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**The functional value of non-integration in clause combining: interpersonal versus
discursive independence**

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ABSTRACT It is argued that the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation for dependent clauses, which is often used as an important parameter in typologies of clause combining mechanisms, is not a unitary phenomenon. The distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation in these contexts correlates with two different functional parameters. On the one hand, there is the parameter of interpersonal independence, according to which a dependent clause can either have no interpersonal value of its own and completely depend on the interpersonal resources of its main clause, or be interpersonally independent from its main clause and have an assertive force of its own. On the other hand, there is the parameter of discursive independence, according to which a dependent clause can either form one single focus domain with its main clause, or function independently from the focus domain of its main clause. These two parameters are organized hierarchically, in that a discursively independent clause can still be interpersonally dependent, whereas an interpersonally independent clause is necessarily also discursively independent.

1. Introduction

Clause combinations with *because* can occur in two functionally distinct intonational formats, which I will call the integrated and the non-integrated format, illustrated in (1) and (2) below. The *because*-clause in (1) is intonationally and functionally integrated in the main clause, explaining why divorce in Cyprus is very rare: “the reason why people stick together is that divorce is socially unacceptable”. The *because*-clause in (2) is intonationally and functionally separate from the main clause, functioning as a separate assertion which justifies the speaker’s commitment to the economic usefulness of supporting foreign students in the main clause: the fact that foreign students later become good ambassadors for the country where they have studied serves to justify the speaker’s commitment to the economic value of sponsoring foreign students.

- (1) it's ^certainly !true in !!C\yprus# you ^kn=ow that#[@:m] . di^vorce is :very "!\are th/ere# - but ^that doesn't 'mean that the :marriages are suc:c\essful# they're ^very _far !fr\om it# . the ^people :just "!\stick to:g\ether#be^cause they "!\h\ave to# (LLC)¹
- (2) "^\{n\ow\} "!\w\e 'think# that ^this is a :subsidy which is "!\well "w\orth it# it's ^well 'worth it in [i:] in un 'intel"!\\ectual'terms . {((to)) be^g\in with#}# .and "^\that is the 'thing that 'matters :m\ost# .but it's ^also :possibly w\orth it# in ^econ!!\omic 'terms# . because ^many of the post'graduate 'students who 'come . to this 'country to w\ork# .^never forg\et# . the ^time that 'they have h/ad# . and the ^benefits that 'they have :g=ained 'here# - ^and . when they re!turn to their 'own c\ountries# . are ^very 'good . am"!\b\assa_dors {for ^th\is 'country#}# (LLC)

The precise intonational features underlying the (non)integration between the *because*-clause and the main clause have been analysed in various ways. Chafe (1984) describes the integrated construction as consisting of one single intonation contour for main clause and secondary clause, and the non-integrated construction as consisting of two separate intonation contours for main clause and secondary clause. Chafe (1988) argues that another relevant factor is the clause-final intonation movement of the main clause, with a distinction between ‘period intonation’ (fall) for the non-integrated type and ‘comma intonation’ (rise, fall-rise, level, or partial fall) for the integrated type. Altenberg (1984: 49) describes the non-integrated type in terms of a “prosodic break, often

manifested as a pause of varying length”. Couper-Kuhlen (1996), finally, links the distinction between integrated and non-integrated *because* to the phenomenon of declination resetting. Declination refers to the fact that the fundamental frequency of the intonational ‘reference line’ for an intonation phrase naturally decreases during the production of the intonation phrase. Couper-Kuhlen argues that integrated *because*-clauses follow the decrease of the reference line set in during the production of the main clause, whereas their non-integrated counterparts reset the reference line to (or towards) the level at which the main clause started, thus effectively creating their own reference line rather than following that of the main clause.

The precise intonational cue that triggers the integrated or non-integrated perception of the *because*-clause will not be the concern of this study, however: I will concentrate on the **functional** value of this intonational distinction in the system of clause combining. Various studies of clause combining mechanisms, such as Chafe (1984, 1988), Haiman & Thompson (1984), and Lehmann (1988), have used the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation as an important parameter in their typologies, arguing for instance that intonational non-integration is a symptom for the ‘less subordinate’ character of clause types that have traditionally been analysed as subordinate. In this study, however, I will show that intonational non-integration is not a unitary phenomenon, but that it has very different functional values in different contexts: the distinction between causal and temporal clause combining will serve to illustrate these different values. The conclusion will be that the parameter of intonational non-integration should be used with caution in typologies of clause combining mechanisms: what matters is not the intonational distinction as such, but the functional value associated with it in a particular type of clause combining.

For causal sequences with *because*, the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation is related to differences in the **interpersonal organization** of the clause combination, i.e. functions like modality and illocutionary force, which take care of the speaker’s interactive position with respect to the propositional content of the clause. An integrated *because*-clause has no interpersonal value of its own: it is integrated into the proposition formed by its main clause and thus also falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of that main clause. A non-integrated *because*-clause, on the other hand, has a separate interpersonal value independent of that of its main clause and thus has its own interpersonal resources which realize the speaker’s position with respect to the proposition it expresses. This difference in interpersonal status between integrated and non-integrated *because* is reflected grammatically in the divergent scope of interpersonal operators such

as interrogation, modality or polarity, in the divergent potential for focus assignment in the clause combination, and in the divergent potential of the secondary clause for undergoing independent illocutionary or modal modification. Moreover, the same distinction with similar grammatical reflections has been attested in other languages such as German, Dutch, Spanish and French, often with additional lexical differentiation in terms of a specialized conjunction for the non-integrated type (German *denn*, Dutch *want*, Spanish *pues*, French *car*, and also English *for*), and sometimes even with surface syntactic differentiation in terms of word order (SVO vs SOV pattern in German).

The intonational distinction observed for *because* also occurs with other semantic categories of conjunction, especially temporal conjunctions like *when*, *after*, *now that*, or *while*. The functional value associated with the intonational contrast, however, is very different from the value it had in causal clause combinations. An integrated temporal clause still functions as part of the proposition formed by the main clause just like an integrated causal clause, but a non-integrated temporal clause can unlike its clausal counterpart no longer be described as realizing its own independent interpersonal value. This is reflected in the fact that the grammatical criteria which revealed the independent interpersonal status of the non-integrated *because*-clause do not apply to non-integrated temporal clauses: temporal clauses cannot undergo any independent illocutionary or modal modification.

