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A Comparative Analysis of "Good Citizenship": A Latent Class Analysis of Adolescents' Citizenship Norms in 38 Countries

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Abstract

Various authors have claimed that citizenship norms have changed dramatically in contemporary societies. Recent research has studied the implications of Russell Dalton's argument that dutybased citizenship norms (emphasizing voting and obeying the law) are being replaced by engaged citizenship norms (emphasizing self-expressive and non-institutionalized forms of participation). In this article we use the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Survey (ICCS 2009, n=140,650) to ascertain the cross-national empirical validity of engaged and duty-based norms. By means of latent class analysis, we show that both of these citizenship norms are indeed adhered to by different groups of adolescents. We also show however that only half of the research population holds these two norms, while other more traditional norms are also identified. The findings confirm expectations that high-status respondents with low political trust are more likely to adhere to engaged norms are less prevalent in highly developed stable democracies, and this casts doubts on the hypothesis that new engaged citizenship norms are predominantly found in stable highly-developed democracies.

Keywords: citizenship norms, ICCS 2009, latent class analysis, engaged citizenship, duty-based citizenship

SUMM A RY

Introduction

There can be little doubt that the relationship between citizens and the political system has altered in a dramatic manner in recent decades. In the literature, however, there is a strong disagreement about how to understand these transformations and how to assess their likely consequences for the future stability of democratic systems. Some of the literature describes these changes as a reduced willingness to engage in politics and community life (Pharr & Putnam, 2000). Other authors point to the fact that highly educated citizens and younger age cohorts are more strongly motivated by self-expressive values, and that they are less likely to adopt a deferential attitude toward those holding political power (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris, 1999). In an influential study on citizenship norms, Dalton (2008) claimed that contemporary democracies are witnessing a decline of duty-based forms of citizenship, in favor of a more intrinsically engaged citizenship concept. Engaged citizens, according to Dalton (2008, 81) are driven by self-expressive values, and while they are likely to engage in various forms of political participation, they tend to avoid elite-defined forms of engagement.

In the literature on changes in citizenship norms, the assumption is that the rise of new citizenship norms will alter the nature of democratic linkage mechanisms between citizens and the political system. Despite these strong claims about evolving value orientations among citizens, there has been little empirical research thus far about the kind of citizenship norms that are actually supported by citizens of contemporary democracies.

The aim of the current article is therefore to investigate the structure and determinants of citizenship norms using recent representative data from a large and diverse group of contemporary democracies. The analysis sheds new light on the main trend in the literature on political value change which explains the emergence of new citizenship norms by referring to broad social changes, most notably the rise of average education levels in industrial countries and generational replacement (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). If this is the case, however, a comparable trend should be found in all highly developed countries with rising average education levels and high levels of economic development and therefore it is important to determine which groups of the population adhere to these new norms.

Our analysis is based on the results of the large scale (n=140,650) International Civic and Citizenship Education Survey (ICCS) that was conducted in 2009 in 38 countries (Schulz, Ainley, & Fraillon, 2011). This survey is well-suited to test theories of citizenship norms and values change because it includes an extensive battery of questions posed to adolescents regarding citizenship norms in a wide variety of national contexts. The focus on adolescents is analytically relevant because Dalton (2007) suggests that this age group drives generational values changes, and because young people are most likely to be affected by current development trends (Sherrod, 2008). Since research has shown that adolescents have already developed a coherent understanding of citizenship roles (van Deth, Abendschön, & Vollmar, 2011), the focus on this age group has an additional advantage that results cannot be driven by age differences in citizenship norms, but rather reflect a reliable comparative picture of citizenship norms among a well-defined segment of the population. These data are analyzed using latent class analysis, a technique that allows us to determine whether the distinct norms of engaged and duty-based citizenship are cross-nationally valid concepts. Further, we investigate which individual-level and country-level factors influence whether actors adhere to different citizenship norms, in order to ascertain the claim that especially in highly developed democratic systems duty-based citizenship norms are eroding.

