The Prolegomena to Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics

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Of the transcripts of Kant's lectures on metaphysics, stretching from 1762 to 1792, eight versions begin with an introductory account of the topic of the lecture series. These sections, often called "prolegomena," correspond to the extremely concise introductory section of Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* and, one way or another, address the question as to what metaphysics is. While the transcripts vary in length and content, all of them deal with this question by offering a definition of metaphysics, distinguishing metaphysics from other disciplines, and by singling out its various parts. In some cases, Kant also sketches the history of metaphysics until his time.¹

Moreover, transcripts from the 1770s and 1780s include reflections on the discipline that, prior to metaphysics proper, inquire into the nature of metaphysics and the limits within which it is possible, in other words, on the discipline that came to be known as transcendental philosophy and is only fully carried out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Since Kant's introductory remarks on the nature of metaphysics are developed in tandem with his published works, they allow us to trace the development of this propaedeutic discipline to his early dissatisfaction with the Wolffian conception of metaphysics as well as his successive efforts to improve both the common definition of metaphysics and the discipline itself.

The topics covered in the introductory sections of the lectures are dealt with not only in a number of Kant's early writings, but also in the Prefaces, the two versions of the Introduction, and the Doctrine of Method of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. However, the lecture transcripts show perhaps more clearly than the published work how the idea of transcendental philosophy emerged from Kant's effort to determine what is worthwhile and worthless in Wolffian metaphysics and so to turn the metaphysics of his German predecessors into a science.² Seen from the perspective of the lectures, Kant was led to write the first *Critique* not because of a concern with the conditions and limits of human knowledge as such, but in order to identify the conditions and limits of the synthetic *a priori* cognition pursued in metaphysics.

This chapter discusses the most important stages of Kant's introductions into the problem of metaphysics by focusing on his critical reception of Wolff and Baumgarten's metaphysics on the one hand and Crusius' on the other. After sketching, in the first section, the most relevant elements of their positions, the second section briefly looks at Kant's response to his predecessors in the Herder transcripts of the early 1760s. In the

third section, I turn to a transcript from the 1770s, *Metaphysics L₁*, that bears clear traces of the *Inaugural Dissertation*. In this transcript, Kant moves away from both the Wolffians and Crusius by requiring that metaphysics establishes itself as a purely intellectual discipline. Finally, the fourth section examines the introductory sections of two transcripts from the first half of the 1780s, *Metaphysics Mrongovius* and *Metaphysics Volckmann*, with the aim of disentangling Kant's various accounts of the task of transcendental philosophy and its relation to ontology and metaphysics. While these accounts may seem difficult to square, I consider the lecture transcripts to cast light on Kant's confusing remarks on the subject in the first *Critique* and so on the relationship between this work and the metaphysical system for which it was supposed to prepare the ground.³

I. Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius

Wolff's highly influential German treatise on metaphysics, titled *Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Human Beings, as well as all Things as such*, was published in 1720 and reprinted eleven times between 1722 and 1752. While the title can be considered a preliminary definition of metaphysics, neither the preface nor the first chapters of the work contain a proper account of the nature, task, and structure of metaphysics. According to the first preface, the task of the treatise is to clarify "the first, general concepts," because in this way light can be shed on "all our knowledge, whether we are dealing with sciences or actions in human life."⁴ In a preface to a later edition, Wolff refers to concepts such as "thing" and "perfection" as "first grounds of knowledge."⁵ The second chapter of the treatise itself, corresponding to ontology or general metaphysics, is said to deal with "the first grounds of our knowledge and all things as such" and starts with a summary discussion of the principle of non-contradiction and the concepts of possibility, actuality, and thing (Wolff 1747, §10-16).

In a more classical vein, Wolff's Latin *Discursus praeliminaris* defines metaphysics at large as "the science of being [*scientia entis*], the world as such, and spirits" (Dp, §79). He considers its first part, the ontology, to deal with "being as such and the general properties of beings" (Dp, §73). Although Wolff here seems to abandon his earlier emphasis on the epistemological strand of metaphysics, if it can be called that, the difference is not a real one; seen from his perspective, the grounds of our knowledge of things are at the same time the grounds of these things themselves. Similarly, the *Ontologia*, first published in 1730, defines ontology both as the science of being as such

and as the discipline that treats the “first principles and first concepts that are used in our reasoning” and can therefore be called first philosophy (Wolff 1736, §1).

As regards Wolff’s overall approach to metaphysics, Baumgarten follows in his footsteps, but focuses more on the epistemological approach. In his *Metaphysics*, first published in 1739, he defines metaphysics as “the science of the first principles in human knowledge” (BM, §1) and ontology, general metaphysics, or first philosophy as “the science of the more general predicates of a being” (BM, §4). These definitions are presented in a “prolegomena” to the metaphysics at large and the ontology respectively, both of which take up only three, extremely concise, paragraphs. Apart from the succinct definition of metaphysics mentioned above, Baumgarten divides metaphysics into ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology (BM, §2) and further distinguishes a natural version of metaphysical knowledge, which everyone possesses, from its explicit articulation and clarification in treatises such as his own (BM, §3). Unlike Wolff, Baumgarten begins his actual ontology with the concept of nothing, which he takes to ground the principle of non-contradiction (BM, §7), and then moves on to the concepts of something and possible and the principles of the excluded middle and identity (BM, §8-11). Thus, neither Wolff nor Baumgarten seemed to consider it necessary to dwell on the very possibility of metaphysics, its limits, or the capacity of the human mind to achieve knowledge of things as such, the world, the soul, and God.

Though highly influential, Wolffian metaphysics was challenged from various directions. During the 1740s, Crusius attacked Wolff’s rationalism, in particular his unbridled use of the principle of sufficient reason.⁶ Although Crusius’s overall conception of metaphysics and its various branches does not substantially deviate from Wolff’s, he does deviate from Wolff by conceiving of metaphysics exclusively in epistemological terms. His *Outline of the Necessary Truths of Reason* (first edition 1745) presents the discipline at stake as the science of the necessary truths of reason insofar as they do not belong to mathematics (Crusius 1766, §4) and as the science “from which all other human knowledge, to the extent that it can be demonstrated a priori, can derive its grounds.”⁷ Crusius considers this definition to be superior to the characteristics the Wolffians attributed to metaphysics, claiming that the latter do not amount to a proper definition. Since the common concept of metaphysics lacks a determinate extension, one “can include ever more into metaphysics and can never determine exactly where its limits are” (Crusius 1766, §6).