Thus, the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation, which is often presented as an important parameter in the system of clause combining, is not a unitary phenomenon but has **different functional values** for causal and for temporal clause combinations. For causal clause combinations, the intonational distinction has consequences in terms of the **interpersonal status** of the *because*-clause, as reflected in its divergent grammatical behaviour in integrated and non-integrated contexts. For temporal clause combinations, the distinction does not have any interpersonal consequences: integrated and non-integrated temporal clauses are not structurally different in terms of interpersonal grammatical organization. In the context of temporal conjunctions, the intonational distinction becomes a **discursive** phenomenon, relating to matters of text organization: non-integrated temporal clauses function as discursively independent versions of their integrated counterparts.

2. The grammatical relevance of integrated versus non-integrated intonation for *because*

In this section, I will outline the relevant grammatical correlates of the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation for *because*-clauses. In the following section, these differences in grammatical behaviour will be explained in terms of the functional distinction between interpersonal dependence and independence, and correlated with a number of other grammatical parameters.

2.1. The scope of the interpersonal systems of the main clause

Integrated *because*-clauses fall within the scope of interrogation, negation (Rutherford 1970, Schleppegrell 1991) and modality (Thorne 1986) of their main clause, whereas non-integrated *because*-clauses do not. This grammatical difference can easily be demonstrated by interrogating, negating or modalizing the main clause, which has an entirely different effect for integrated constructions like (1) and non-integrated constructions like (2).

- (3) Do people in Cyprus stay together because they have to? [Is that the reason?]
- (4) I had to face the questions, What will be the price of my denial? Do I love God because God blesses? Do I serve the Lord for some reward? Will I remain loyal through difficulty or hardship? (FROWN)²
- (5) People in Cyprus don't stay together because they have to. [That is not the reason]
- (6) "He's my son ...I can't help feeling it's all our fault." "Isaac would be delighted to hear you say so, but you know it's nonsense. He was always gay. We were too thick to notice. He didn't turn gay because we left him. (FLOB)
- (7) People in Cyprus must be staying together because they have to. [That must be the reason]
- (8) With regard to Samuel the singular form may have been used because the whole people of Israel are referred to in the singular, as they are in another verse. (LOB)

In the interrogated, negated and modalized versions of the integrated (1), the *because*-clause can always serve as the focus of the interrogative, negative and modal value of the main clause: (3) can be interpreted as 'is that the reason why people in Cyprus stay together?', (5) as 'that is not the reason why they stay together', and (7) as 'that must be the reason why they stay together', and the same applies to the parallel corpus examples in (4), (6) and (8). Thus, the ability to serve as focus of the negation, interrogation and modality of the main clause shows that the *because*-clause in the

integrated construction falls within the scope of these systems. Non-integrated *because*-clauses, on the other hand, cannot fall within the scope of interrogation, negation or modality in the main clause: the intonational boundary serves as a structural boundary for the scope of the interpersonal grammatical systems of the main clause. This can be demonstrated by the fact that as soon as the main clause of a non-integrated example like (2) is interrogated, negated or modalized, the *because*-clause does not serve as focus of this interrogation, negation or modalization, but rather as an independent justification for the interrogative speech act, or for the assessment expressed in the modalization or the negative polarity, as illustrated in (9), (11) and (13), and the parallel corpus examples in (10), (12) and (14).

- (9) Is sponsoring exchange students worth it economically? Because [that is an aspect we should also take into account]³
- (10) Are you looking forward to going up though? Because you, you'll probably be in one of the better ... [h= houses] (COLT)
- (11) Sponsoring exchange students may be worth it economically, because they will be good ambassadors for our country in their home country.
- (12) But Musgrave's influence must have helped, because the next thing I heard, once I was back in England, was that the uncle and nephew had got their visas and were being housed, along with a number of other Czech refugees, in Musgrave's mansion in Sussex. (FLOB)
- (13) Sponsoring exchange students isn't worth it economically, because [most of them take their knowledge back to their home country afterwards].
- (14) Japan did something to a man - and it wasn't just Japan, either, because the same thing applied anywhere overseas. It was as if foreign duty implied and excused license; it intimated that the folks at home would never know about it, and, therefore, why not? (BROWN)

2.2. Focus assignment in the clause combination

The grammatical differences in terms of scope highlighted in the previous section can also be looked at from the perspective of focus assignment in the clause combination. The fact that integrated *because*-clauses are within the scope of the interrogation, modality and negation in the main clause has been demonstrated by their ability to serve as the focus of these systems: this shows how clause

combinations with integrated *because*, unlike those with non-integrated *because*, actually form one single domain for focus assignment.

Focus in English operates in **domains** where one element is assigned focal function by means of tonic prominence (the primary locus of pitch movement), and the rest of the domain acquires a presupposed status (Halliday 1967a: 199-211, Halliday 1967b). If we look at the potential for focus assignment in clause combinations with integrated *because*, it is clear that the domain of focus assignment is the entire clause combination consisting of main clause and *because*-clause: the focus can be assigned throughout the entire clause combination, and the accompanying presupposed status is invariably assigned to the remaining elements within the clause combination, as shown in (15)-(17). (The focal element is indicated in italics. Context has been provided to ensure the correct location of the focus.)

(15) [A: Why do people in Cyprus stay together?]

B: People in Cyprus stay together *because divorce is socially unacceptable*.

(16) [A: What are the consequences of the social taboo on divorce in Cyprus?]

B: Well, people in Cyprus *stay together* because divorce is socially unacceptable.

(17) [A: Is it true that people in the Mediterranean stay together because divorce is socially unacceptable?]

B: I don't know about the entire Mediterranean, but *people in Cyprus* certainly stay together because divorce is unacceptable.

With non-integrated *because*-clauses, on the other hand, the domain of focus assignment is no longer the entire clause combination consisting of main clause and *because*-clause. Each of the component clauses forms its own domain of focus, and assigning focus within one of them does not affect the status of the other, as it did with integrated *because*. For instance, if we take the non-integrated example (18) and assign focus to some element in the *because*-clause (*good ambassadors*), this does not impose presupposed status on the main clause as it did in (15). Rather, the main clause forms its own domain of focus with its own focal element (*economically*).

(18) Sponsoring exchange students is worth it *economically*, because they will be *good ambassadors* for our country in their home country.

In addition to the intonational focus assignment discussed above, there are also specific **grammatical** constructions which assign focus, such as the cleft construction and *wh*-questions. As could be expected, integrated and non-integrated *because*-clauses equally differ in terms of these constructions (Rutherford 1970; Couper-Kuhlen 1996). Integrated *because*-clauses can be clefted unproblematically, as shown in (19) and (20). Non-integrated *because*-clauses, on the other hand, cannot be clefted without affecting their function. There is always a cleft alternative available, as shown in (21), but this is never functionally proportional to the non-integrated original the way it is with integrated *because*. Clefting in (21) destroys the status of non-integrated *because* as a separate assertion which justifies the speaker's commitment to the economic usefulness of exchange students.

