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Mo Zi Research in the People's Republic of China

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Contemporary Chinese Thought

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Mo Zi Research in the People's Republic of China

Editors' Introduction

CARINE DEFOORT, ANNICK GIJSBERS, AND LEE TING-MIEN

3

"Filial Piety," "Three Years Mourning," and "Love"

Differences in Positions and Debate Between the
Confucians and Mohists

GUO QIYONG

12

A Study on the Dating of the *Mozi* Dialogues and the Mohist View of Ghosts and Spirits

DING SIXIN

39

Author Index to *Contemporary Chinese Thought*,

Volume 42 (Fall 2010/Winter 2010–2011–Summer 2011)

88

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CARINE DEFOORT, ANNICK GIJSBERS,
AND LEE TING-MIEN

Mo Zi Research in the People's Republic of China

Editors' Introduction

Where was Mo Zi born? Was his hometown Tengzhou in Shandong province, where the Mozi International Research Center and the China Mozi Institute are now based? Or was it Lushan county (in the past called Luyang) in Henan province, where the Henansheng Mozi Institute has been active for over a decade? This is one of the topics discussed in China today. Although far from being the dominant debate in contemporary *Mozi* research, it does show how historical research, *in casu* about the person to whom the book *Mozi* is attributed, is embedded in many other concerns—concerns that are institutional, economic, touristic, and cultural. Trying to determine Mo Zi's true hometown is not a small matter for regions that want to exploit all their potential: attract funding, organize meetings, install a reputation for themselves, and create a firm identification with a part of China's cultural heritage. Despite such undeniable broader embeddings, however, *Mozi* research in China has always reached beyond these concerns and has also been steered by various intellectual and academic interests. The two papers in this issue, by scholars of Wuhan University, Guo Qiyong and Ding Sixin, give a good impression of contemporary *Mozi* research in China. We begin with an overview of *Mozi* studies tentatively divided into six stages.

Carine Defoort is the editor of *Contemporary Chinese Thought*. Annick Gijssbers and Lee Ting-mien are doctoral students at K.U. Leuven.

An Overview of *Mozi* Studies in China

We know from Mencius's worries about "heterodox" influences that Mo Di (ca. 479–381) was perceived as a serious challenge to early Ru ideals in the late Warring States period (*Mencius* 3B9).¹ Interest in Mohism seems to have evaporated during the imperial era, however. Only during the Qing dynasty was there a revival of textual research of the book *Mozi*: among the most influential *Mozi* scholars were Bi Yuan (1730–1797), Wang Niansun (1744–1832), Wang Yinzhi (1766–1834), Yu Yue (1821–1907), and Sun Yirang (1848–1908). This was a first and very fruitful stage of *Mozi* research in China.

It was followed by a second stage in the late Qing and Republican era, when interest in Mo Zi's thought was stimulated by its perceived similarity with Western or modern thinking; hence, the focus on Mohist views on logic, science, and technology. Liang Qichao (1873–1929) and Hu Shi (1891–1962) were the most remarkable representatives of that era. Liang was the first scholar to study *Mozi* specifically for its philosophical content. His interest in the book was inspired by Sun Yirang's work, more particularly his reconstruction of the Mohist Canon (*Mojing*). But Liang soon became a fervent promoter of Mohist moral, social, and political ideas as an indigenous inspiration for saving the nation.² Hu Shi strove for the "dethronement of Confucianism" and discovered in Mohist "utilitarianism" and "pragmatism" the basis for modern concepts such as rationality, equality, democracy, and meritocracy, which were thus found to be "not totally alien to the Chinese mind."³ In the days of the May Fourth movement, Mohism was often discussed in opposition to Confucianism.⁴ A recurrent research topic in this respect contained speculations about the demise of Mohism from the Han dynasty onward, when the Ru began to dominate the scene: Why did this once so challenging and promising trend of thought disappear from view in the imperial era?

The third new type of *Mozi* research began with the installation of the People's Republic. Grand-scale textbooks and general overviews of Chinese philosophy all dedicated a special chapter or section to Mo Zi's thought. The most well-known examples are *Zhongguo sixiang tongshi* (General History of Chinese Thought), vol. 1 (Beijing/Shanghai: Renmin, 1947), chapter 7 by Hou Wailu (1903–1987); *Zhongguo zhexue shi* (History of Chinese Philosophy), vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin, 1963), chapter 2.2 by Ren Jiyu (1916–2009); and *Zhongguo zhexue shi xinbian* (New History of Chinese Philosophy), vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin, 1964), chapter 7 by Feng Youlan (1895–1990). Despite different interpretations and evaluations of Mohism within the Marxist frame, there was an agreement that Mo Zi had taken up the defense of the workers or the exploited class, and that there were materialist (e.g., epistemological) elements as well as idealist ones (e.g., elements of religion) in his thought.

Not only the “early” social and political thought attributed to the master himself, but even the five chapters by “later Mohists” on logic and science (*Mozi* 40–45) were presented in Marxist jargon.