Crusius’s concept of ontology illustrates his effort to determine at least the limits of this discipline in a new way. On his account, ontology differs from all other disciplines in

that it deals with simple concepts, that is, concepts that result from an analysis of composite things and cannot be analyzed any further (Crusius 1766, §7). Crusius's actual ontology starts from the concept of a thing and distinguishes between possible things, actual things, and non-things (Crusius 1766, §11) before turning to the principle of non-contradiction (Crusius 1766, §13). After discussing the determinations we can attribute to things in thought alone, Crusius turns to the question as to what it means to conceive of something as existing, thus distinguishing the ideal and the real more sharply than the Wolffians had done. According to the "true concept of existence" Crusius puts forward, attributing "existence" to a thing means positing that it is "somewhere and somewhen."⁸ As we will see, Kant in his lectures repeatedly refers to this account of existence to illustrate the problems that arise if metaphysics does not define its limits in a proper way.

II. Kant's Early Criticism of Wolff and Crusius in the Herder Transcripts (1762-1764)

The main elements of Kant's very first course on metaphysics, delivered between 1762 and 1764, are known thanks to the transcripts of the young Herder. While brief, Kant's preliminary remarks on the topic are more wide-ranging than those in Baumgarten's textbook. What for Baumgarten went without saying, gave rise to increasingly detailed reflections on Kant's part. According to the Herder transcripts, Kant accepts Baumgarten's definition of ontology as the science of the general predicates of things and as the part of metaphysics that contains the first basic concepts (MH, 28:7). On the other hand, he endorses Crusius's view that these concepts must be simple, i.e., the result of an analysis of complex concepts (MH, 28:5). He likewise follows Crusius by maintaining that metaphysics must identify the basic judgments, or principles, that are evident though indemonstrable and from which all other judgments are derived (MH, 28:5). Though the transcript does not offer any details here, Kant seems to refer to Crusius's distinction between material metaphysical principles and formal ones such as the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.⁹

With regard to these concepts and principles, Kant follows Crusius's criticisms of Wolff, but also criticizes Crusius's own position. For whereas Wolff is said to err because of his misguided ambition to demonstrate even first principles by means of the principle of non-contradiction, Crusius is said to include principles in his ontology that are not self-evident and, hence, yield a variety of false judgments (MH, 28:5; cf. 156-57). The principle according to which everything that exists must be "somewhere and somewhen" is cited as a case in point (MH, 28:5-6). However, apart from noting that metaphysicians ought to be more careful and modest than their predecessors, Kant has as yet little to offer

in the way of alternatives. This begins to change during the second half of the 1760s, a period marked by various efforts on Kant's part to get to the bottom of the flaws he attributed to his German predecessors.

III. *Metaphysics L₁* (1770s)

In the introductory part of the Heinze extracts from *Metaphysics L₁*, Kant mainly seems to be concerned with reforming metaphysics by excluding any sensible determination from its concepts and principles. His thoughts in this regard share common ground with the *Inaugural Dissertation* published in 1770.¹⁰ In order to situate the lectures, I will briefly comment on Kant's criticism of Wolff and Crusius in this pivotal treatise.

As far as explicit references are concerned, the *Dissertation* only takes issue with Wolff's explanation of the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition as a merely logical distinction between confused and clear representations (MSI, 2:394-95).¹¹ Apart from that, Kant implicitly blames Wolff for his assumption that the mathematical or demonstrative method applies to all sciences, metaphysics included (MSI, 2:411). The two points are related in that those who use the mathematical method are likely to ignore the role of sensibility and so to infect their general and allegedly purely intellectual cognitions with contents derived from sensibility.¹² Kant therefore urges metaphysics to make sure "that the principles which stem from sensible cognition do not transgress their limits and do not affect intellectual cognitions" (MSI, 2:411). For Kant, metaphysics must consist of purely intellectual cognitions alone, for only these represent things as they truly are.¹³

By establishing the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition as a distinction in kind, the *Dissertation* contributes to the "propaedeutic science" that according to Kant must precede metaphysics proper (MSI, 2:395). Regardless of the differences between the two works, the critical impetus of the *Dissertation* announces the propaedeutic task carried out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This impetus is foregrounded in a letter to Lambert written shortly after the *Dissertation*, in which Kant summarizes his point as follows:

The most general laws of sensibility unduly play a large role in metaphysics, in which merely concepts and principles of pure reason are at issue. It seems that a quite special, though purely negative science . . . must precede metaphysics. In it, the principles of sensibility, their validity and their limitations, would be determined, *in order that they not be confusedly applied to objects of pure reason*,

as has heretofore almost always happened. . . . [E]xtremely mistaken positions result from subjecting something that is not at all an object of sense, but is thought through a general and pure concept of the understanding, i.e., a thing or substance as such, to basic concepts of sensibility.¹⁴

The *Dissertation* does not clarify whether this criticism applies to Wolffian metaphysics. But there is no doubt Kant took it to apply to Crusius. To illustrate how allegedly intellectual metaphysical judgments can be contaminated by sensibility, Kant refers to the “spurious” principle, put forward by Crusius, according to which “whatever is, is at some place and at some time.”¹⁵ On Kant’s account, a sensible concept such as “somewhere” is a condition of our sensible cognition and cannot be used to determine things insofar as they are thought. In other words, Crusius’s principle is valid with regard to appearances alone.¹⁶ Accordingly, the *Dissertation* firmly denounces the “idle” questions which had sprung from the latter, including the much-debated questions as to whether the soul occupies a space or whether God is contained in infinite space.¹⁷

Kant’s effort to purge metaphysics from its unacknowledged dependence on sensible notions plays an important role in the lectures on metaphysics delivered after the publication of the *Dissertation*. For one, it allows him to respond to Crusius’s charge that the Wolffians failed to adequately determine the limits of metaphysics. Without acknowledging his debt to Crusius in this regard, Kant states in the prolegomena to *Metaphysics L₁* that Wolffian metaphysics failed to determine its proper “territory.” It starts from an abstract determination such as ‘something’ or ‘thing’ – its *terminum a priori* – but it is unclear where metaphysics ends and another discipline begins, for terms such as “highest” and “first” refer to an indefinite series rather than a closed domain and do not exclude empirical principles (ML1, 28:172). Since any definition of a concept must fix its extension, Baumgarten’s definition of metaphysics is said to be false:

Those definitions of metaphysics are false that merely determine the *terminum a priori*, by identifying it with the highest principles [*oberste Gründe*] of human cognition as such, and do not take into consideration the *terminum a posteriori* at all. (ML1, 28:172; cf. 223)

This criticism is repeated in later lecture courses as well as in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.¹⁸ But how does Kant solve the problem? In *Metaphysics L₁*, he provides metaphysics with a *terminum a posteriori* by positing, in line with the *Dissertation*, that

metaphysics must be purely rational as regards both its form and object. In terms of its form or method, metaphysics obtains knowledge by dint of the activity of the understanding itself, that is, independently of external things that affect us (ML1, 28:172-73). In terms of its content, metaphysics has “pure concepts of the understanding” instead of empirical concepts as its object (ML1, 28:172).¹⁹ While metaphysics shares this feature with mathematics, it differs from the latter by dealing with the qualities of things rather than their quantities (ML1, 28:173).²⁰ Unlike Baumgarten’s, Kant’s definition makes it possible to expel any metaphysical principle contaminated by spatial or temporal intuitions.²¹

However, Kant notes that the required purity of metaphysics does not entail that it abstract from the realm of experience altogether. Both metaphysics and mathematics can take into consideration pure concepts that are found in experience without being derived from it:

The rational sciences are not completely void [*entblösst*] of all experiences (appearances), which are sensible representations, but in these experiences rational representations, or concepts, are mixed in [*untermengt*]. (ML1, 28:173)²²

I take Kant to hold that both metaphysics and mathematics isolate these non-empirical elements of empirical cognitions so as to treat them in a systematic manner. Clearly, this view is retained in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.²³

Kant’s definition of metaphysics as a purely rational treatment of purely rational concepts in *Metaphysics L_I* also allows him to account for the internal division of metaphysics in a new way. While this division largely corresponds to Baumgarten’s, the latter lists the various disciplines without providing any ground for the division.

Kant, for his part, starts from the then common distinction between pure and applied metaphysics (ML1, 28:174-175). He considers pure metaphysics to include not only ontology or general metaphysics, but also cosmology and natural theology. These two disciplines are considered pure because they deal with the rational determinations of all things independently of experience, and do so by considering these things as parts of a whole (cosmology) or as consequences of an ultimate cause (theology), that is, in view of the coordination and subordination of all things respectively (ML1, 28:174; cf. 171, 195). Applied metaphysics, on the other hand, is said to consist of rational somatology and rational psychology. Although these disciplines are rational in the sense that “they are not derived from experience,” they differ from pure metaphysics because they “establish the

grounds that make it possible to clarify experiences.” They differ from one another, finally, insofar as they deal with the rational grounds of outer and inner experience respectively (ML1, 28:175). Clearly, Kant takes these disciplines to investigate pure concepts insofar as they are initially “mixed in” with experiences.²⁴

The fact that the grounds by means of which Kant derives the various branches of metaphysics somewhat deviates from those provided in the Architectonic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* need not concern us here.²⁵ More relevant is the result Kant took his new definition and division of metaphysics to yield. According to Kant, Wolff and Baumgarten had no rational ground to exclude empirical psychology from their metaphysics, because they assumed that empirical and rational psychology basically dealt with the same concepts and principles, albeit in a different way.²⁶ Given Kant’s new definition of metaphysics, it is clear that empirical psychology must be excluded from metaphysics.²⁷

However, this new definition does not entail a thoroughgoing critique of Baumgarten’s *Metaphysics* or Wolffian metaphysics as such. Kant’s preliminary reflections rather seem to be intended to purge metaphysics of heterogeneous elements and rationalize its divisions. Arguably, Kant aimed to improve metaphysics’s understanding of its own nature, task, and limits rather than the contents treated in its various parts. In a note dated 1776-1778, Kant refers to Baumgarten as “a Cyclops among metaphysicians, who was missing one eye, namely critique.”²⁸ All that is needed, this note suggests, is to provide the metaphysics of his predecessor with a second eye, one turned inward rather than outward.

Yet in one respect Kant’s reflections in *Metaphysics L_I* seem to breach the Wolffian framework. In passages not discussed so far, Kant seems to draw out the implications of his earlier claim that metaphysics has pure concepts as its sole object. Radicalizing the epistemological strand of the Wolffian conception of metaphysics as well as Crusius’s approach, Kant takes metaphysics to be concerned with cognitions rather than things. Moving beyond his predecessors, he for this reason proposes to conceive of metaphysics as a mode of logic:

As regards its object, metaphysics is rational philosophy. Since it is logic that deals with the use of the understanding and reason, metaphysics is a logic of the use of the pure understanding and pure reason. (ML1, 28:173)

It is unclear to what extent this description is intended as a criticism of Baumgarten's *Metaphysics*. Even though Baumgarten does not conceive of his metaphysics as a logic, his discussion of concepts such as "something," "real," or "whole" might be said to emerge from a consideration of how we seek to conceive of things independently of experience and so to carry out a task similar to general logic.

However, Kant's description of metaphysics as a mode of logic leaves room for a mode of metaphysics that investigates the use of the pure understanding and pure reason in a way Baumgarten could not have imagined. Kant specifies that, metaphysics, *qua* logic, is a pure science in which the understanding is not occupied with "other objects," but rather "reflects . . . on its own nature" (ML1, 28:173).²⁹ I take him to suggest that metaphysics in this sense not only treats the basic concepts and principles of any cognition, but also investigates the human mind insofar as it purports to know things independently of experience. As he puts it:

[I]n metaphysics we must study the subject, and metaphysics therefore tells us how we are to deal with purely rational concepts [*reine Vernunftbegriffe*], and is a logic of the use of the pure understanding and pure reason. (ML1, 28:174)³⁰

This remark not only recalls the critical strand of the *Dissertation*, but also announces the program of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet the relevant passages are very sketchy, and it is impossible to tell whether this is due to lapses of the note-taker, a certain caution on Kant's part, or the premature stage of his reflections. Not surprisingly, later transcripts, to which I now turn, deal with this new approach to metaphysics in more detail.