- (19) It is because Burns was an ordinary man who would reach out to the stars that we celebrate him.
- (20) Is this life-death question a part of the chaos? Yes. If life and death did not both present themselves to us, there would be no inscrutability. If there were only darkness, all would be clear. It is because there is not only darkness but also light that our situation becomes inexplicable. (BROWN)
- (21) Sponsoring exchange students is worth it *economically*, because they will be *good ambassadors* for our country in their home country. ≠ It is because the exchange students will be good ambassadors for our country that sponsoring them is worth it economically.

2.3. Non-intonational lexical and syntactic marking of the distinction in other languages

The observations about the different structural status of integrated and non-integrated *because*-clauses are also confirmed from a cross-linguistic perspective. German, Dutch, French and Spanish possess pairs of causal constructions which are distinct in terms of exactly the same grammatical parameters that were discussed in the previous two sections (see Küper (1991) for German, Van Belle (1989) for Dutch, Groupe λ -1 (1975) for French and Goethals (2000) for Spanish; for a comparison see Hentschel (1989)). In terms of marking, however, the causal pairs described in these languages also have a **lexically** distinct conjunction for the non-integrated causal sequence in addition to the intonational parameter that is the main surface marker for English *because*. Thus,

German has a conjunction *denn*, Dutch has a conjunction *want*, French has a conjunction *car* and Spanish has a conjunction *pues*, which can all be considered as lexically specific markers for non-integrated causal sequences that cannot fall within the scope of interrogation, negation and modality of the main clause, that do not form one single domain of focus assignment with their main clause and that cannot be clefted⁴.

In addition to the lexical differentiation that can be found in all of these languages, German also displays differences in the **syntactic** marking of integrated and non-integrated constructions. The German causal conjunction *weil* is fully parallel to English *because*, in that it allows both an integrated and a non-integrated construction with precisely the same grammatical differences as those outlined for integrated and non-integrated *because*. Alongside with the basic intonational marking, however, German *weil* also allows additional syntactic marking in terms of word order (Küper 1991). In general, German has two basic types of word order, an SVO order for main clauses and an SOV order for dependent clauses. For *weil*-clauses, the integrated type has the normal SOV order for dependent clauses, whereas the non-integrated type (just like the construction with *denn*) is syntactically distinct from the integrated type in that it also allows the SVO order typical of main clauses, as in *Die Bezeichnung ist doch offenkundig falsch, weil er ist eben doch kein Bankbeamter* (MK; see further, for instance, Küper 1991).

Thus, the grammatical distinctness of integrated and non-integrated *because* which in English is revealed mainly in terms of the divergent grammatical behaviour of the two types - summarized in Table 1 - is confirmed by the fact that cross-linguistically various other types of marking, lexical and syntactic, occur in addition to the intonational distinction.

Integrated <i>because</i>	Within scope of interpersonal grammar of main clause (can serve as focus for interrogation, negation, and modalization)
	Single focus domain with main clause
	Allows clefting
Non-integrated <i>because</i>	Independent assertion outside of scope of interpersonal grammar of main clause (cannot serve as focus for interrogation, negation, and modalization)
	Two separate focus domains for main clause and <i>because</i> -clause
	Does not allow clefting

Table 1: The grammatical behaviour of integrated and non-integrated causal sequences

3. The functional value of the non-integrated construction for *because*

The grammatical differences between integrated and non-integrated *because* that have been outlined in the previous sections can be regarded as reflections of one central **functional** parameter: the **interpersonal (in)dependence** of the *because*-clause with regard to the main clause. Non-integrated *because*-clauses are interpersonally independent from the main clause in that they have their own interpersonal structures which encode the speaker's interactive position with respect to their propositional content. Integrated *because*-clauses are interpersonally dependent on the main clause in that they do not have any structures of their own to encode the speaker's position with respect to their propositional content: instead they are integrated into the propositional content of the main clause and therefore fall within the scope of the interpersonal structures which encode the speaker's position with respect to the proposition in the main clause.

3.1. The scope of negation, interrogation and modalization in the main clause

The divergent behaviour of integrated and non-integrated *because*-clauses in reaction to negation, interrogation and modalization in the main clause (section 1.1.) can be explained in terms of their interpersonal (in)dependence with respect to the main clause. Modality, interrogation and negation

are **interpersonal** resources which encode the speaker's position with respect to the proposition: modality and polarity together serve to encode positions of deontic or epistemic **commitment** (does the speaker want it to happen or not / does the speaker believe that it happens or not), and interrogation is part of the system which takes care of the **exchange** of these positions between speaker and interlocutor. When the main clause is modified in terms of one of these interpersonal parameters, integrated and non-integrated *because*-clauses react differently, which reveals their different relations with the interpersonal organization of the main clause.

Examples (22)-(24) show how integrated *because*-clauses simply follow any interpersonal modification of the main clause as the potential focus of the new illocutionary or modal value. In example (22), the speaker states that the reason why people stay together in Cyprus is because divorce is socially unacceptable. If we modify the main clause interpersonally by making it interrogative or by adding an explicit modal verb, the *because*-clause still functions as focus of this new illocutionary or modal value: the speaker in (23) *asks* whether social pressure is the reason why people in Cyprus stay together, and in (24) he *conjectures* that this may be the reason. Thus, the relation between the *because*-clause and the propositional content of the main clause remains constant; what changes is the interpersonal position the speaker takes with respect to the causal relation between main clause and *because*-clause: is it asserted, questioned, or conjectured? This shows that integrated *because*-clauses form part of one single proposition together with the main clause, which is interpersonally negotiated as a whole by means of the interpersonal grammar of the main clause.

- (22) it's ^certainly !true in !!C\yprus# you ^kn=ow that#[@:m] . di^vorce is :very "!\are th/ere# -
 but ^that doesn't 'mean that the :marriages are suc:c\essful# they`re ^very _far !fr\om it# . the
 ^people :just "!\stick to:g\ether#be^cause they "!\h\ave to# (LLC)
- (23) Do people in Cyprus just stick together because they have to?
- (24) People in Cyprus may just stick together because they have to.