The fourth period began during the early 1980s, with the open-up and reform era, when *Mozi* studies for the first time began to boom in China. Mohism became the main topic of separate books and articles, and was thus emancipated from its status as the topic of a mere chapter or section within more general works. According to the contemporary *Mozi* scholar Tan Jiajian, there were less than ten academic works on Mohism alone between the 1950s and the 1970s, but in the following two decades, there were 70 books and more than 480 articles written.⁵ Aside from the revival of the pre-Liberation topics, this period was characterized by two new trends. First, like other fields of study hit by the “culture heat” (*wenhua re*) of the 1980s, there was an influx of Western theories and methodologies. This led to new philosophical, psychological, educational, aesthetic, military, and cultural approaches toward Mohism. A second trend arose, perhaps partly as a result of Western works (making use of Qing scholarship) and partly as a reaction against the Western influx: scholars began reflecting on the nature of *Mozi* studies since the twentieth century, discussing the work of previous scholars such as Hu Shi, Liang Qichao, and Guo Moruo (1892–1978).

The 1990s could count as the fifth stage: during this time, some Chinese scholars reacted against the uncritical or dominant Western influence and “national studies heat” (*guoxue re*) came into vogue, in which Mo Zi scholars also took part. Reliance on Western ideas and methodology had to be balanced with a thorough knowledge of Chinese concerns, history, language, and texts. Layered over the continuous booming of older research topics came at least three new debates: Mo Zi’s contemporary relevance, the location of his hometown, and the relation of Mohism to other early trends of thought.⁶ The latter debate differed from older visions opposing the Mo to the Ru, by incorporating other relations besides mere rivalry between them (e.g., similarities, influence, assimilation) and with other intellectual lineages (e.g., Taoism).⁷ In the hometown debate, there was the opposition between Tengzhou (defended by, e.g., Zhang Zhihan) and Lushan (defended by, e.g., Guo Chengzhi).⁸ This debate did not stand on its own but coincided with the establishment of research institutes, study associations, and academic conferences dedicated to Mohism. In 1990, Shandong University and the Tengzhou City government established the Mozi International Research Centre (*Guoji Mozi yanjiu zhongxin*). Moreover, during its first international conference (*Moxue guoji yantaohui*) held in 1992, Zhang Zhihan and his colleagues announced the foundation of the China Mozi Research Institute (*Zhongguo Mozi xuehui*). Since then, this institute has held eight interna-

tional conferences on Mohism and published seven conference volumes. In 1997, scholars advocating that Mo Zi's hometown was contemporary Lushan county in Henan (the ancient city of Luyang in the state of Chu) held the National Mozi Conference and the Establishment of the Henan Province Mozi Institute Grand Meeting (*Quanguo Mozi yantaohui ji Henansheng Mozi xuehui chengli dahui*). They have held three international conferences and published two collections of papers. A third initiative was the creation in 2001 of a column about *Mozi* in the journal *Zhida xuebao* (Journal of Workers' University). This journal was the initiative of 44 private universities in China to discuss topics in the human sciences; the *Mozi* column has already published about 100 papers; its second international meeting will be held in the summer of 2011.

In a sixth stage, *Mozi* research is still booming in the twenty-first century. We can again identify two trends: increasing interest in the contemporary relevance of Mohism and use of excavated material. As for the former, articles about Mo Zi's contemporary relevance, especially the idea of "universal love" (*jian ai*) began to boom during the 1990s. During the last decade, this interest has increased and has been joined by other Mohist notions about "justice" (*yi*), "standards" (*fa*), "frugality" (*jie*), and "antiaggression" (*fei gong*). The "harmonious society" (*hexie shehui*) policy introduced by Hu Jintao in 2005 to herald the government's turn from economic growth to overall societal balance, has also been discussed in terms of Mohist thought, often in a comparison with Confucianism.⁹ The second novelty of twenty-first century Mohist studies is the inclusion of newly excavated material, even though until now, no text has been excavated that explicitly identifies itself with Mohism (e.g., by carrying the title of a *Mozi* chapter). There has been speculation about the Mohist affiliation of a bamboo text that has been coined *Guishen zhi ming* (The Awareness of Ghosts and Spirits) by its contemporary editors at the Shanghai Museum. Like most unearthed manuscripts, the bamboo text itself does not carry any title. We agree with the more cautious opinion that there is more harm than benefit in providing this manuscript with a title and an affiliation.¹⁰ By giving the unearthed textual fragments a title and an affiliation, one risks forgetting the fragmentary nature of, respectively, the discovered material and the intellectual landscape during the Warring States period, and as a result, one also risks approaching the material with inappropriate, modern expectations.¹¹ Aside from the increasing focus on Mo Zi's contemporary relevance and the use of excavated texts, *Mozi* studies in the last decade are also characterized by a general increase in information and nuances. For instance, not only has the perceived opposition of Ru and Mo been fine tuned, but also the view that Mohism disappeared during the Han dynasty. Zheng Jiewen's opus

magnum *Zhongguo Moxue Tongshi* (General history of *Mozi* studies), for instance, shows the continuous influence of Mohism throughout Chinese history, providing a comprehensive historical survey of the establishment, development, and reception of Mohism.

The Papers in This Issue

One of the *Mozi* research centers outside of China is at the K.U. Leuven in Belgium. The two papers of this issue were first presented at a workshop that was held there in June 2009: “The Many Faces of *Mozi*: A Synchronic and Diachronic Study of Mohist Thought.”

The first author, Guo Qiyong (1947–), acted as dean of the Philosophy Department at Wuhan University, which is among China’s most well-known centers of philosophical reflection. He is now director of the National Studies Institute (Guoxueyuan) of the university and still holds many important positions in the fields of Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, and new Confucianism. Guo’s paper fits in the trend of the last decades searching for the contemporary relevance of Mohism. He shows an interest in early Chinese philosophy that goes beyond the academic sphere, and finds moral inspiration in his nation’s own intellectual heritage. For Guo, the answer lies mostly in Confucianism,¹² but in this paper, he shows the relative communality and compatibility between early Ru and Mo in their views on love or care (*ai*).