IV. *Metaphysics Mrongovius* and *Volckmann* (1782-1785)

The transcripts of the lectures Kant gave after the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* differ from earlier versions by his efforts to explain the task of transcendental philosophy and the project of the *Critique of Pure Reason* more generally. Yet there is no real gap between the earlier and later texts. As we will see, Kant uses the notion of transcendental philosophy, or transcendental logic, to refer to the self-critical strand of metaphysics that he discussed previously in less specific terms. However, he also uses it to refer to the core of the discipline that used to be called ontology. This is to say that the distinctions he draws between transcendental philosophy, metaphysics proper, and ontology are far from clear and need to be fleshed out. Since the introductory sections of

Metaphysics Mrongovius (1782-83) and *Metaphysics Volckmann* (1784-85) substantially overlap, I will do so by focusing on the former.

In *Metaphysics Mrongovius*, Kant again begins by presenting metaphysics as a science that considers the totality of cognitions as subordinated to one another, that is, as related to one another as ground and consequence (MMron, 29:747). While the first grounds are the highest principles of any cognition, the ultimate consequence is always a particular experience (MMron, 29:748). Since we cannot have exhaustive empirical knowledge, metaphysics abstracts from the matter of experience so as to limit itself to “the highest principles of human knowledge” (MMron, 29:748-49). As in *Metaphysics L_I*, however, Kant points out that metaphysics and the other sciences differ in kind rather than degree (MMron, 29:749).³¹ Whereas Baumgarten defined metaphysics by referring to indefinite “first principles” of human cognition, Kant asserts that metaphysics contains “the principles of the possibility of all *a priori* cognition” (MMron, 29:749). The “true touchstone” of metaphysics, in other words, is its purity or independence from experience, which entails that empirical psychology does not belong to it (MMron, 29:750).

What is new in this transcript is Kant’s presentation of the transcendental logic carried out in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (MMron, 29:752-53). In agreement with *Metaphysics L_I*, this logic is said to consist in “a kind of self-knowledge” of reason (MMron, 29:756). I hold Kant’s reflections on this subject to be significant because they reinforce his remarks in the Prefaces, the Introduction and the Doctrine of Method of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the effect that this work is not an end in itself, but a propaedeutic investigation supposed to pave the way for a metaphysical system that would meet the requirements of a science. Critique, Kant writes in the second preface,

is the preparatory activity required for the advancement of a thorough metaphysics, of metaphysics as a science that must necessarily be carried out dogmatically and, complying with the strictest requirement, systematically, hence in the manner of the schools [*schulgerecht*]. . . . Thus, in someday carrying out the plan stipulated by the *Critique*, i.e., in the future system of metaphysics, we will have to follow the strict method of the famous Wolff, the greatest under all dogmatic philosophers, who gave us the first example . . . of the way in which the secure course of a science is to be taken, through the regular ascertainment of the principles, the clear determination of concepts, and the attempt at strictness in the proofs.³²

Even though Kant never published a metaphysical treatise along these lines, various letters and other documents confirm that he never abandoned his intention to do so.³³ If this intention is taken into account, it makes sense that Kant after 1781 continued to use Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* as a textbook. In my view, he by no means considered its defects to preclude a metaphysical system in the sense of a systematic account of the pure concepts and *a priori* principles constitutive of any cognition of objects.³⁴ In this sense, Kant's lectures put into perspective the achievement of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and complicate the common division of Kant's thought into a pre-critical and critical phase.

As in earlier transcripts, Kant in *Metaphysics Mrongovius* distinguishes two main branches of metaphysics, namely, pure and applied metaphysics (MMron, 29:751).³⁵ Yet his account of the content of these two branches has undergone a significant modification, which is clearly meant to accommodate the preliminary investigations carried out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In *Metaphysics L₁*, as we have seen, Kant considered pure metaphysics to include ontology, cosmology, and natural theology because these disciplines are purely intellectual. In 1782/83, by contrast, pure metaphysics is said to have reason itself for its object and, more specifically, to "deal with the sources, extent, and boundaries of our pure reason" (MMron, 29:750). As was to be expected, Kant identifies this pure part of metaphysics with "transcendental philosophy, or critique of pure reason" (MMron, 29:751). Thus, Kant no longer considers pure metaphysics to treat things in a purely intellectual manner, but maintains that only that part of metaphysics is pure that abstracts from things and their determinations altogether. In ontology, Kant notes, "I speak already of things, substances and accidents, which are properties of things that I know *a priori*" (MMron 29:752). In transcendental philosophy, by contrast, concepts such as substance and accident are treated as *a priori* concepts and, hence, investigated in view of their source and the limits within which they can be used. In the latter case,

I will say that the *a priori* concepts include substance and accident. How do I arrive at that? What can I do with such concepts? What can be known about objects *a priori*, insofar as they are substances? . . . If we consider the critique of pure reason independently of all experience, then this is the *genuine pure philosophy*, i.e., the consideration of the faculty of reason itself is pure philosophy. (MMron, 28:752-53, my italics)³⁶

As I see it, Kant's point is here that while ontology used to be considered the pure part of metaphysics, transcendental philosophy constitutes pure metaphysics properly speaking. Transcendental philosophy is a logic that deals with the rules to which the use of pure reason is bound and, as such, must precede any attempt to obtain knowledge of objects. Accordingly, Kant no longer considers the title "ontology" to appropriately designate the preliminary or pure part of metaphysics. As he puts it, transcendental philosophy

occupies itself with the sources, extent, and the boundaries of pure reason without concerning itself with the objects. For that reason it is wrong to call it ontology. In the latter we consider things already in view of their general properties.

Transcendental logic abstracts from all that. (MMron, 28:756, cf. MVol, 28:363)

This passage recalls Kant's well known distinction between ontology and transcendental philosophy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant here states that the principles treated in the Transcendental Analytic

are merely principles of the exposition of appearances, and the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic *a priori* cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine . . . must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding. (A247/B303)

In Kant's days, the terms "transcendental" and "transcendental philosophy" had come to be associated with the first part of metaphysics and, thus, with ontology.³⁷ Kant, by contrast, dissociates what he calls transcendental philosophy from former ontology to a much greater extent. As we have seen, he conceives of it as a logic concerned with reason itself. By itself, however, Kant's innovative use of the term "transcendental philosophy" does not decide the fate of the discipline that Wolff, Baumgarten, and many others called "ontology." Given his new distinction between pure and applied metaphysics, Kant might well have relegated ontology to the latter. So let us turn to his discussion of this second branch to see if this is indeed the case.