With non-integrated *because*-clauses, the reaction to interpersonal modification in the main clause is entirely different. Whereas with integrated *because* it was the relation between main clause and secondary clause which was interrogated or modalized, with non-integrated *because* it is only the main clause as such which undergoes interpersonal modifications, and the *because*-clause retains

its separate assertive status, as shown in (25)-(28). In the non-integrated (25), the speaker states in the main clause that the publishing firm in question might be worth approaching and then justifies this statement in the *because*-clause by referring to the technical and unremunerative nature of the book to be published. When the main clause is interrogated, negated or modalized, the *because*-clause retains its assertive status and comes to function as the speaker's assertive justification for the new illocutionary or modal value: in (26), the speaker's assertion that the book in question is unremunerative comes to function as a justification for asking whether the publishing company in question would be worth approaching, in (27), it comes to function as a justification for his argument that they are not worth approaching, and in (28) it comes to function as a justification for his conjecture that they may be worth approaching. What this shows is that non-integrated *because*-clauses unlike their integrated counterparts do not form one complex proposition with their main clause that is negotiated interpersonally by the interpersonal grammar of the main clause: instead they have their own interpersonal-assertive value which functions independently from the interpersonal grammar of the main clause.

- (25) I !don't quite :kn\ow#but ^they would *[m]* be !worth ap:pr\oaching#[m] - ^because that a!g\ain#is a ^t\echnical# ((or)) ^unre:munerative type of !b=ook# - [m] in a ^s\ense I _mean# it's - a ^limited *m/arket# (LLC)
- (26) Would they be worth approaching? Because that again is a technical or unremunerative kind of book.
- (27) They may be worth approaching, because that again is a technical or unremunerative kind of book.
- (28) They are not worth approaching, because that again is a technical or unremunerative kind of book.

3.2. Independent interpersonal modification of the *because*-clause

The independent assertive status of non-integrated *because*-clauses is not only reflected in their independence with respect to interpersonal modifications in the main clause, but can also be demonstrated by looking at their **internal structure**: non-integrated *because*-clauses allow a whole

range of different clause types besides the prototypical declarative, whereas their integrated counterparts only allow the declarative.

- (29) Rudolf knows he should feel safe in the train. He is making his escape after all. Every mile they travel takes him that much further away from retribution, recrimination, repatriation. But instead the train seems to echo those very words over and over again and he has the impression that wherever it stops it will deliver him straight into the waiting arms of his pursuers. Which is ridiculous because aren't they behind him? (FLOB)
- (30) Dragging one heavy foot behind the other, he has announced measles and a high fever, and in a stinky mumble as dull as the one that sends black years to the Irish kids on his new Buick in the street, he has even mentioned the possibility of hospital. But this doesn't worry me because what's a hospital? One, nurses: quick-stepping, white-clad girls whose heads are all blond and faces shiksasilly. And two, doctors: bald, heavy men, sad-eyed and Jewish, who walk slowly on dragging legs, their bodies wrapped up in old maroon bathrobes, shamefully all worn away in one spot. (FROWN)
- (31) A high occupancy in the building would tend to show that there is income for the building, because do not forget that once you have bought a condo you will still have a monthly fee to pay. (IC)

Non-integrated *because*-clauses are structurally distinct from integrated *because*-clauses in that they allow other clause types than the simple declarative (Green's (1976) 'main clause phenomena' and Lakoff's (1984) 'performative subordinate clauses'). This is illustrated in (29) and (30), which are grammatically interrogative, and (31) which is grammatically imperative. The fact that integrated *because*-clauses only allow declaratives whereas their non-integrated counterparts allow the whole range of clause types can be explained in terms of the different illocutionary status of the two constructions. Non-integrated *because*-clauses have their own assertive illocutionary value, which is prototypically realized by a declarative clause type, but which also allows non-declarative realizations in the 'rhetorical' interrogatives and imperatives illustrated in (29)-(31). Integrated *because*-clauses, on the other hand, simply lack any illocutionary value: if the declarative mood in integrated *because*-clauses were a marker of assertive illocutionary force, we should expect them to allow a whole range of non-declarative realizations in addition to the typical declarative.

From a cross-linguistic perspective, the distinct word order patterns for integrated and non-integrated *weil*-clauses in German (section 1.3.) can also be regarded as reflections of distinct illocutionary status (Küper 1991). The word order in German is normally SVO for main clauses and SOV for dependent clauses: integrated *weil*-clauses follow the normal pattern in that they only allow SOV order, but non-integrated *weil*-clauses also allow SVO in addition to SOV. The availability of SVO order for the non-integrated construction can be regarded as a reflection of their independent assertive force, in that they formally adapt to the normal SVO word order that is typically associated with assertive main clauses. The absence of SVO word order for the integrated construction type, on the other hand, again reflects its lack of independent assertive value.

Summing up, the grammatical differences outlined in these sections can all be related to the functional parameter of interpersonal (in)dependence of the *because*-clause. Non-integrated *because* functions as a separate assertive utterance, with its own interpersonal structure independent of the interpersonal organization of the main clause. Integrated *because*, on the other hand, does not function as a separate assertion and has no interpersonal structure of its own, but functions as part of the proposition of the main clause that is interpersonally managed by the illocutionary force, modality and polarity of that main clause. The different interpersonal status of the two constructions also has important implications for their function in discourse. Discursively, clause combinations with non-integrated *because*-clauses consist of two utterances with their own illocutionary force, one which can have any illocutionary force and a *because*-clause which functions as an assertion that has some kind of justifying relationship with the other clause (on the semiotic import of this ‘justifying’ relationship see Goethals 2000). Clause combinations with integrated *because*-clauses, on the other hand, are discursively different in that they function as one single utterance with one single illocutionary force, about the causal relation between two States of Affairs. The different discursive status of these two types has also been demonstrated in a conversation-analytic framework by Couper-Kuhlen (1996: 404-410), who has investigated the two construction types in terms of turn taking mechanisms. The use of the two construction types in conversation shows that the integrated type typically forms one single turn-constructive unit, “planned and executed ‘in one go’”, whereas the non-integrated type typically involves two turn-constructive units, “the second constituting an augmentation (volunteered or elicited) of the first” (Couper-Kuhlen 1996: 410).

3.3. Interpersonal independence and the internal-external distinction

The distinction between integrated and non-integrated *because* is closely related but **not to be equated** with the distinction between internal and external *because* (terminology borrowed from Halliday & Hasan 1976): **external** *because*-clauses elaborate on the propositional content of their main clause and **internal** *because*-clauses elaborate on some aspect of the role of the speaker in the main clause (see also Sweetser 1990, Verstraete 1998). Examples (32)-(35) illustrate this internal-external distinction. In the external examples (34) and (35), the *because*-clause is causally related to the propositional content of the main clause: working late is the cause of being tired in (34), and not paying is the reason for not giving the goods in (35). In the internal examples (32) and (33), the *because*-clause is not related to the propositional content of the main clause but to some act of the speaker: the *because*-clause justifies the asking of a question in (32) and the drawing of a conclusion in (33).