The second author, Ding Sixin (1969–), also a professor in the Philosophy Department at Wuhan University, is a young scholar in the field of early Chinese philosophy. His paper for this issue represents some important trends in *Mozi* scholarship: it begins with an overview of the history of *Mozi* studies, contains thorough textual research, and exhibits a close acquaintance with recently excavated materials.

This issue’s first paper, by Guo Qiyong, “‘Filial Piety,’ ‘Three Years Mourning,’ and ‘Love’: Differences in Positions and Debate Between the Confucians and Mohists” discusses various types of love and views on funeral practices from the Confucian (Ru) and Mohist perspectives, linking them to their concepts of, respectively, benevolence (*ren ai*) and universal love (*jian ai*). The paper consists of three parts.

First, Guo presents the views of Mo Zi, the Later Mohists, and the Confucians on filial piety (*xiao*). He believes that Mo Zi’s views can mainly be retrieved from the three “Jian ai” (Universal love, Care for all) chapters (*Mozi* 14, 15, 16). In this triad, Mo Zi advocates filial piety and kindness (*ci*), and affirms the value of reciprocal love between parents and children, but discusses this all in the framework of benefit. The Later Mohists (*Mozi* 40–45)

12.

also define filial piety on the basis of universal love and mutual interest. The Confucians, for their part, place filial piety and fraternal duty within the frame of benevolence (*ren*): loving family members is the basis for loving other people in society. They do not directly link filial piety to utility or results, which, according to Guo, “conforms to ordinary human feelings, and is easy and reasonable.” But Guo also insists that the Confucian “moral sense” and Mohist “utilitarianism” cannot be sharply distinguished.

In the second part, Guo treats the Mohist criticisms of the Confucian “three years of mourning.” Worried about the utility and social benefit, Mohists consider three years of mourning a cause of social and familial disruption. Guo, however, defends the Confucian funeral practices for their cultural significance and long-term benefits. A second criticism of the Ru concerns the perceived contradictions in their teachings, such as the conflict between social stratification on the one hand and some funerary rites on the other, such as in relation to the respect shown to women (see *Mozi* 39). While admitting that the Mohists often had a point, Guo restates his preference for Confucian mourning customs as an expression of human feelings and enhancement of the social atmosphere. But again, he agrees with the Mohists that there should be moderation and no waste or delays.

The final part deals with the analysis of the Mohist theory of “love without differentiation” versus the Confucian “love with differentiation.” Guo discusses the conversation between Mo Zi and Wu Ma Zi, who stated that he was not able to love universally (in *Mozi* 46), and the debate between Mencius and Yi Zhi, whose behavior showed that even a self-proclaimed Mohist loves with distinction (*Mencius* 3A5). Guo concludes that the Ru love with gradations, which can be extended from the self to family members and further outward, is rooted in empathy and moral standards, and is therefore more amenable to practical application. But the Mohist criticism deserves credit for exposing certain prevalent customs and corrupt practices, and thus served as a good complement to Confucianism.

The second paper of this issue, by Ding Sixin, is much longer. “A Study on the Dating of the *Mozi* Dialogues and the Mohist View of Ghosts and Spirits” consists of two rather different parts: dating of the Dialogue chapters (*Mozi* 46–49/50) and the Mohist view on “ghosts and spirits.” Ding believes that determining the dates of the Dialogues is a necessary precondition for understanding the evolving Mohist view of the supernatural.

As for dating the Dialogues, Ding supports the view that they postdate the Core Chapters (*Mozi* 8–37) and were written by Mo Zi’s disciples or later generations. This contrasts with the opinion of some scholars, most recently defended by Zheng Jiewen, that the Dialogues stand as the “Mohist *Analec*ts” as the oldest testimony of Mo Zi’s thought. On the basis of differences in the

book *Mozi*, as well as similarities with other early works, Ding also argues that the extant chapter “Fei Ru” (Against the Confucians) (*Mozi* 39) postdates the Core Chapters and was written around the time of the Dialogues, namely, during the late Warring States period. Within the Dialogues, there is a degree of aggression toward opponents (often the Ru), philosophical sophistication, and argumentative strategies that are absent from the Core Chapters. Comparison with other works supports the view that the Dialogues contain later Mohist arguments from the time of Mencius at the earliest. They may be based on or inspired by Mo Zi’s thought, but are not true accounts of the Master’s words and deeds. This chronology largely agrees with the currently dominant views among *Mozi* scholars in the West.¹³

The second major topic of Ding’s paper concerns the Mohist views on ghosts and spirits (*gui shen*): they include arguments in favor of their existence and awareness (*ming*), criticism of the perceived contradiction in Confucian theory between denying their existence and yet insisting on sacrificial rituals, and attacks on the lavishness of Ru burials and the long duration of mourning. With a very thorough study of taboos in early China, using a wide variety of recently discovered manuscripts, Ding concludes that the fragment on the travel taboo in “Gui yi” (Valuing Righteousness, *Mozi* 47) represents a theory that was at its height during the Qin and Han dynasties, when the chapter may have been written. The views on the supernatural realm expressed in the Dialogues also confirm the evolution from the Core Chapters to the Dialogues. ~~<CARINE: IS THIS SENTENCE OKAY NOW?>~~ While the Core Chapters stress the existence of ghosts and spirits, the Dialogues insist on their awareness and capacity to punish and reward, not their existence; ghosts and spirits have also shifted their interest from people’s deeds and attitudes to their intentions; there is an increased knowledge of the natural world (including causes of illness) that limits the belief in the supernatural; and there is more refutation of opposing views from Ru scholars as well as critical disciples among Mohists. And finally, Ding also points out that the Shanghai Museum’s Chu bamboo *Awareness of Ghosts and Spirits* closely resembles the “Gongmeng” chapter of the Dialogues (*Mozi* 48) in content and style, but he does not insist, as many scholars do, on the Mohist affiliation of that text: all we can say is that there seems to have been a shared interest in the awareness of ghosts and spirits and in their capacity to influence human life.