Metaphysics Mronovius alone contains three different descriptions of applied metaphysics.³⁸ According to the first description, applied metaphysics is concerned with the "application of *a priori* principles to objects of experience" (MMron, 29:751).

Regardless of whether ontology can be subsumed under this concept of applied metaphysics, the latter seems to have a very limited extension. In agreement with Kant's

new account of pure metaphysics, the second, broader, description, considers applied metaphysics to consist in the application of *a priori* principles “to objects.” The third description likewise takes applied metaphysics to deal with the *a priori* cognition of objects, but specifies that this branch is “metaphysics in the strict sense” and must take the form of a system:

Applied metaphysics, which contains the *a priori* cognition of objects, constitutes a system of pure reason, and the system of the cognition obtained by pure reason is called metaphysics in the strict sense. (MMron 29:752)

Kant’s reference to a metaphysical system, or system of pure reason, corresponds to the passages from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, one of which was quoted above, about the system he intended to elaborate on the basis of this propaedeutic work.

According to Wolff and Baumgarten, metaphysics must begin with an ontology because the latter provides the various branches of special metaphysics with their basic principles. Given Kant’s innovative definition of applied metaphysics, it follows that, for him, ontology *qua* investigation into things as such and their general properties is part of the latter. On this account, applied metaphysics no longer coincides with special metaphysics (concerned with objects such as the soul, the world as such, and God), but would be divided into general metaphysics, or ontology, and special metaphysics. Accordingly, the metaphysical systems elaborated by Wolff and Baumgarten would belong to applied metaphysics from beginning to end.

Given the results of the *Critique*, one might infer that Kant himself intended to restrict the domain of ontology to that of objects of experience. As is well known, he took himself to have demonstrated in this work that the human mind cannot achieve knowledge of ideas of reason such as the soul, the world as such, and God. Seen in this way, ontology would have to be conceived of as a discipline concerned with the application of concepts such as substance or causality not to objects as such, but to a particular kind of objects, namely, objects of possible experience.³⁹ Even the parts of Kant’s intended metaphysical system devoted to the soul, the world as such and God might be said to be restricted to this domain, for they deal with ideas of reason that according to Kant are required to conceive of objects of experience as elements of an overarching totality.⁴⁰

On the other hand, restricting ontology to the realm of experience seems difficult to square with the practical part of Kant’s intended metaphysical system, which requires

categories such as substance and causality *qua* determinations of things insofar as they can be thought.⁴¹ Since Kant's second and third descriptions of applied metaphysics do not restrict its domain to objects of experience, they seem more apt than the first one.⁴²

It is difficult to know what Kant thought about his projected ontology, however, because *Metaphysics Mrongovius* does not use this term in its explanation of what applied metaphysics amounts to. Actually, the transcript no longer uses the term "applied metaphysics," but refers to it as the "system of pure reason." This system itself falls into a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals (MMron, 29:754). Following Kant, we can leave aside the latter part. Kant tells his students that the metaphysics of nature "contains the principles of the speculative use of reason" (MMron, 29:754). His further division of this metaphysics of nature into rational physics, rational psychology, rational cosmology, and natural theology resembles the division in the Architectonic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet there is one perspicuous difference. Contrary to the Architectonic, Kant's lecture does not refer to ontology as the first part of the theoretical part of the system of pure reason.⁴³

So where has the ontology gone? Kant explains that any science rests on *a priori* concepts and principles and that the latter constitute the content of metaphysics. The only examples he offers concern the metaphysics presupposed in natural science. This science is said to presuppose, among other things, "that nothing happens without sufficient reason" and that "substance does not pass away but only the form does" (MMron, 29:755). Moreover, he notes that metaphysics in general "presents the elementary concepts, e.g., substance, necessity, as well as principles that reason makes use of in any case" (MMron, 29:755). Kant's comparison of metaphysics to the empirical sciences is very rudimentary here, but it is clear that his examples concern *a priori* principles that used to be treated in ontology. Moreover, Kant in *Metaphysics Volckmann* (1784-85) explicitly considers ontology to be a mode of applied metaphysics:

Ontology is called a transcendental philosophy, but consists in the consideration of objects by means of reason. It is an applied metaphysics (*metaphysica applicata*), through which I obtain objects by means of principles of pure reason.

Transcendental philosophy, by contrast, consists in the self-knowledge of our reason and accordingly is a science of its own, one that we take in a very specific sense.⁴⁴

Thus, we can conclude that Kant indeed relegated the discipline that used to be called ontology to the realm of applied metaphysics, thus divesting it of its status as the first, foundational part of metaphysics as such.

Yet this result does not solve all tensions between Kant's various descriptions of ontology and transcendental philosophy. Did Kant think that the metaphysical system he intended to elaborate needed to include a separate ontology or did he think his transcendental logic made the latter superfluous? Kant's apparent hesitation in this regard is brought to the fore particularly clearly in two passages from *Metaphysics Volckmann*. Both passages refer to transcendental philosophy as a propaedeutic that must precede metaphysics proper. Yet whereas the first passage associates this discipline with the self-reflexive investigation into pure reason carried out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the second associates it with ontology:

Before gathering the cognition of objects in a science, it is recommended to identify its principles; and the latter are first of all investigated in view of their origin, number, and the possibility of their use. Accordingly, transcendental philosophy is the propaedeutic to metaphysics proper. Reason first investigates its proper *a priori* capacity [*Vermögen*]; when it has cast light on the latter, it uses it and applies it to objects. (MVol, 28:359)

Kant here clearly dissociates transcendental philosophy from applied metaphysics. Yet shortly after this remark he uses the term "transcendental philosophy" to denote ontology, that is, a discipline that the same transcript counts as part of applied metaphysics. On this account, the only difference between Wolff and Kant seems to regard the latter's introduction of rational physics:

Wolff divides metaphysics into ontology, cosmology, psychology, and theology. We, by contrast, divide it into two parts, [i.e.] in transcendental philosophy or ontology and metaphysics in the strict sense of the term; the latter, in turn, consists of *physica rationalis*, *psychologia rationalis*, *cosmologia rationalis* and *theologia rationalis*. (MVol, 28:365)

Kant's description of transcendental philosophy in the first passage corresponds to his remarks on transcendental critique in the Introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, albeit that he here distinguishes critique *qua* preliminary mode of transcendental

cognition from transcendental philosophy proper (A12/B25-26). The description in the second passage, on the other hand, corresponds to Kant's division of metaphysics proper, or in the strict sense, in the Architectonic. Thus, the apparent tension between these two parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* recurs in the lectures. I think, however, that the lectures also offer some clues to solve the problem. Such a solution rests on making explicit two related distinctions that remain largely implicit in Kant's account and that his students are likely to have missed.