Results

Citizenship Norms Identified Cross-nationally

The indicators of good citizenship used in this analysis, listed in Table 1, indicate that on average, adolescents tend to consider some elements more important than others. There is an almost universal consensus that obeying the law is important for good citizenship, but protecting the environment and human rights is also high on the priority list. Discussing politics, or joining a political party, on the other hand, are considered as important by less than half of the respondents.

The latent class analysis is based on these twelve indicators of good citizenship, with country as a covariate. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is the most widely used statistic for identifying optimal solutions, and a smaller BIC indicates better model fit. An additional approach that complements the BIC statistic is to assess the percent reduction of the likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic L^2 in comparison to the one-LC model (Magidson & Vermunt 2004, 176-177). Even though the goodness of fit statistics in Table 2 show that the absolute value of the BIC still decreases up through the seven-LC model, there is relatively little improvement in the percentage reduction of the L^2 in the six-LC and seven-LC models. The seven-LC solution is clearly not preferable because of the small reduction in the L^2 and increased classification error. The substantive results of the five-LC and six-LC models were compared, showing that the six-LC solution identified a sixth group that lacked distinct normative emphases on the good citizenship indicators. Given these considerations, we opted for a five latent class solution.

[Table 2 About Here]

In sum, the preferred model for this analysis identifies five distinct latent classes that represent distinctive citizenship norms held by different groups of survey respondents. Two of these normative types correspond quite well to the expected normative emphases of engaged and duty-based citizens, as shown in Figure 1.

[Figure 1 About Here]

The group labeled 'engaged' (25 percent of the research population) is very likely to attribute importance to typically postmodern sensitivities like promoting human rights, protecting the environment and helping people in the community. At the same time, members of the engaged group have notably low probabilities for attributing importance to electoral and elite-defined activities such as voting and party membership. The analysis also identifies a 'duty-based' group (20 percent of the research population) whose preferences and priorities are often opposite to those of the engaged citizens. This group attributes relatively a low priority to promoting human rights and protecting the environment. Voting, on the other hand, is seen as important and this group is also characterized by the importance they give to political parties. Although these groups are fairly similar to each other on some indicators of good citizenship, their distinctively different normative emphases align with the two ideal types of citizens described by Dalton. Yet, these two groups together add up to only 45 percent of the research population.

Figure 2 presents the norms that are held by the remaining 55 percent of the research population. A small group (six percent) has relatively low probabilities of attributing importance to the variety of behaviors investigated in this research. In line with Almond and Verba (1963), these respondents could be called 'subjects' given their relative emphasis on the importance of obeying rather than actively participating. The group labeled 'respectful citizens' (18 percent of the research population) is characterized by a particularly high score on the item 'it is important to show respect for government representatives'. Members of this group attribute relatively high importance to most other behaviors as well, but do not consider discussing politics to be an important component of good citizenship. Finally, the largest group of respondents (32 percent), which we describe as 'all-around citizens' believes that all possibilities offered are very important (with only the behavior of joining a political party obtaining a meaningfully lower score, but still well above the average of the whole sample). Additional data would be required to adjudicate between several possible interpretations regarding why this group has high scores on all items, including social desirability, genuinely high expectations about what a good citizen should do, or youthful lack of developed priorities regarding good citizenship. What is clear, however, is that all three of these groups, which together make up more than half of the research population, do not adhere to the normative profiles discussed most prominently in the literature of duty-based or engaged citizenship.

[Figure 2 About Here]

In sum, in relation to the first research question of this article, the findings confirm that the distinction introduced by Dalton in his analysis of U.S. data is empirically valid in this crossnational analysis: the latent class analysis identifies two distinctive groups of engaged citizens and duty-based citizens that contrast strongly with regard to their priorities for good citizenship. It is noteworthy, however, that these two groups account for only 45 percent of all respondents. In other words, slightly more than half of all respondents in this international research project did not fit the typology that has become prominent in the recent literature on citizenship norms. Indeed, it is important to note that more traditional citizenship concepts such as 'respectful' and 'subject' citizenship norms are identified even among adolescents.