The translations of the *Mozi* fragment have benefited from (but not always followed) Ian Johnston’s recently published *The Mozi: A Complete Translation* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2010). Many footnotes in the Chinese papers by Guo and Ding have been left out of the translation, but can be retrieved from the original papers published in Chinese journals. We

(13)

hope that this issue will rekindle Western interest in this very challenging and rather neglected early rival of Confucian views.

Notes

1. For a more detailed overview of the history of *Mozi* studies, see Zheng Jie-wen, *Ershi shiji Moxue yanjiushi* (History of the Study of *Mozi* in the Twentieth Century) (Beijing: Qinghua University, 2002). Li Quanxing published an index of *Mozi* research in the twentieth century (including Japanese research, but no Western research) on SLX.com (www.xslx.com/upfiles/Article/200632874532158.doc) (last accessed June 6, 2011).

2. Liang begins his preface to *Zi Mozi xueshuo* (The Teachings of Master Mo Zi) by partially imitating Mencius, who claimed that Yang Zhu's thought would destroy the world. Liang, however, believes that true Mohist thought will save it. This book was first published in the journal established by Liang Qichao in Yokohama, Japan, *Xin min congbao* (New Citizen's Journal), no. 3 (1904): 1–5, 9, 10.

3. Hu Shih, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1968), pp. 8, 9. This book was first published in 1921, based on the author's doctorate of 1917.

4. See, for example, Cheng Menghui, "Qianlun Mo Di de fan Kong sixiang" (On Mo Di's Anti-Confucian Thought), *Journal of Sun Yat-sen University, Social Science Edition*, no. 1 (1975): 50–52.

5. See Tan Jiajian, "Zhongguo jin 20 nian zhi Moxue yanjiu" (Research on Mohism in the Past Twenty Years in China), *Qi Lu xuekan* (Qi Lu Journal) 154, no. 1 (2000): 36–40. Song Limin's survey records more than 70 books and 500 articles. See Song Limin, "Dangdai Mojia sixiang yanjiu shuping" (A Summary of Contemporary Studies of Mohist Thought), *Shehui kexue zhanxian* (Social Science Front), no. 3 (2003): 208–214.

6. See Chen Daibo, "Shi nian lai Moxue yanjiu zongshu" (Summary of *Mozi* Research in the Last Ten Years), *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* (History of Chinese Philosophy), no. 4 (1998): 125–128.

7. On the assimilation of Mohism by Confucianism, see, for example, Ding Yuanming, "Lun Mo Ru xiang tong" (The Connection between Confucianism and Mohism), *Mozi yanjiu luncong* (Collection of *Mozi* Research) (Jinan: Shangdong University, 1991). On the relationship between Mohism and religious Taoism, see, for example, Qin Yanshi, "Cong Huainanzi dao Taipingjing zhong de Mo: yiduan chenfu yu Handai xueshu zhengzhi bianqian" (Mohism from the *Huainanzi* to the *Taipingjing*: The Political Vicissitudes of Heterodox Vogues and Scholarship in the Han Dynasty), *Nandu xuetan* (*zhexue shehui kexueban*) (Academic Forum of Nandu [Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition]) 21, no. 5 (2001): 1–6.

8. See, for example, the almost decade-long debate between Guo Chengzhi and Zhang Zhihan. See, for example, Guo Chengzhi, "Mo Di guli kaobian" (An Investigation into the Hometown of Mo Di), *Zhongzhou xuekan* (Academic Journal of Zhongzhou), no. 5 (1990): 100–103; Zhang Zhihan, "Zai tan Mozi liji yingdang zai jin zhi Tengzhou" (Revisiting the View that Mo Zi's Hometown Must have been Current Tengzhou), *Wen shi zhe* (Journal of Literature, History, and Philosophy), no. 2 (1991): 92–97; again, Guo Chengzhi, "Mo Zi guli Tengzhou shuo zhiyi" (Doubting the Theory that Tengzhou was Mo Zi's Hometown), *Academic Journal of Zhongzhou*,

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no. 5 (1992): 63, 136–138; and Zheng Qiangsheng, “Quanguo Mozi yantaohui zongshu” (Summary of the National Mozi Conference), *Academic Journal of Zhongzhou*, no. 1 (1998): 118–119.

9. The Henan Province Mozi Institute held a conference in 2008 titled “Moxue yu hexie shijie guoji xueshu yantaohui” (International Academic Conference on Mohism and the Harmonious World). The journal *Zhida xuebao* (Journal of Workers’ University) holds a conference in Inner Mongolia in the summer of 2011 about the contemporary relevance of Mohism.

10. See Erica Brindley, “‘The Perspicuity of Ghosts and Spirits’ and the Problem of Intellectual Affiliations in Early China,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 129, no. 2 (2009): 215–237. The bamboo text is published in *Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhangguo Chu zhushu* (Warring States Bamboo Documents from Chu Preserved at the Shanghai Museum), ed. Ma Chengyuan, vol. 5 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2001–2008), pp. 149–159 (plates), pp. 307–320 (transcription).