(32) How might that affect any of you? *Because* it is going to affect all of you. (COLT)

(33) It was a bitterly cold day and I remember it as snowing. Perhaps I went to school late that term, as it certainly wouldn't have been snowing in September. It must have been cold though, because I was dressed in a white fur coat and hat and long grey gaiters just above my knee. (FLOB)

(34) I'm actually really tired *because* I worked last night. (WSC)

(35) Yeah, and that was what this argument about [*sic*], and Piers wants this CD rack but Russ won't give it to him, because he hasn't paid him. (COLT)

There is an important connection between our distinction between integrated and non-integrated *because* and the internal-external dichotomy, in that the internal *because*-clauses will always be of the non-integrated type and conversely the integrated *because*-clauses will always be of the external type (as observed in Sweetser (1990) and Couper-Kuhlen (1996); Verstraete (1998) provides an explanation for these connections). The two dichotomies cannot be equated, however, because the non-integrated type is not always speaker-related (internal) but can also be proposition-related (external). This is shown in (35) above, where the *because*-clause is not intonationally integrated and still functions as an explanation for the propositional content 'why Russ won't give the CD rack' rather than being related to some act of the speaker.

The two distinctions simply categorize different phenomena. Integration versus non-integration is concerned with the **interpersonal status of the *because*-clause**, which can either have its own interpersonal structure independent of that of the main clause or be integrated into the propositional content of the main clause and thus fall within the scope of the interpersonal structures of that main clause. Internal versus external function, on the other hand, is concerned with the **component in the main clause to which the *because*-clause is related**, which can be either the propositional content or the interpersonal resources encoding the position of the speaker with respect to that content. The **relation** between the two dichotomies is that a *because*-clause which is integrated with the propositional component of the main clause cannot be related to the interpersonal systems of that main clause, which explains the implicational relation between integrated *because* and an external interpretation (Verstraete 1998, see Figure 1). For non-integrated *because*, however, there are no restrictions: it can either be related to the proposition or to the interpersonal systems of the main clause.

Figure 1: The relation between the internal/external and the integrated/non-integrated distinction

4. The value of the non-integrated pattern for temporal relations

The distinction between an integrated and a non-integrated intonation pattern that has been described for *because* equally occurs with other types of clause combinations (as argued in Chafe 1984, 1988), for instance temporal sequences marked with connectives like *after*, *when* or *now that*: examples (36) and (37) illustrate the distinction for *after*, and (38) and (39) illustrate it for *when*.

- (36) I think that !wr\iting# . is the ^n\ext big st/ep# be^cause you can then write !d\own your th/oughts# . and . ^hold them back ((to)) :look at again or :pass them on to other people after you`re :d\ead# (LLC)

- (37) Cec Frith would never be much of a ladder climber again, after he lost a leg in the coke ovens.
(ACE)
- (38) ^I can im\agine# ^century after c/entury# the ^Lord of the M\anor !lived here# - and "^\I have
{^no d\oubt#}# that the ^c\entre of our v\illage# was a^round ab\out {this ^m\ansion#}# - -
and ^Bells H\ill# .^only de"v/elope# - ^when the !road com_munic/ations
{de^v/elope#}{between ^Sl/ough#} {and Gerrards ^Cr/oss#}# (LLC)
- (39) The next thing he knew was that he was stationed in the leading personnel-carrier, being
propped up on the hard seat by Zelikov. Arif felled by his opponent, had recovered and
jerked the man's legs from behind, when the main was momentarily off balance. (CB)

Although these examples show the same two intonation patterns as *because*-clauses, the functional value associated with the intonational distinction is very different. Unlike with *because*-clauses, the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation does not correlate with differences in interpersonal organization: non-integrated *after*-clauses or *when*-clauses do not have their own interpersonal value independent of that of the main clause. This is reflected in their grammatical behaviour, which does not show any of the characteristics that revealed the interpersonal independence of non-integrated *because*: non-integrated *after* or *when* does not allow any other clause types than the simple declarative, and does not retain any assertive value in reaction to interpersonal modification of the main clause. The only characteristic they have in common with *because*-clauses is the organization of focus assignment in the clause combination: integrated temporal clauses form one single focus domain with their main clause, whereas non-integrated ones are disconnected from the focus domain independent of the main clause.

4.1. The lack of interpersonal implications for non-integrated intonation with temporal clauses

With *because*-clauses, the grammatical characteristics that revealed the special interpersonal status of the non-integrated construction were the range of clause types allowed for the *because*-clause and the reaction to interpersonal modifications in the main clause. The fact that non-integrated *because* allows interrogative, imperative or exclamative clause types in addition to the prototypical declarative shows its separate illocutionary status as an assertion. This separate assertive status also explains its behaviour in reaction to interpersonal modifications of the main clause: non-integrated

because always retains its function as a separate assertion, which usually causes a reinterpretation of the *because*-clause as a justification for the new interpersonal value in the main clause.

None of these characteristics can be observed for non-integrated temporal clauses. First of all, non-integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses do not allow any other clause type than the simple declarative. In this sense, they are similar to integrated *because*-clauses, which equally do not allow any other clause type. The absence of other clause types in addition to the declarative shows that the declarative clause type in these contexts does not function as a marker of assertive force: non-integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses do not have any illocutionary force of their own, just like integrated *because*-clauses. This also explains their behaviour in reaction to interpersonal modification of the main clause: unlike non-integrated *because*-clauses, non-integrated *when*- and *after*-clauses cannot function as assertive justifications for the new interpersonal value. In the interrogative (41), (43) and (44), for example, the non-integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses do not assert anything - note how they copy the question intonation of the main clause, and simply add a 'postscript' which specifies the temporal setting for the questioned proposition. The same goes for the conclusions marked with *must* in (45) and (46): again the *when*-clause does not assert anything with respect to the conclusion drawn, but simply delimits the temporal scope of the main clause in a 'postscript' form.

