the philosophy department? How will it be financed? Who are the members of the committees awarding funding applications? Et cetera.

Point 8. Insist on explicitness. Whatever one’s view on the (non)philosophical nature of Chinese thought, the future contains a wealth of possible

changes by merely making one's choices a bit more explicit. The quality of teaching and research would gain by an increased explicitness about the region and languages of one's research topic, the titles and content of the courses, the reasons for focusing on some topic and excluding others, the nature of one's limitations, the choices made in hiring staff, and occasional reference to sources that are considered non-philosophical. Even if these would all end up confirming the status quo, this very exercise would make a world of difference.

These eight points may not touch upon the argumentative core of the legitimacy debate, but they are perhaps more crucial than the mere label of "philosophy" for a portion of the Chinese heritage. Insistence on these points could support the study of Chinese masters and, indirectly, revitalize philosophy itself. With the currently changing geopolitics, the legitimacy issue itself might very well wither away. Old castles remain strong as long as they suffer attacks but fall into ruin when they are neglected.¹² What really counts is that Chinese texts, along with other non-Western sources, are being studied and found relevant; that they inspire conversation with scholars who are willing to engage in dialogue; and that human beings keep reflecting on their predicament.

I am aware of the uncommon format of this book review, shaped as a banter on Chinese ideological policies. Newcomers to the debate may disapprove of this detour verging around philosophical arguments. Many scholars have argued in favor of Chinese philosophy, including Eric Nelson in this book. More fascinating to me than his (generally convincing) arguments in favor of Chinese philosophy are his detailed analyses of the historical context of Western philosophy and more specifically the ingredients of its stark ethnocentric rejection of others in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, with his remarkably intercontinental career, his multidisciplinary training, and his astonishing linguistic skills, Nelson can be said to represent the European Dream. Reading this book made me nostalgic for the twentieth century, when a phenomenologist remarked that philosophy's "center is everywhere and its circumference nowhere" (p. 4, quoting Maurice Merleau-Ponty) and another European scholar provided "a gust of fresh air" to "the characteristic monotonous Eurocentrism of modern Western philosophy" (p. 202, referring to Martin Buber). Perhaps all we need is a crisis as in the good old days, so that we can apprehend Eric Nelson's *Thought on Philosophy with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era*. I trust—and fear—that this crisis is coming.

Notes

- 1 – For 2003, see, e.g., Wei Changbao 魏长宝, "'Zhongguo zhexue' de 'hefaxing' xushi ji qi chao Yue" "'中国哲学' 的 '合法性' 叙事及其超越" (Concerning the narrative of the "legitimacy" of "Chinese philosophy" and beyond), *Zhexue dongtai* 哲学动态 6 (2004): 7–10, at p. 7. Wei

cites the Shanghai journals *Xuishu yuekan* 学术月刊 (Academic monthly) and *Wenhui dushu zhoubao* 文汇读书周报 (Wenhui reading weekly). For 2016 see, e.g., Jay L. Garfield and Bryan W. Van Norden, "If Philosophy Won't Diversify, Let's Call It What It Really Is," *New York Times*, May 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/opinion/if-philosophy-wont-diversify-lets-call-it-what-it-really-is.html?_r=0.

- 2 – Along with, e.g., Peter Park, *Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780–1830* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013).
- 3 – For "fixed formulations", see, e.g., Michael Schoenhals, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies*, China Research Monograph (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1992).
- 4 – For my previous English publications, see Carine Defoort, "Contemporary Chinese Philosophers on Chinese Philosophy: Editor's Introduction," *Contemporary Chinese Thought* 30, no. 4 (1999): 4–8; "Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate," *Philosophy East and West* 51, no. 3 (2001): 393–413; "Is 'Chinese Philosophy' a Proper Name? A Response to Rein Raud," *Philosophy East and West* 56, no. 4 (2006): 625–660; "The Philosophy of Zhuang Zi: Editor's Introduction," *Contemporary Chinese Thought* 38, no. 2 (2006–2007): 3–8; "'Chinese Philosophy' at European Universities: A Threefold Utopia," *Philosophy East and West* 67, no. 4 (2017): 1049–1080; Carine Defoort and Ge Zhaoguang, "The Legitimacy of 'Chinese Philosophy', Part I: Editors' Introduction," *Contemporary Chinese Thought* 37, no. 1 (2005): 3–10.
 For Chinese publications by Dai Kalin, see Dai Kalin 戴卡琳, "Jiujing you wu 'Zhongguo zhexue'?" "究竟有无 '中国哲学'," *Zhongguo zhexueshi* 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese philosophy), 2006, no. 2: 5–16; "'Zhongguo zhexue' de zhengming zhi bian" "'中国哲学' 的正名之辩," *Duoyuan* 多原 (Pluris, 2006), pp. 48–74; "Ouzhou Daxue zhong de 'Zhongguo zhexue': San zhong mianxiang de 'wu' tuobang" "欧洲大学中的 '中国哲学': 三种面向的 '无' 托邦," *Waiguo zhexue* 外国哲学 (Foreign philosophy) 36, no. 12 (2019): 75–104.
- 5 – For a recent example of this well-meaning response, see Tim Heysse, "The Conversation of Philosophy: A Polemical Response to Carine Defoort," *Philosophy East and West* 67, no. 4 (2017): 1081–1086. For a reaction, see Carine Defoort, "Outrageously Irrelevant Remarks of a Girl in a Closed Conversation: A Response to Tim Heysse," *Philosophy East and West* 67, no. 4 (2017): 1086–1091.
- 6 – For the often futile and humiliating duty of Chinese masters to defend themselves as philosophers, see, e.g., Wiebke Denecke, *The Dynamics of Masters Literature: Early Chinese Thought from Confucius to Han*

Feizi (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 23–38.

- 7 – See Defoort, “‘Chinese Philosophy’ at European Universities,” pp. 1053–1065, comparing the History and Philosophy departments at KU Leuven, Belgium.
- 8 – For the situation in Europe from 2007 to 2014, see Ralph Weber, “On the Contemporary Study of ‘Chinese Philosophy’ in Europe,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 42, nos. 3–4 (2017): 371–396.
- 9 – For a critical view of the universality of the sciences, see, e.g., David Livingstone, *Putting Science in Its Place: Geographies of Scientific Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
- 10 – See Defoort and Ge, “The Legitimacy of ‘Chinese Philosophy’, Part I,” pp. 3–4.
- 11 – See Defoort, “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy?” pp. 406–409; and Defoort, “Is ‘Chinese Philosophy’ a Proper Name?” pp. 638–642—inspired by Rudi Visker.
- 12 – This claim has been attributed to Thomas Aquinas.