Individual and Country-level Determinants of Citizenship Norms

The latent class analysis has shown that engaged and duty-based citizenship norms can be empirically distinguished. Based on the literature our expectation is that the engaged citizenship norm will be more prevalent among adolescents with a higher socio-economic status, and it is customary in research on adolescents to operationalize this characteristics by an estimation of the number of books at home. The same holds for those with higher levels of political sophistication, where we can rely on measures of respondents' educational goals and level of political interest. Intensive media use is also included as a control variable because it is expected to contribute to political sophistication, particularly for the young age groups (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Dalton (2008) expects that the engaged citizenship norm will be associated with lower levels of political institutions. Engaged norms are expected to be more common among adolescent girls, who already highly value non-institutionalized forms of political participation, in comparison to boys of that age (Hooghe & Stolle, 2004). Finally, on the country level, the expectation is that these citizenship norms will be most prevalent in economically advanced countries with a longer

tradition of stable democracy. In these countries it is expected that citizens develop more selfexpressive values and a more critical attitude toward political authorities (Welzel & Inglehart, 2005). Question wording and descriptive statistics can be found in appendix.

As a first step for this analysis, we list the distribution across countries (Table 3). These data already hint at the fact that the distribution of citizenship norms does not always respond to theoretical expectations. While in the total sample, 25 percent of all respondents was assigned to engaged citizenship norms, it can be observed that the highest scores here are recorded in countries like Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, this citizenship norm is hardly found in Indonesia or the Dominican Republic. In the overall sample, 20 percent of all respondents was assigned to the duty-based citizenship concept. The highest scores for this form of citizenship concept, however, are recorded in advanced democracies like Switzerland and Denmark. Duty-based citizenship is hardly present in countries like Colombia, Guatemala and Taiwan.

[Table 3 About Here]

The distribution of citizenship norms in Table 3 clarifies that there are strong variations between countries, and therefore it is worthwhile to investigate the factors determining citizenship norms. In line with the second research question, we investigate the factors that influence the likelihood to adhere to a particular citizenship type (i.e. engaged, duty-based, subject, respectful or all-around citizen) using a multinomial multilevel model, with duty-based citizens as a reference category to allow for a direct comparison between engaged and duty-based citizenship norms. Given the fact that the country-level variables are closely related, they could not be included simultaneously in the analysis, forcing us to construct three different models for every citizenship type. It also has to be noted that this regression analysis remains limited to 34

countries because not all data were available for the small countries or territories of Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Malta and Liechtenstein.

From a theoretical perspective, the most relevant comparison is the direct comparison between engaged and duty-based citizenship norms. When we first investigate the individual level determinants (Table 4), it is obvious that most expectations are confirmed. Engaged citizenship norms are more likely to be found among girls, and among respondents where the high number of books at home indicates a higher socio-economic status. Media-use too contributes to the developed of engaged citizenship norms. Those adhering to engaged norms, are characterized by higher levels of generalized trust, but they have less trust in political institutions. This suggests that engaged citizens indeed adopt a more critical outlook toward the functioning of political institutions, which is in line with what we would expect based on the literature.

If we subsequently turn to the country-level variables, results are counter-intuitive. In fact, engaged citizenship norms are less likely to be found in richer countries and in stable democracies, as both the years of stable democracy and the GDP/capita have a significantly negative effect. To express it differently: while in the literature it is expect that in highly-developed stable democracies engaged citizenship norms will prevail, the results of our analysis suggest that in fact duty-based citizenship concepts are predominant. Given space restrictions, we can only briefly mention some result on the other types. It is clear that the subject citizenship concept is characterized by a lack of political interest and political efficacy. Respectful citizens, on the other hand are strongly interested and this type is more prevalent in recent democracies. The all-around citizens, finally, have high levels of trust in political institutions, while this norm too is concentrated in recent democracies. So while on the individual level the expectations about

the prevalence and the distribution of these engaged norms are largely confirmed, we find the opposite pattern at the country level: duty-based citizenship norms seems to prevail in highly developed and stable democracies.

Discussion

This article contributes to the theoretical debate on citizenship norms in three main ways, which we elaborate upon in this discussion. First, the concepts of duty-based and engaged citizenship are identified in a large group of diverse countries. The findings also show, however, that these two citizenship concepts do not cover the full range of normative concepts that respondents actually hold. Finally, while the individual-level determinants of engaged and duty-based citizenship norms generally follow theoretical expectations in the literature, the country-level findings diverge in several ways from theoretical expectations.