The first distinction goes back to *Metaphysics L₁* and was mentioned in the previous section. When using the term "ontology," Kant sometimes assesses the ontologies elaborated by Wolff and Baumgarten and sometimes puts forward his own view of the task that used to be attributed to ontology. Seen from Kant's perspective, ontology in its Wolffian guise belongs to "applied" metaphysics because it is concerned with things rather than reason itself. Yet I take Kant to hold that ontology can become enlightened about its true nature and realize that it is nothing but a logic concerned with the use of pure reason. In that case, it can shed the inadequate name of ontology and present itself as transcendental philosophy *qua* investigation into the *a priori* principles of any cognition. Evidently, such a modern, reformed guise of ontology can no longer count as a mode of applied metaphysics.

Apart from the remarks quoted above, Kant in *Metaphysics Mrongovius* clearly distinguishes between "true" transcendental philosophy and the ontology that was sometimes called by that name:

No one has had a *true* transcendental philosophy. The word has been used and understood as ontology, but (as it is easy to make out) this is not how we are taking it. In ontology one speaks of things in general, and thus actually of no thing – one is occupied with the nature of the understanding, [which consists in] thinking things – here [in ontology] we have the concepts through which we think things, namely, the pure concepts of reason – hence it is the science of the principles of the pure understanding and pure reason.⁴⁵

Although the wording is somewhat vague, I take Kant to mean that the shared core of transcendental philosophy and ontology consists in their investigation into the *a priori* principles of any cognition of objects. However, this is not to say that Kant identifies transcendental philosophy and his purified version of ontology, for the passage just quoted continues by noting that ontology conceived in this new way "belongs" to

transcendental philosophy (MMron, 29:752). I assume that the term “transcendental philosophy” here is used in a broad sense and refers to the investigation into pure reason as such. If we take his remark seriously, it follows that Kant took this investigation to include at least two strands. This brings us to the second distinction I take to underlie Kant’s reflections.

I would contend that Kant actually attributes two tasks to the discipline that he calls “transcendental philosophy” or “transcendental logic” in the lectures and “transcendental cognition” in the Introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A11-12/B25). The first task, discussed above, corresponds to the task that used to be attributed to ontology, namely, the systematic treatment of the *a priori* concepts and principles presupposed in any cognition of objects. I propose to call this strand first-order transcendental philosophy.⁴⁶ The Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be said to carry out this task, albeit without completing it, insofar as they treat space and time, the categories, and the principles of the pure understanding. This strand of transcendental philosophy might as well be called “ontology,” as Kant occasionally does in the lectures and, as we have seen, in the Architectonic.⁴⁷

At any rate, it seems to me that if Kant had proceeded to elaborate his system of pure reason, he would have had to include a separate ontology, whether called by that name or not, so as to provide the four disciplines that together make up special metaphysics with their basic principles. Since this purified version of ontology is one strand of transcendental philosophy in the broad sense, and therefore does not deal with objects, it belongs to the first, pure part of metaphysics rather than applied metaphysics. Seen in this way, the question whether Kant assigned ontology to pure or applied metaphysics is misguided. The answer depends on whether we are considering his account of Wolffian metaphysics or rather his own view as to the rational core of the latter. The same holds true of Kant’s seemingly incongruous comments on transcendental philosophy. This brings us to the second distinction.

Kant’s concept of transcendental philosophy is not exhausted by the first-order investigation into the *a priori* concepts and principles of any cognition of objects. The second task Kant attributes to transcendental philosophy cannot be aligned with the Wolffian division of metaphysics, because it consists in the second-order reflection on the conditions under which metaphysics can become a science in the first place and, as the *Critique of Pure Reason* puts it, constitutes “a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries” (A11/B25). Like its first-order counterpart, this second-order investigation, or transcendental critique, deals with the *a priori* principles of

any cognition, that is, with pure reason itself. For this reason, it belongs to transcendental philosophy. Yet transcendental critique investigates pure reason not in view of its products, i.e., concepts and principles, but in view of their origin and the activities carried out by the human mind independently of experience. For this reason, it must precede first-order transcendental philosophy and thus metaphysics in the strict sense as such.⁴⁸ This second-order strand can be found throughout the Transcendental Logic and is, in many cases, intertwined with the first-order strand of transcendental philosophy discussed above.

Depending on the context, or for reasons hard to determine, Kant sometimes foregrounds the one strand, sometimes the other, and sometimes refers to either of them as transcendental philosophy without qualification. I hold, however, that his various accounts agree at least insofar as they maintain that the theoretical part of metaphysics exemplified by Baumgarten's treatise must be preceded by a preliminary investigation into its very possibility and limits, and that metaphysics proper must deal with, first, the pure concepts and *a priori* principles that underlie any cognition of objects and, second, the more specific pure concepts and *a priori* principles without which it would be impossible to achieve systematic knowledge of nature. As I hope has become clear, these three tasks correspond to (1) what Kant calls transcendental critique, (2) what Kant considered transcendental philosophy in the narrow sense of the term and the Wolffians called general metaphysics or ontology, and (3) what the Wolffians called applied or special metaphysics.

V. Conclusion

Even apart from textual difficulties, it goes without saying that Kant's classes on metaphysics, drawing, in most cases, on Baumgarten's textbook, need not adequately represent his own views at a certain point in time. Yet I hope to have shown that the various versions of the introductory sections reflect important developments in Kant's published works. In their own way, they shed light on the genesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as well as on Kant's understanding of its main aim, namely, to prepare the ground for a metaphysical system worthy of the name "science." Above all, we can learn from the lectures that, for Kant, such a system had to be purely intellectual, yet purged of the ambition to determine particular objects by intellectual means alone. By thus giving the positive strand of Kant's critique of metaphysics its due, the lectures support the view that Kant's criticism of his Wolffian predecessors became more radical over time, but never took the form of a radical departure. Even though Kant came to give priority to

other endeavors, his lectures show him to be on his way to the metaphysical system exemplified, albeit imperfectly so, by Baumgarten's work.