11. For a more complete argumentation in this respect, see William G. Boltz, “The Composite Nature of Early Chinese Texts,” in *Text and Ritual in Early China*, ed. Martin Kern (Seattle/London: University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 50–78. For an early Chinese scholar expressing similar concerns, see Fu Sinian, “Zhangguo wenji zhong zhi pianshi shuti—yige duan ji” (The Forms of Writings of the Sources from the Warring States—A Brief Note), in *Fu Sinian quanji* (Complete Works of Fu Sinian), vol. 3, ed. Ouyang Zhesheng (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu, 2003), pp. 17–21.

12. For more information on Guo Qiyong, see also two earlier issues of *Contemporary Chinese Thought*: “Guo Qiyong and Zheng Jiadong in New Confucianism” 36, no. 2 (Winter 2004–2005), guest ed. John Makeham, and “Confucian Filial Piety: Root of Morality or Source of Corruption?” 39, no. 1 (Fall 2007), guest ed. Huang Yong.

13. See, for example, Ian Johnston, trans., *The Mozi: A Complete Translation* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2010), pp. xxxi–xxxiv, and Chris Frazer, “Supplement to Mohism, Organization of the Mozi,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. See <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/mohism/>. Other versions are listed under <http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=mohism>. One difference might be that most Western scholars would date the whole *Mozi* book to the Zhou dynasty, whereas Ding attributes some chapters to the Qin-Han transition and even to the Han.

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GUO QIYONG

“Filial Piety,” “Three Years Mourning,” and “Love”

Differences in Positions and Debate Between the Confucians and Mohists

The academic world is rife with debate regarding the shared origins and divergence of the Confucians and Mohists. This paper only proposes to consider the agreement and disagreement between the two schools concerning the concepts “benevolent love” (*ren ai*) and “universal love” (*jian ai*) from the perspective of the connections and divergences between the two schools on the issues of “filial piety” and “funeral ceremonies.”

Differences in the Mohist and Confucian Positions Concerning “Filial Piety”

Mo Zi Affirmed “Filial Piety” and Used the Concept of Universal Love to Interpret It

Mo Zi criticized inequity in the way the powerful rewarded or punished as follows:

Those who are worthy will not be encouraged, and those who are wicked will not be stopped. If this is so, at home there will not be kindness and filial behavior toward parents, and abroad there will not be proper regard

English translation © 2011 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Chinese text: Guo Qiyong, “Ru Mo liang jia zhi ‘xiao,’ ‘san nian zhi sang’ yu ‘ai’ de qubie yu zhenglun,” *Zhexue yan-zhou* (Research of Philosophy), no. 1 (2010): 48–55. Translated by John Carroll.

Guo Qiyong is the director of the National Studies Institute (Guoxueyuan) at Wuhan University. <<POSITION FOR GUO QIYONG CORRECT AS ADDED?>>

Mozi—Ed.], namely, “Being Sympathetic Toward Officers” (Qin shi), as follows: “So even a worthy ruler will not look kindly on an official without merit, and even a compassionate father will not look kindly on a son without promise. For this reason, a man who occupies a position for which he is not competent is not the man for the position. Likewise, a man who receives emolument for a rank he does not merit is not the man to have that emolument.” Thus, if the ruler makes demands of his minister or the father of his son, the latter must fulfill their responsibilities. In other words, what this excerpt from the “Qin shi” is stressing is that the minister must produce good results for the ruler and the son must benefit his father, or else the ruler will not love his minister and the father will not love his son.

It can be seen from the preceding excerpt that Mo Zi does advocate filial piety and kindness, and that he affirms reciprocal love between parents and their children. In particular, he is encouraging service to one’s parents, and promoting kindness on the part of parents, filial piety on the part of children, and friendliness on the part of older brothers and respectfulness on the part of younger brothers. However, he does so from the standpoint of affirming that such forms of love are to the benefit of parents. In other words, Mo Zi is discussing “filial piety” within the framework of “universal love” or “universal mutual love, interaction for mutual benefit.” Put otherwise, even between family members, if one sees the other and loves the other as oneself, when considered in terms of its effects, this is also mutual favor and mutual benefit. Mo Zi is discussing filial piety by means of phrases such as “One who loves others will inevitably be loved; one who hates others will inevitably be hated” and “good will shall be recompensed with good; evil shall be recompensed with evil” (“Canon, Upper” [Jing, shang]). This is a confirmation of the effect of mutual and universal benefiting by filial sons. It is argued from a utilitarian position emphasizing consequences. Of course, its most important tendency is to put the loving and benefiting of other people’s parents first.

The Mohist Definition of “Filial Piety”

Earlier, we learned from the debate about filial piety in the three chapters on “Universal Love” and the “Being Sympathetic Toward Officers” chapter of the *Mozi* how Mo Zi interpreted this concept. Next, we will see how later Mohists regarded filial piety. Filial piety in the “Mohist Canons” is defined as follows: “Being filial is to benefit parents,” (“Canon, Upper”) and “Being filial: To take parents as one’s sphere of action and, having ability, to be able to benefit them. It is not necessary to attain [recognition]” (“Explaining the Canon, Upper”) **<<CHINESE TITLE?>>**. The character *fen* (分; division), simplified from 芬 in the original text, has the meaning of *zhifen* (duty, of-

tend outward. But that is not to say that the Confucians abandoned the ultimate ideal enunciated by Zhang Zai that “People are my brothers; things are like me too.” Rather, the message is that the extension of love and benevolence and realization of this ideal on all-encompassing love is an infinite process. Exemplary persons of the Confucian persuasion were good at extending from themselves to others. If we were to blindly promote “love without differentiation,” however, I fear that this would be lacking in emotional appeal and even more difficult to put into practice by the common people. However, Confucian principles were more amenable to practical application, for they were “one root with many manifestations,” and moreover, were stratified.