The findings document our use of latent class analysis to ascertain that there are indeed distinct groups of respondents who express either engaged or duty-based citizenship norms. While Dalton (2008) proposed this distinction based on a factor analysis in a single country (the U.S.) and confirmed it with a select group of advanced democracies (Dalton 2007), we can now support the cross-national validity of the existence of these citizenship norms based on a latent class analysis of respondents in 38 countries. Both groups can be clearly distinguished since they are opposed on a number of vital indicators of good citizenship. Engaged citizens score very high on the importance of protecting human rights, but they downplay the importance of traditionally duty-based behaviors like voting and political party involvement. Engaged citizens also strongly emphasize the importance of contributing to the local community. For the duty-based citizens, however, we find opposite normative emphases.

The current analysis therefore clearly lends comparative data support for the claim put forward by Dalton and other authors that engaged and duty-based citizenship norms are prevalent in a variety of contemporary democracies. This finding has important implications for future participation patterns of today's youth. If the Dalton thesis about generational replacement of duty-based citizenship norms by engaged citizenship norms will prove to be correct in future research, a decline in duty-based norms could indeed explain emerging trends which show that contemporary young age cohorts are characterized by lower voter turnout figures in comparison to their counterparts a generation ago. Simultaneously, however, we can expect that younger age groups will be more inclined to participate in various forms of non-institutionalized participation.

An important caveat to be added to Dalton's thesis, however, based on the findings in this article, is that the distinction between duty-based and engaged citizenship tells only part of the story. While the proportion of citizens who adhere to these two types of citizenship norms is large enough to have the potential for real-life impact on political outcomes such as environmental action and electoral turnout, it has to be noted that only about half of all respondents belong to these two groups, while the other half adhere to other citizenship norms. Indeed, there is a substantial group of respondents that adheres to what we might call rather traditional citizenship norms that invoke respect for authorities or the duty to obey the law. In line with the reasoning developed by Almond and Verba (1963), our findings suggest that traditional citizenship norms will not simply disappear, but rather continue to linger on in populations along with more recent engaged norms.

For the determinants of citizenship norms, it is important to distinguish individual level and country level findings. The individual-level findings generally confirmed expectations in the literature that girls and high-status respondents are indeed more likely to adhere to engaged citizenship norms. On the country-level, however, the findings did not support the argument made by authors such as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) that self-expressive values and corresponding citizenship norms will develop mostly in advanced societies and democracies. Even the opposite phenomenon occurred as adolescents in established democracies are more supportive of duty-based citizenship norms.

(...)

		All-around Engaged Duty-based (32%) (25%) (20%)		Respectful (18%)	Subject (6%)	
AUT	Austria	17	26	41	07	08
BFL	Belgium (Dutch)	14	51	23	02	11
BGR	Bulgaria	21	56	06	12	04
CHE	Switzerland	18	20	46	08	09
CHL	Chile	20	26	09	41	04
COL	Colombia	20	23	04	51	02
CYP	Cyprus	44	10	30	10	05
CZE	Czech Republic	15	63	10	00	11
DNK	Denmark	13	16	45	16	10
DOM	Dominican Rep.	23	04	13	60	01
ENG	United Kingdom	34	28	26	04	08
ESP	Spain	29	36	15	16	05
EST	Estonia	14	47	19	13	07
FIN	Finland	13	47	19	07	14
GRC	Greece	33	40	23	02	03
GTM	Guatemala	29	10	04	56	01
HKG	Hong Kong	45	16	19	16	04
IDN	Indonesia	43	00	10	47	00
IRL	Ireland	39	26	18	12	05
ITA	Italy	52	05	20	21	01
KOR	Korea	71	06	19	00	03
LIE	Liechtenstein	14	23	44	09	10
LTU	Lithuania	28	15	33	19	04
LUX	Luxembourg	22	20	39	10	09
LVA	Latvia	35	23	36	03	04
MEX	Mexico	41	18	17	20	04
MLT	Malta	24	22	24	26	05
NLD	Netherlands	16	28	42	01	13
NOR	Norway	44	20	15	17	04
NZL	New Zealand	29	24	27	10	09
POL	Poland	32	11	29	24	04
PRY	Paraguay	19	14	08	57	02
RUS	Russia	36	10	23	27	04
SVK	Slovakia	15	59	16	01	10
SVN	Slovenia	19	43	21	08	10
SWE	Sweden	21	47	17	02	14
THA	Thailand	69	01	14	15	01
TWN	Taiwan	40	47	04	04	05

Table 3. Distribution of Citizenship Norms Across Countries


Entries are the percentage of respondents in a country that belongs to one of the five latent classes identified in the LCA analysis (Table 2 and Figure 1).