¹ See ML1, 28:175-77. I will disregard Kant's sketchy treatment of this issue. I also largely pass over transcripts from the 1790s, since their content corresponds to earlier versions or well-known sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

² See A12-13/B26, Bxv-xix; Prol, 4:255-7. To my knowledge, the prolegomena to Kant's lectures on metaphysics have not been the subject of separate investigations. Lorini 2013, relying on Heinze's *Vorlesungen Kants über Metaphysik aus drei Semestern* (1894), focuses on Kant's account of ontology in *Metaphysics L_I* and provides detailed information about philological issues. Recent accounts of the lectures on metaphysics further include Ameriks 1992, Lorini 2015, and Fugate 2015. Each of these authors challenge the prevailing view that Kant came to reject the metaphysics of his predecessors. However, Ameriks deals much less with Kant's shifting thoughts on ontology and transcendental philosophy than the title of his article suggests. In many respects, my approach is in agreement with Fugate's.

³ Whereas Ameriks 1992 and Lorini 2015, in line with earlier commentators, stress the ambiguity of Kant's various accounts, the present chapter, drawing on De Boer 2011, seeks to bring out their coherence by distinguishing between Wolff's conception of metaphysics, Kant's presentation of it, his identification of its rational core, and his own account.

⁴ Wolff 1747, Preface to the first edition, unpaginated. Most of the preface is devoted to the method Wolff takes himself to have used in the work.

⁵ Wolff 1747, Preface to the fourth edition, § 2.

⁶ Crusius 1744, §4, cf. §10-16. See Perin 2015 for a discussion of Wolff, Crusius, and the early Kant on this issue.

⁷ Crusius 1766, Preface, 3, cf. § 6. Thus, Crusius, like Kant after him, introduces the terms "necessary" and "*a priori*" to improve the Wolffian definition of metaphysics. On this, see Heimsoeth 1956, p. 134. Heimsoeth's study, originally published in 1923, offers a comprehensive and illuminating account of Crusius's metaphysics and Kant's response to it; see also Kanzian 1993.

⁸ Crusius 1766, § 46, cf. §48, 50, 54.

⁹ Kant praises Crusius on this point in his contemporaneous *Prize Essay* of 1763, referring to the judgment “bodies are composite” as one of the “first material principles of the human mind” (UD, 2:295).

¹⁰ Given this affinity, I think it is likely that at least the prolegomena to *Metaphysics L_I* stems from, or goes back to, the early 1770s. Obviously, this need not be true of later sections.

¹¹ Kant repeats this point in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A44/B61).

¹² Empirical concepts, Kant notes in the *Dissertation*, “do not, in virtue of being raised to greater universality, become intellectual in the real sense, nor do they pass beyond the species of sensible cognition; no matter how high they ascend, as a result of abstraction, they always remain sensible” (MSI, 2:394).

¹³ “Whatever in cognition is sensible depends upon the particular nature of the subject, . . . it is clear that sensible thoughts are representations of things *such as they appear*, while intellectual thoughts are representations of things *such as they are*” (MSI, 2:392). See Moledo 2016 for an illuminating interpretation of the *Dissertation*, one that likewise stresses both the critical, propedeutic character of the text and Kant’s innovative determination of metaphysics as a purely intellectual mode of philosophy. On this topic, see also De Boer 2018.

¹⁴ Letter to Lambert, September 2, 1770 (Br, 10:98; emphasis mine, translation modified). Kant here likewise refers to the preparatory discipline he envisions as a “propedeutic science.”

¹⁵ MSI, 2:413. Crusius is never mentioned by name. For a helpful overview of the eighteenth-century debate on whether the soul can be present in space as well as of Kant’s various positions in this regard up to the *Dissertation*, see Heßbrüggen-Walter 2014.

¹⁶ Kant explains that “since the laws of sensible cognition are not conditions of the possibility of things themselves, *should the predicate be a sensible concept*, it will not be valid of *the subject which is thought by the understanding*, and thus cannot be asserted objectively. Thus, in the case of the common axiom “whatever exists, is somewhere,” the predicate pertains to the condition of sensible cognition, which entails that it cannot be asserted of the subject of the judgement in general, namely, of anything

that exists whatsoever. Accordingly, this formula is false if taken in an objective sense” (MSI, 2:412n.; translation modified).

¹⁷ MSI, 2:413-414; cf. 419. As Heimsoeth 1956, p. 180, points out, Crusius’s *Enwurf* affirms both points (Crusius 1766, § 250, 253).

¹⁸ See MMron, 29:749; MVol, 28:357-58; A843/B871-72.

¹⁹ While Kant seems to be indebted to Crusius’s definition of metaphysics, he seems to hold that Crusius did not live up to it by defining existence as such in spatio-temporal terms.

²⁰ Wolff’s *Discursus praeliminaris* defines mathematical cognition as cognition of “the quantity of things” (Dp, §14). Kant criticizes his own earlier use of the distinction between quality and quantity in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A714-15/B742-43).

²¹ Fugate 2015, p. 75, rightly notes that Kant’s new definition of metaphysics in *Metaphysics L_I*, contrary to Baumgarten’s, is “subjective” in that it presupposes the distinction between the receptivity and spontaneity of the human mind. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant holds on to the idea of metaphysics as an *a priori* and purely rational science that possesses well defined borders (cf. Axiv, Axx, Bxiv, A14-15/B28-29; see also Prol, 4:265). This approach to metaphysics abstracts from the question as to what kind of objects can actually be known independently of experience, a question that obviously takes center stage in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and so tends to overshadow the features this work has in common with the *Dissertation*. Since Kant’s metaphysical system was supposed to *treat* pure concepts and principles rather than *use* them in order to determine objects, it would not have had to rely on pure intuition. I also agree with Fugate 2015, p. 82, in this regard.

²² The German is not very clear at this point. I take it that “diese,” referring back to “Erfahrungen,” needs to be added. Crusius likewise maintains that a discerning mind might “abstract the whole of ontology from any truly actual thing that presents itself to the senses” (Crusius 1766, § 9).

²³ Kant states in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that “even among our experiences cognitions are mixed in [*sich mengen*] that must have their origin *a priori* and that perhaps serve only to establish connections among our representations of the senses” (A2; cf. B1-2).