- (40) Cec Frith would never be much of a ladder climber again, after he lost a leg in the coke ovens.
(ACE)
- (41) Would Cec Frith ever be a ladder climber again, after he lost a leg in the coke ovens?⁵
- (42) As the war clouds gathered, he returned to active duty and was stationed in Washington, D.C., when the carrier-borne bomber idea was broached. Doolittle was told to help find the right bomber. (FROWN)
- (43) Was he stationed in Washington, when the carrier-borne bomber idea was broached?
- (44) ^was !she 'writing with the 'will on a tr\ay# ^when she "!f\irst s/igned# . (LLC)
- (45) He must have been stationed in Washington, when the carrier-borne bomber idea was broached.
- (46) Put differently, there is less resentment of superior machinery than of people with superior skills. Yet even the machinery may be resented to some extent, when its foreign origins or

foreign ownership is taken as invidious reflections on the capabilities of the local inhabitants.
(CB)

4.2. The function of non-integrated intonation with temporal clause combining: a matter of focus domains

The function of non-integrated intonation for temporal clauses can in fact be explained in terms of the one grammatical correlate of integrated and non-integrated intonation which temporal clauses do share with *because*-clauses: the distribution of focus assignment within the clause combination. Integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses, just like integrated *because*-clauses, form one single domain of focus assignment with their main clause, where the temporal relation between main clause and secondary clause usually serves as the actual focus, as in (47). As with integrated *because*-clauses, integrated temporal clauses can also be focused on by means of cleft constructions, as shown in (48).

(47) She had written the note and left it in the summerhouse. Which meant they must have found it after she'd gone. (FLOB)

(48) Mrs Dunkel admitted the slaying and said that the son-in-law became her lover after the death of her daughter in 1934. It was when he attempted to end the relationship that the murder took place. (BROWN)

With non-integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses the temporal clause is disconnected from the focus domain of the main clause. The distinction in terms of focus domains can be demonstrated with the interaction between focus and presupposition in interrogative contexts. With an integrated *after*- or *when*-clause, as in (49), focus on the temporal relation automatically implies presupposed status for the main clause, because both belong to a single domain of focus: (49) presupposes that the interlocutor did kill and asks whether the killing took place when the victim arrived. With a non-integrated *after*- or *when*-clause, however, main clause and dependent clause do not form one single focus domain any more, which also implies that the main clause can never be presupposed due to focus on the temporal relation: an example like (50) does not presuppose that the interlocutor

killed, but simply asks whether this is the case and then, in a second move, delimits the temporal setting for the act of killing about which he interrogates the interlocutor.

(49) Did you kill him when he arrived?

(50) Did you kill him, when he arrived?

The analysis applies to examples like (51) or (52), where the main clause introduces a proposition independent of any temporal context, and the secondary clause delimits the temporal setting of that proposition in the shape of a focus domain that is separate from the main clause. The reasons for construing the temporal setting as a new focus domain rather than integrating it into the focus domain of the main clause are related to the status of the temporal clause in the structure of the discourse. In examples like (51) and (52), the *when*-clause is discursively important in that it signals a return to the main thread of the text: in (51), the *when*-clause returns to the main theme of “the long-distance bombing of Japan” after an interlude about the career of the pilot who was to select the right bomber, and in (52), the *when*-clause contains the actual description of cruelty towards the unkind protagonist, which is the main theme of the text. Apart from the discursive importance of the *when*-clause, another reason for construing it as an independent focus domain may be its status as an afterthought: in an example like (53), the non-integrated *when*-clause gives as it were a ‘postscript’ delimitation of the general principle stated in the main clause, with its postscript status indicated in *that is*.

(51) Almost from the moment he learned of the unprovoked surprise attack on the Hawaiian Islands, President Franklin D. Roosevelt demanded that his military leaders strike back. Specifically, he wanted American airplanes to bomb the Japanese home islands - to put it right in their face. And he wanted those bombs to fall soon. The problem was that there was no apparent way to comply. There were no bombers based anywhere near striking distance of Japan, and moving one of the Navy's precious carriers close enough to conduct such a mission with naval aircraft would make it vulnerable to overwhelming retaliation. But then an unlikely 4-striper came up with an audacious idea. Capt. Francis Low, a submariner, suggested a strike with long-range Army bombers launched from a Navy flat - top operating well away from the Japanese coast. The idea caught fire in Washington - theoretically it would work.

And the best man to put the theory into flight was the balding, middle-aged lieutenant colonel right down the hall. Years before the outbreak of war, James H. Doolittle had already secured his place in the Hall of Aviation Immortals. A 'daredevil' pilot who actually calculated all risks very carefully - he held a Ph.D. in aeronautical science from MIT - Doolittle had set transcontinental speed records, won a brace of races, performed the first outside loop and conducted the first 'blind' flight on instruments. As the war clouds gathered, he returned to active duty and was stationed in Washington, D.C., when the carrier-borne bomber idea was broached. Doolittle was told to help find the right bomber. The rough criteria for the aircraft: It had to be able to operate from an exceedingly confined space and take off in less than 500 ft. while hauling a ton of bombs and enough fuel to fly 2000 miles. Only one airplane in the inventory fit the bill: the new North American B-25 Mitchell medium bomber. And it would require modifications.(FROWN)

- (52) It is noteworthy that even as reward-and-punishment tales celebrate kindness and compassion, they are notoriously uncharitable when it comes to fixing the fate of their unkind protagonists. In one such tale, a girl sits in a room waiting for a sack of gold to come flying in (as it had for her sister), when a little gray man whisks into the room and "lops her head off her body." That punishment must have gone a long way toward discouraging the cruelty to animals practiced by the unkind sister. Another story is even more graphic in illustrating the consequences of a girl's failure to share her porridge with a little old man: "When the girl finished eating, the little man took her, tore her into a thousand pieces, and hung them up in the trees." (FROWN)
- (53) The following plausible assumptions are made: |1. That an uncharged capacitor behaves as a short circuit at the instant of applying a steady {Op.d.}; and after a long time, when fully charged, acts as a disconnexion or infinite impedance. |2. That a pure (resistanceless) inductance behaves in the opposite way; offering apparently infinite impedance at the instant of application of the direct voltage, and short circuit after a long time*- that is, when the current is steady. (LOB)

4.3. Discursive independence with *because*: initial position as a structural correlate of discursive independence

The notion of discursive independence introduced in the previous section is based on the fact that non-integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses are disconnected from the focus domain of their main clause. This separation of the focus domains of main and dependent clause was also found with non-integrated *because*-clauses (section 1.2.), however, which shows that *because*-clauses are equally discursively independent. The fact that non-integrated *because*-clauses share the feature of discursive independence with non-integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses raises the question of the **relation** between the parameters of discursive and interpersonal independence: is the discursive independence of non-integrated *because*-clauses merely a consequence of their interpersonal independence (in the sense that interpersonally independent clauses are always discursively independent), or is this a separate parameter which can also occur on its own with *because*-clauses?