	Engaged			Subject				Respectful		All-around		
	В	В	В	В	В	В	В	B	В	В	В	В
Individual level	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
Female	0.159***	0.155***	0.016***	-0.112	-0.140*	-0.115*	0.204***	0.194***	0.203***	0.094**	0.083*	0.094**
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.030)
SES proxy ^a												
< 25 books	-0.186***	-0.198***	-0.168**	-0.051	0.031	-0.002	0.241***	0.079	0.159*	-0.075	-0.092	-0.097
	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.058)
25-100 books	-0.048	-0.051	-0.039	-0.051	-0.031	-0.027	0.118*	0.045	0.079	-0.039	-0.044	-0.049
	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Education goal ^b	0.029	0.028	0.045	-0.105*	-0.052	-0.069	0.092	0.061	0.063	0.068	0.067	0.064
	(0.046)	(0.046	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Media use	0.048*	0.060**	0.050*	-0.094**	-0.078*	-0.075*	0.070*	0.040	0.046	-0.017	-0.021	-0.028
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.021)
Political interest	-0.088*	-0.066	-0.072	-0.335***	-0.334***	-0.301***	0.148***	0.120**	0.131**	0.276***	0.301***	0.278***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.0410)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.036)
Institutional	-0.046	-0.064*	-0.049	-0.233***	-0.287***	-0.267***	0.063	0.106**	0.107**	0.094	0.092*	0.114**
trust	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.043)
Internal	-0.127***	-0.139***	-0.129***	-0.266***	-0.266***	-0.257***	0.067	0.023	0.050	0.069*	0.031	0.060
efficacy	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Generalized	0.140***	0.132***	0.134***	0.084*	0.055	0.074	0.010	0.037	0.013	0.076**	0.077**	0.074**
trust	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Country level												
GDP/capita		-0.000**			0.000			-0.001***			-0.001***	
		(0.000)			(0.000)			(0.000)			(0.000)	
Democracy			-0.005**			-0.002			-0.012***			-0.008***
(years stable)			(0.002)			(0.001)			(0.002)			(0.001)
Constant	0.003	0.193**				-1.309***	-	-0.283***	-0.338***	0.281**	0.467***	0.398***
	(0.074)	(0.064)	0.071	-1.314***	-1.184***	(0.082)	0.510***	(0.081)	(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.064)	(0.080)
			(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.078)		(0.092)					

Table 4. Multilevel Multinomial Model Explaining Citizenship Types


Source: 2009 ICCS. n= 107,176; 34 countries. Notes: Results of a multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis. Reference category = duty-based citizens. Log likelihood_{M1}= 152,824.98. Log likelihood_{M2} = -143,137.94. . Log likelihood_{M3} = -152,499.06. Variance_{M1}: 0.063 (0.005). Variance_{M2}: 0.045 (0.003). Variance_{M3}: 0.054 (0.001). ^{a.} Reference category is '>100 books'. ^{b.} Reference category is tertiary education. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.


Figure 1. Citizenship Norms: Engaged and Duty-based



Legend: Citizenship norm, followed by percentage of the population adhering to this norm

Note: Latent Class Analysis conditional probabilities for two of the five latent classes identified in the five-class model (together constituting 45% of the research population). The y-axis plots the conditional probabilities that members of a latent class will consider the indicators on the x-axis to be important elements of good citizenship. Indicators on the x-axis are organized from left to right by decreasing means, and the sample mean is listed beneath the x-axis labels in parentheses.





Note: Latent Class Analysis conditional probabilities for the remaining three latent classes identified in the five-class model.