As we can see, the issues of filial piety, funerals, love with differentiation, and so forth are quite complicated and concrete, and while the Confucians held to the concrete and the practical, they even more strongly emphasized inherent human values and ethical universality. Benevolence is universal, and the implementation and extension of benevolence is a concrete manifestation of this universality. The Confucian and Mohist schools were both pragmatic; both emphasized utility and consequences. In comparison, however, the Mohists were more pragmatic, while the Confucians laid more emphasis on long-term humanistic values and would not be confined to theories of utility and theories of results. The Confucians also held to the theory of moral integrity: they would not abandon the way of proper human conduct for pragmatic utility. The concept of “love with differentiation” does not invalidate the universality of benevolent love; on the contrary, it can justify it even more. On the other hand, the criticisms from the Mohists were not totally devoid of value and significance. The Mohists were wary of filial piety to one’s parents and the transformation in the meaning of funeral rites. The Confucian advocacy of “three years of mourning” and the way this practice was institutionalized gave rise to many defects and caused the loss of true human feelings and a waste of social resources. Thus, the Mohist critique of social inequalities and the lack of all-encompassing love makes sense, and it also has its own ideals. The Mohist critiques of the Confucians and various prevalent customs and corrupt practices thus actually served as a complement to and completion of Confucian theories.

Notes

1. Tan Jiefu, ed., *Mojing fenlei yizhu* (Categorical Translation and Commentary on the *Mojing*) (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1981), p. 194.
2. Jiang Baochang, *Mojing xunshi* (Commentary and Translation of the *Mozhi*) (Jinan: Jilu, 1993), p. 23.
3. Xue Bocheng, *Mojia sixiang xintan* (New Discussion of Mohist Thought) (Harbin: Renmin, 2007), p. 191.

4. Lin Suying, *Sangfu zhidude wenhua yiyi: Yi Yili "Sangfu" wei taolun zhongxin* (The Cultural Meaning of the System of Mourning Habits: Taking the Chapter "Mourning Habits" in the Book *Etiquette and Ceremonials* as a Topic of Discussion) (Taipei: Wenjin, 2000), p. 82.
5. See, for example, Ding Linghua, *Zhongguo sangfu zhidushi* (The History of China's System of Mourning Habits) (Shanghai: Renmin, 2000).
6. Sun Xidan, *Li ji jijie* (Commentary on the *Book of Rites*) (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1989), vol. 2, pp. 1372–1377.
7. Tan Jiajian, *Mozi yanjiu* (Research of the *Mozi*) (Guiyang: Jiaoyu, 1995), p. 29.
8. Ibid., p. 28.
9. David Nivison, in *Rujia zhi dao: Zhongguo zhixue zhi tanlun* (The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy), ed. Bryan Van Norden, trans. Zhou Chicheng (Nanjing, Renmin, 2006), p. 127.
10. Ibid.
11. See Liu Shuxian, *Quanqiu lunli yu zongjiao duihua* (Global Ethics and Religious Dialogue) (Taipei: Lixu wenhua, 2001), pp. 60–61.
12. Mou Zongsan, *Song Ming Ruxue de wenti yu fazhan* (Issues and Evolution of Song Ming Confucianism) (Shanghai: Huadong, 2004), p. 109.
13. He Lin, "Wulun guannian de xin jiantao" (New Discussion of the Concept of Five Relations), in *Zhexue yu zhexueshi lunwenji* (Collection of Writings about Philosophy and Its History) (Beijing: Shangwu, 1990), pp. 364–367.
14. Ibid.

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DING SIXIN

A Study on the Dating of the *Mozi* Dialogues and the Mohist View of Ghosts and Spirits

Hu Shi clearly grouped the five chapters starting with *Mozi*, “Geng Zhu” (chapter 46) together. Luan Tiaofu went on to name these the *Mohist* Dialogues [*Moyu*, chapters 46 to 50—Ed.], and this grouping has been followed by many later scholars. When were these Dialogues written? Answering this question is a necessary precondition to investigating the Mohist view of the supernatural. Many scholars also combine them with the Core Chapters [*Shilun*, “Ten Theses,” chapters 8 to 37/39—Ed.] and discuss both at once, seeing them as serving a supplemental purpose. Others even say that they predate the Core Chapters, and represent a true account of Mo Zi’s early words and deeds, or so-called original materials. To investigate whether these two theories hold, we must carefully carry out textual research and lay out arguments. Also, what did the Mohist view of the supernatural involve, what were the main subjects of these views, and where did these views lie in the main threads of the development of philosophy? All of these questions involve both direct discussions of the content of the Dialogues and the establishment of “later Mohism.”