The answer to both these questions is yes. On the one hand, interpersonally independent *because*-clauses are necessarily also discursively independent: a *because*-clause which functions as a separate speech act with an assertive force of its own cannot be part of the focus domain of its main clause. In interpersonally independent *because*-clauses, therefore, discursive independence is a necessary corollary of their interpersonal independence. On the other hand, however, discursive independence can also occur as a separate parameter with *because*-clauses, as shown by the behaviour of preposed *because*-clauses. Preposed *because*-clauses are discursively independent, in that they generally cannot serve as focus for the interpersonal systems of the main clause, and yet they can never be interpersonally independent. The discursive independence of preposed *because*-clauses can easily be demonstrated by contrasting them with their postposed counterparts. Postposed integrated *because*-clauses form one single focus domain with their main clause: they can serve as focus for negation, interrogation, or modalization in the main clause, illustrated in (54)-(56). As soon as the *because*-clauses in such examples are preposed, however, the single-domain interpretations of their postposed counterparts become impossible, which shows that preposed *because*-clauses are discursively independent⁶. This discursive independence is not a consequence of interpersonal independence, however. Preposed *because*-clauses are never interpersonally independent: unlike their postposed counterparts, they cannot function as separate assertions, as shown by the fact that they do not allow any other clause types than the simple declarative. More generally, therefore, the behaviour of preposed⁷ *because*-clauses shows that discursive independence with *because*-clauses is not always a corollary of interpersonal independence: discursive independence can also occur as an independent parameter.

- (54) I had to face the questions, What will be the price of my denial? Do I love God because God blesses? Do I serve the Lord for some reward? Will I remain loyal through difficulty or hardship? (FROWN)
 ≠ Because God blesses, do I love him?
- (55) "He's my son ...I can't help feeling it's all our fault." "Isaac would be delighted to hear you say so, but you know it's nonsense. He was always gay. We were too thick to notice. He didn't turn gay because we left him. (FLOB)
 ≠ Because we left him, he didn't turn gay.
- (56) With regard to Samuel the singular form may have been used because the whole people of Israel are referred to in the singular, as they are in another verse. (LOB)
 ≠ Because the whole people of Israel are referred to in the singular, the singular form may have been used.

The role of discursive independence for *because*-clauses shows that there is a hierarchical relation between the parameters of discursive and interpersonal independence: a clause can be discursively independent without being interpersonally independent, as shown by non-integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses and preposed *because*-clauses, but it cannot be interpersonally independent without being discursively independent, as shown by the behaviour of interpersonally independent *because*-clauses.

5. Conclusions

5.1. Different values for non-integrated intonation: discursive versus interpersonal independence

What the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation has in common for *because*, *when* and *after* is the signalling of discursive dependence versus independence. The integrated pattern always forms one single focus domain which consists of main clause and secondary clause, often with the relation between main clause and secondary clause as the actual focus of the construction. In the non-integrated pattern, on the other hand, main clause and secondary clause never form one single domain of focus: the secondary clause is discursively disconnected from the

main clause, in that it cannot serve as focus for the interpersonal systems of that main clause. As shown in the previous section, this discursive independence can be exploited in various ways, for instance to signal a return to the main theme of the text or to indicate the ‘afterthought’ status of the secondary clause as an adverbial delimiter for the proposition in the main clause.

For temporal clause combinations with *after* or *when*, discursive (in)dependence is the **only** function that is signalled by the intonational distinction between integration and non-integration. In every other respect, a non-integrated *after*- or *when*-clause is structurally and functionally identical to its integrated counterpart. This is not the case for *because*-clauses, however: in addition to the discursive independence which they share with temporal clauses, the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation can - but need not, as shown by the discussion of preposed *because* in section 3.3. - equally signal *interpersonal* independence of the *because*-clause. Such non-integrated *because*-clauses are functionally different from their integrated counterparts in that they have their own interpersonal value independent from that of the main clause. This interpersonal independence has been demonstrated by the range of clause types that are allowed in non-integrated *because*-clauses and by their reaction to interpersonal modifications in the main clause. The availability of ‘rhetorical’ imperative, interrogative and exclamative clauses in addition to the prototypical declarative shows that non-integrated *because*, unlike its integrated counterpart, has its own assertive illocutionary value. And this independent assertive value explains its behaviour in reaction to interpersonal modification of the main clause: non-integrated *because*-clauses invariably retain their assertive function, which usually leads to a reinterpretation of the *because*-clause as a justification for the new illocutionary value of the main clause.

Conjunction	indep focus domain	diff clause types	assertive status with respect to interpersonal modifications in the main clause
<i>after, when, ...</i>	yes	no	no
<i>because</i>	yes	yes	yes

Figure 2: The divergent functional value of non-integrated intonation

5.2. The generality of the parameters

The three concepts of discursive dependence, discursive independence, and interpersonal independence that have come to the surface as the functional correlates of integrated vs non-integrated intonation patterns with *because*, *after*, and *when* are not restricted to these three elements. In fact, they can be shown to be more generally applicable in the domain of conjunctions as a whole.

Concessive conjunctions like *although*, for instance, can be analysed using the same parameters in a different combination. What distinguishes concessive conjunctions from the types which have been looked at so far is that they are never discursively dependent: as shown in König (1988) and Crevels (1998), concessive clauses cannot serve as focus for interrogation or negation, and do not occur in cleft structures, which shows that they do not form one focus domain with their main clause. For the rest, their behaviour is parallel to that of *because*-clauses. They can be discursively independent without being interpersonally independent, as shown by the fact that they can be preposed: like preposed *because*-clauses, preposed *although*-clauses are discursively independent yet can never serve as independent assertions. They can also be interpersonally independent, however: like non-integrated *because*-clauses, independent assertive illocutionary force can be realized by different clause types, as shown in (57)-(59).