²⁴ Kant offers a similar, but not quite identical division a few pages later (ML1, 28:177). What was called pure somatology is here said to deal with the rational grounds of both empirical knowledge and judgments of taste. Natural theology is ranged under both pure and applied metaphysics, which suggests the note-taker or editor was confused.

²⁵ Cf. A845-47/B873-75.

²⁶ Cf. BM, § 503.

²⁷ “By contrast, the *psychologia empirica* does not belong to metaphysics at all, but has been added to the latter out of ignorance” (ML1, 28:175; cf. MMron, 28:756-57).

²⁸ R 5081, AA 18:82 (1776-1778). Similarly, the *Critique of Pure Reason* notes with respect to Wolff that he gave the first example of “the way in which the secure course of a science is to be taken,” and that he would actually have been able to “move a science such as metaphysics into this condition, if only it had occurred to him to prepare the field for it by a critique of the organ, namely, of pure reason itself” (Bxxxvi).

²⁹ Similar passages can be found, for example, in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (cf. TG, 2:368). See also R 4152, dated 1769-70 (AA 17:436).

³⁰ Cf. MSI, 2:407, 412. It seems to me that Kant in *Metaphysics L₁* and elsewhere, including the *Inaugural Dissertation*, does not yet distinguish between the understanding and reason, but refers to non-sensible concepts in general.

³¹ Cf. MVol, 28:59.

³² Bxxxvi, cf. Axx-xxi, Bxxx, A11-12/B25-26, A13/B27, A707-708/B735-36, A841/B869. The fact that Kant elsewhere in the *Critique* rejects Wolff’s view that philosophy should employ the same method as mathematics (A726-27/B754-55) does not imply he rejected Wolff’s method in all respects. On this, see Zöller 2001, p. 55-56.

³³ See, among other texts, Kant’s letters to Jakob of September 11, 1787 (Br, 10:494), to Herz of May 26, 1789 (Br, 11:48-9), and to Beck of January 20, 1792 (Br, 11:313). Kant encouraged Jakob to publish “a short system of metaphysics” that treats categories and predicables “just as they can be found in Baumgarten.”

³⁴ See Ameriks 2006, p. 257-8. One of the reasons why Ameriks considers it difficult to get clear on Kant’s take on metaphysics is “the fact that Kant’s own written work hardly presents a thorough treatment of ‘immanent’ ontology” (Ameriks 2006, p. 258). This alleged difficulty disappears, I argue in this section, if we assume that the core of Kant’s

intended ontology is elaborated in the Transcendental Analytic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself.

³⁵ Kant uses the Latin terms *metaphysica pura* and *applicata*. Cf. MVol, 28:359.

³⁶ Cf. MVol, 28:362. The transcript here is very repetitive, which suggests it is compiled from various sources, and seems to contain errors; I disregard the problematic passages. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant likewise defines transcendental cognition by drawing a distinction between the consideration of objects and *a priori* concepts of objects (A11-12; cf. B25).

³⁷ See MVol, 28:360; MMron, 29:753. Wolff uses the term “transcendental cosmology” to refer to his general or rational cosmology (Dp, § 78), that is, to a treatment of the essential determinations of the world. Kant refers to the Wolffian use of the term “transcendental,” at ML1, 28:195 and uses it in this sense himself at ML1 28:177 to distinguish pure metaphysics, called “transcendental metaphysics,” from applied metaphysics. I disagree with Lorini 2015, p. 114, on this point. In his view, Kant’s use of the term “transcendental” here signals a break with the *Dissertation*. Krouglov 2004 explains that Tetens, in line with Wolff, used an equivalent of the term “transcendental philosophy” to denote the first part of metaphysics in *Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie* (1775). In a note dated 1776-1778 Kant distinguishes his own notion of transcendental philosophy from Tetens’s psychological investigation into the production of concepts (R 4900, AA, 18:23, cf. R 4901, AA, 18:23). By contrast, Hinske 1970, p. 31-34, stresses the impact of Tetens’s conception of transcendental philosophy on Kant’s own. I discuss Wolff and Kant’s use of the term “transcendental” and related terms in De Boer 2011, though with less emphasis on the lectures.

³⁸ Here as elsewhere, this may have been caused by the combination of notes from different note-takers and/or lectures.

³⁹ See MDoh, 28:617. This transcript stems from 1792-93.

⁴⁰ Cf. A643-44/B671-72, A845-46/B873-74. While the lectures note that rational cosmology and theology are relevant to the investigation into sensible objects, they do not specify the role of these disciplines (cf. MMron, 29:754; MVol, 28:365).

⁴¹ Cf. KpV, 5:5-6, 65, 136.

⁴² This view is supported by *Metaphysics Volckmann*, where Kant refers to the objects of applied metaphysics in general as “objects of pure reason” and “objects” (MVol, 28:360).

⁴³ MMron, 29:754-55; cf. A846-47/B874-75.

⁴⁴ MVol, 28:360-61. The introductory section of this lecture series has not been included in the Cambridge translation of the lectures on metaphysics. Translations from this text are my own.

⁴⁵ MMron, 29:752; cf. MVol, 28:363.

⁴⁶ On this, see De Boer 2011.

⁴⁷ A12/B25-26, A81-83/B107-109. As Kant points out in these passages, however, his treatment of *a priori* concepts and principles here does not amount to a full-blown transcendental philosophy, for unlike Baumgarten’s ontology it does not include a discussion of derivative pure concepts such as force or change.

⁴⁸ In line with A12/B25-26, *Metaphysics Mrongovius* considers transcendental philosophy to be “the result of critique, for if I can represent the extent and the sources in a connection, then the connected representation of the *a priori* principles is transcendental philosophy, and if I take all the consequences that flow from it, then that is metaphysics” (MMron, 29:785; cf. ML2, 28:541). Clearly, Kant here uses the term “transcendental philosophy” to denote its first-order branch alone. This strict division between critique and transcendental philosophy has the disadvantage, however, of obliterating their common ground, namely, the investigation into pure concepts and principles. As said, Kant repeatedly uses the term “transcendental philosophy,” in the broad sense, to refer to this common ground. By contrast, *Metaphysics Volckmann* refers to critique as “transcendental philosophy proper” (MVol, 28:378), here using the term with regard to the second-order discipline that must precede any effort to establish a metaphysical system.