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bell, if you hit it, it sounds; and if you do not hit it, it does not sound.” This metaphor is common in texts from the mid to late Warring States period. The Shanghai Museum’s bamboo text “On Nature and Emotion” (Xingqing lun) says: “Bronze and stone make sounds, but won’t sound if not hit.” The last four characters are missing from the Guodian bamboo “Nature Derives from Decree” (Xing zi ming chu). Zhuangzi, “Heaven and Earth” (Tian di) has: “Bronze and stone make sounds, but will not sound if not hit.” Xunzi, “On the Model for Conduct” (Fa xing) has: “Sound when hit.” And Huainanzi, “Sayings Explained” (Quanyan) contains this line: “Bronze and stone make sounds, but will not sound if not hit.” Based on this, “Gongmeng” must not have been written before “Nature Derives from Decree.” In my opinion, this bamboo text was probably written around the time that the Guodian No. 1 Chu tomb was interred. Also, “Gongmeng” says: “Now you are speaking without having been hit—is this what you call sounding without being hit? Is this what you call not being a superior man?” This language is even more harsh and biting, and shows a developed custom of Confucians and Mohists rebuking one another. Overall, from these four examples we can see that the Dialogues must have been written around the same time as “Against the Confucians.”

Comparing the Dialogues and Core Chapters, on the whole, the former came after the latter. First, some of the Core Chapters focus on establishing theories, while others focus on refuting theories. They present their arguments in a stable and sound fashion, and lack harsh, biting tones. The Dialogues tend to go on the attack, and use sharp, cutting language. They are often satirical and tend to use analogies and *reductio ad absurdum* arguments, which is a characteristic of the mid to late Warring States period in which the philosophers liked to argue with one another. There are many examples of this, and I will not cite them here. Also, there are many places in the Dialogues that are especially aimed at refuting the Confucians, while the Core Chapters do not specify that their refutations are aimed at them, and they even lack the character 儒 (*ru*). The previous generation of scholars pointed out most of these things. Apart from these, it is especially worth noting that in the Dialogues, the Mohists use a style of boasting and self-praise. “Valuing Righteousness” contains the following fragment: “Master Mo Zi says: ‘My words are enough to be used. Those who abandon my words and change my ideas are like those who abandon harvesting and take up grains. Those who use their words to refute my words are throwing eggs against rocks, and even if they use up all the eggs in the world, the rock is unchanged and cannot be destroyed.’” This is the same as “when people are gone from the world, the words of Master Mo Zi will still be here” from “Choosing the Greater,” and boasts that “the words of Master Mo Zi” are the eternally unchanging absolute truth. This is one example of this tendency. Mencius also liked to argue, and defended

which is
correct placement?

rect. Based on the Jiudian strips, the word “dragon days” is quite old. So why was the word “dragon” used for “taboo”? This truly is a problem that is quite difficult to explain. Liu Lexian says that “dragon” should be read as *da*, or as a derivation of *da*, and that it may have been taken from the word *zhe*, which he tells us means “taboo.”³³ But based on examination of ancient texts, both characters in the word “dragon taboo” have the same meaning, and the word did not originally mean “taboo.”

In his annotations to the Jiudian Chu strips, Li Jiahao says:

Mozi, “Valuing Righteousness”—Many scholars believe that this text explains the so-called dragon taboos. The Qin bamboo *Divination Books*, A 126, reverse, says: “Travel east on Jiazi, Yin, and Chen, death. Travel south on Bing Zi, Yin, and Chen, death. Travel west on Geng Zi, Yin, and Chen, death. Travel north on Ren Zi, Yin, and Chen, death.” The heavenly stems in the bamboo text correspond to the four directions, which is basically the same as in *Mozi*, which probably is also part of the “dragon taboos.”³⁴

“Valuing Righteousness” matches the heavenly stems to the four directions as follows: Jia/Yi—East, Bing/Ding—South, Geng/Xin—West, Ren/Gui—North. This is basically the same as the Qin bamboo *Divination Books*, but it is not completely the same. <<IS THE NEXT SENTENCE AS MEANT?>>

Li’s *Annotations* compares the two, and he makes an important argument: *Records of the Grand Scribe*, “Postface of the Grand Scribe” (Taishigong zixu): “The diviners in Qi, Chu, Qin, and Zhao each had their own customs.” The account of divination found in *Mozi* may be from the Qi tradition, which is why it was slightly different from the Qin (see the Qin bamboo *Divination Books*) and Chu (see the Jiudian strips) accounts. We do not have a clear-cut textual basis for the “five dragons” account in the unearthed *Divination Books*, however, so we are still left with the question of how to deal with the “dragon” in these taboos. If we follow the words of the diviner in *Mozi*, then the “dragon taboos” are taboos against traveling in certain directions on certain days due to the Heavenly Emperor slaying dragons on those days. *Huainanzi* has both an account of the “four celestial animals” (Red Phoenix in the South, Black Tortoise in the North, Green Dragon in the East, and White Tiger in the West) and “five dragons.” The former had very early origins, and the latter is seen in *Huainanzi*, “Terrestrial Forms” (Dixing). The “five dragons” refers to the yellow, green, red, white, and black dragons, and this matches what is said in “Valuing Righteousness.” The chapter “Surveying Obscurities” (Lanming) in *Huainanzi* talks about “slaying the black dragon”: “Thereupon, Nüwa refined the stones of five colors to repair the Heavens, broke the tortoise’s legs to set up the four pillars, slayed the black dragon to rescue Jizhou, and piled up reeds and lime to stop the threatening waters.” This “slaying the black dragon”

traditions in the Mohist views on “frugal funerals” and “respecting spirits,” and that this was where the error was in the Mohist view of ghosts and spirits and the reason their teachings were abandoned.