- (57) News about the anti-American demonstrations which had begun to appear in Berlin and other parts of Germany in the fortnight since the summit hadn't exactly helped sell what was supposed to be Michelle's greatest success. Although what did the mid-west care about Berlin? (BNC)
- (58) [...] into Las Vegas where Robert drove through the Strip and down to Glitter Gulch to find serious poker players. He arrived having driven, on drugs and alcohol, for eleven hours; he played through the night – although who could tell night from day in there? (BNC)
- (59) Whisk together pineapple and pink grapefruit juice, cassis and lime for an Exotic Blossom, or top orange juice with crushed strawberries for a Tropical Sunrise. You needn't leave out alcohol, although remember that it does dehydrate the body. (CB)

Taken together, the analyses of *because*, *although*, *after* and *when* define three possible combinations for the three concepts (summarized in Table 2). *Because* can be discursively dependent, discursively independent, and interpersonally independent; *after* and *when* can be either discursively dependent or discursively independent, but not interpersonally independent; *although*, finally, can be either discursively or interpersonally independent, but not discursively dependent. An interesting question for further research is how the different clusterings for different semantic types of relation can be explained: why do only concessive and causal relations allow interpersonal independence, and why do concessive relations not allow discursive dependence?

	discursively dependent	discursively independent	interpersonally independent
<i>after, when</i>	+	+	-
<i>because</i>	+	+	+
<i>although</i>	-	+	+

Table 2: Combinations of the three parameters

5.3. Non-integrated intonation and typologies of clause combining mechanisms

In discussions of clause combining mechanisms in English, the existence of a non-integrated intonation pattern is often cited as an important argument for the ‘less subordinate’ character of elements which have traditionally been analysed as subordinating conjunctions (Altenberg 1984, Haiman & Thompson 1984, Lehmann 1988, Chafe 1988, Schlepppegrell 1991). In this study, however, I hope to have show that non-integrated intonation for elements like *because*, *although*, *when* and *after* is not a straightforward unitary phenomenon, but that it can signal functionally and structurally very different things for different conjunctions. For *after* and *when*, non-integrated intonation merely signals discursive independence for the secondary clause: in all other respects, non-integrated *after*- and *when*-clauses are functionally and structurally similar to their integrated counterparts. For *because*, on the other hand, non-integrated intonation can also signal interpersonal independence. Integrated *because* does not have any interpersonal value of its own but belongs to the proposition formed by the main clause predicate which is interpersonally managed by the interpersonal grammar of that main clause. Non-integrated *because*-clauses, however, have their

own interpersonal value: they function as independent utterances with their own assertive illocutionary force independent of the main clause.

Given the fact that non-integrated intonation correlates with very different functional and structural parameters for different types of conjunctions, it should also be used with great care as a criterion in typologies of clause combining mechanisms. What matters is not the non-integrated intonation as such, but the functional values which it marks. In this perspective, I believe that only the parameter of interpersonal independence should be considered as a relevant argument for the ‘more coordinate’ status of conjunctions with non-integrated intonation: the parameter of interpersonal (in)dependence actually provides a **rationale** for setting up a typology of clause combining mechanisms in terms of degrees of dependence. What it means for a clause to be (in)dependent is to be able to function as a separate move by the speaker in the interaction. Integrated *because*-clauses are at one extreme of the spectrum: they can never function as separate moves, because they belong to the proposition formed by the main clause and are interpersonally managed by the main clause. At the other extreme, clauses connected by the traditional coordinators *and*, *or* and *but* always function as separate moves in discourse: they have their own interpersonal resources and can take different illocutionary values. In between these two extremes we find constructions like interpersonally independent *because*- and *although*-clauses: like clauses connected by *and*, *or* and *but* they have their own interpersonal value, but unlike these traditional coordinate constructions they only allow *assertive* illocutionary value (this assertive value can be realized by a broad range of clause types, but the range remains limited in that it must have a basically assertive function: we only find rhetorical rather than straight imperatives or interrogatives (Lakoff 1984). Thus, non-integrated *because* and *although* are independent because they can function as separate moves in the interaction, but there still is some kind of interpersonal asymmetry with their ‘main clause’: the main clause can have any type of illocutionary force, just like the clauses connected by *and*, *or* and *but*, whereas the *because*-clause remains fixed in its assertive illocutionary value.

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Notes

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¹ The examples used are taken from the *ICAME*-collection of English corpora, the *COBUILD* corpus and the *British National Corpus*. The following abbreviations have been used: ACE (Australian Corpus of English); BNC (British National Corpus); BROWN (Brown Corpus); FLOB (Freiburg-Lob Corpus of British English); FROWN (Freiburg-Brown Corpus of American English); CB (Cobuild Corpus); COLT (Bergen Corpus of London Teenage Language); LLC (London-Lund Corpus); LOB (Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus); WC (Wellington Corpus of Written New Zealand English) and WSC (Wellington Corpus of Spoken New Zealand English). LLC also provides prosodic transcription. The most important transcription conventions are: tone unit boundaries are indicated by #, nuclear tones are indicated by \ (falling), / (rising), ∨ (falling-rising), ∧ (rising-falling), and = (level).

² Whenever grammatical operations are applied to example sentences, the resulting structure is paired with a structurally similar corpus example.

³ For (9) and (13), interrogating and negating the main clause makes it semantically impossible to retain the original *because*-clause, because it provides a justification for why exchange students are economically useful. This is why a new *because*-clause, compatible with the interrogation and negation, has been used in (9) and (13). Of course, the fact that the original *because*-clause cannot even be maintained in these contexts shows a fortiori that the non-integrated construction is grammatically different from the integrated.

⁴ In fact, English also has a lexically specific marker *for*, and it might even be argued that some new kind of lexical differentiation is developing in the attrition of *because* to *cos*, but the data in Stenström (1998: 138) show that the distinction between *cos* and *because* does not fully correlate with the distinction between the integrated and the non-integrated type: *cos* also figures in the integrated pattern (even in 51 % of the instances of *cos*), and *because* also figures in the non-integrated pattern

(still in 34 % of the instances of *because*). So the lexical differentiation is only incipient, if we can speak of differentiation at all.

⁵ Admittedly, there is one interpretation in which the non-integrated *after*-clause can have some kind of justifying function, but in such a context the *after*-clause is no longer purely temporal but acquires a causal-argumentative flavour: ‘the fact that he lost his leg justifies my wondering about his future as a ladder climber’.

⁶ This functional difference is in accordance with Thompson’s (1985) point that preposed and postposed clauses are best not regarded as two positional variants of one single clause type, but as two functionally different clause types. In fact, I even suspect that Thompson’s comparison between the different functions of initial and final purpose clauses can actually be reduced to the distinction between discursive dependence and independence, in that her initial clauses are discursively independent and her final clauses are prototypically discursively dependent.

⁷ The focus on preposed *because*-clauses in this section is not meant to imply that discursive independence without interpersonal independence is a unique property of preposed clauses or that postposed disintegrated *because*-clauses are always interpersonally independent. Preposed clauses have only been singled out because they provide the clearest context to separate discursive independence from interpersonal independence: discursive independence appears to be a general property of preposed clauses, both for temporal and for causal sequences (cp also Ford 1993 on the discourse functions of preposed adverbial clauses).

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