Overall, the later Mohists’ view of ghosts and spirits on the one hand was influenced by the new era and its philosophical concepts and knowledge, and on the other hand, developed under the criticism of the Masters and doubts of the internal circle of disciples. There is no question that the Dialogues still maintained the views of Mo Zi himself that there were ghosts and spirits and the necessity of their knowledge. While considering how to maintain these two fundamental views, however, there were many changes and innovations in the arguments of the later Mohists in terms of style, method, and content. On the one hand, the failure of the Mohists’ teachings to continue to be passed on was related to their inability to adapt their core tenets to new philosophical developments, and on the other hand—as Wang Chong pointed out—it was intimately related to the contradictions among their positions.

Notes

1. See Sun Yirang, *Mozi jiangou* (Clarifying Commentary of the *Mozi*) (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2001).
2. See Hu Shi, *Zhongguo zhhexueshi dagang* (Outline of Chinese Philosophy) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1997), pp. 108–109, and Liang Qichao, *Mo Zi xue'an* (Mo Zi: Life and Thought) (Shanghai: Shang wu, 1921), pp. 13–14. See also Luan Tiaofu, “Ershinian lai zhi Moxue” (*Mozi* Research in the Last Twenty Years), in *Mozi yanjiu lunwenji* (Collection of *Mozi* Research) (Beijing: Renmin, 1957), pp. 141–142.
3. See Fang Shouchu, “*Mozi shu zhi kao zheng*” (Verification of the Book *Mozi*), in *Moxue yuanliu* (Ramifications of *Mozi* Studies) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1937), pp. 39–58.
4. Bi Yuan, “Mo Zi xu” (About Mo Zi), in *Ershier zi: Mo Zi* (Twenty-Two Masters: Mo Zi) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1986), p. 223.
5. Hu Shi, *Outline of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 109.
6. Liang Qichao, *Mo Zi: Life and Thought*, p. 14.
7. Luan Tiaofu, *Collection of Mozi Research*, p. 118.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
9. Luo Genze, *Zhuzi kaosuo* (Examination of the Masters) (Beijing: Renmin, 1958), p. 194.
10. Meng Wentong, “Lun Moxue yuanliu yu Ruxue huihe” (About the Ramifications of Mohism and Its Assimilation with Confucianism), in *Guxue zhenwei* (Discriminating the Subtle in Ancient Learning) (Chengdu: Bashu, 1987), pp. 216–217.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 211–222.
12. Luan Tiaofu, *Collection of Mozi Research*, pp. 113–114.
13. Meng Wentong, *Discriminating the Subtle in Ancient Learning*, p. 212.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 212–217.
15. Yang Junguang, *Mozi xinlun* (New Theory on *Mozi*) (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu, 1992), pp. 23–25.

16. Meng Wentong, *Discriminating the Subtle in Ancient Learning*, p. 212.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Fang Shouchu, *Ramifications of Mozi Studies*, pp. 57–58.
20. Wu Yujia, *Mozi jiaozhu* (Annotation and Collation of the *Mozi*) (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1993), p. 655.
21. Yan Lingfeng, *Mozi jianbian* (Brief Edition of the *Mozi*), in *Shijia lun Mo* (Ten Scholars on *Mozi*), ed. Cai Shangsi (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 2004), p. 258.
22. Zheng Jiewen, *Zhongguo Moxue tongshi* (General History of *Mozi* Research in China) (Beijing: Renmin, 2006), vol. 1, p. 2.
23. Ibid., p. 4.
24. Ibid., p. 3.
25. See Qian Mu, *Xian Qin zhuzi xianian* (Dates of Pre-Qin Philosophers) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu, 2002), p. 213.
26. Zheng Jiewen, *General History of Mozi Research*, pp. 4–24.
27. Sun Yirang, *Clarifying Commentary*, p. 286.
28. Ibid., p. 454.
29. Ibid., p. 38.
30. Ibid., p. 447.
31. Ibid., pp. 447, 448.
32. See Qiu Xigui, “Hanshi yu gaihuo—Jiezi Tui fensi chuanshuo yanjiu” (Eating Cold Food and Changing the Fire: Study of the Myth of Jiezi Tui Dying in the Fire), in *Wenshi conggao: Shanggu sixiang, minzu yu guwenzi xueshi* (Collected Papers on Literature and History: Ancient Thought, Popular Customs, and the History of Paleography) (Shanghai: Shanghai yuandong, 1996), pp. 90–121.
33. Liu Lexian, *Jianbo shushu wenxian tanlun* (Discussion of Bamboo and Silk Manuscripts on Divination) (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu, 2003), p. 96.
34. Li Jiahao, *Jiudian Chu jian* (Chu Bamboo Slips from Jiudian), ed. Hubei Institute of Cultural Relics and Archaeology (Beijing: Wenwu, 2000), p. 137.
35. Fang Shouchu, *Ramifications of Mozi Studies*, pp. 104–105, 106.
36. Guo Moruo, *Shi pipan shu: Kong Mo de pipan* (Ten Criticisms: Criticism of Kong Zi and Mo Zi) (Beijing: Donggang, 1996), p. 109.
37. Ibid., p. 111.
38. Fang Shouchu, *Ramifications of Mozi Studies*, p. 106.
39. See Ma Chengyuan, ed., *Shanghai bowuguan cang zhanguo Chu zhushu (wu)* (The Warring States Bamboo Books from Chu Preserved at the Shanghai Museum), vol. 5 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2005), pp. 310–320.

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