The Particularity of the Hermeneutics of God

A Response to Richard Kearney's God-who-may-be

Lieven Boeve

Introduction: Between Philosophy and Theology

In line with some of his earlier work, Richard Kearney suggests in his contribution to this volume a 'poetics of the possible God,' evoking the contours of a 'God-who-may-be,' as an alternative to the powerful omnipotent God 'who is,' thought of in classical rationalist accounts as self-sufficient being and as self-causing cause.¹ Through 'three hermeneutical detours,' playfully and selectively interpreting texts and intuitions from Scripture, testimonial/confessional texts, and literary sources, Kearney poetically makes a plea for the priority of the possible over the actual. Perhaps this approach is indeed the most adequate way of highlighting the 'micro-theology' he intends: i.e. a poetics of the kingdom of the last and the least, of 'small things,' resisting "the standard macro-theology of the Kingdom as emblem of sovereignty, omnipotence, and ecclesiastical triumph" (Kearney 2006: 309-310). Explicitly, Kearney waves all theological, exegetical, confessional-orthodox competencies and calls upon the 'immunity of poetic licence.' Through his 'threefold variation of imagination,' he hopes to identify some key traits of a post-onto-theological God, a God-who-may-be that reveals itself to us poetically. One could say that, in this poetics, Kearney strives at 'possibilizing' this revelation of the God who 'possibilizes' us to bring about the Kingdom of peace and justice, so actualizing God's *posse*. He features an eschatological God of promise and powerlessness – a God not of *potestas* or *potentia*, but (a 'post-God') of *posse* or *possest* – a God

¹ In the past few years, Kearney released a trilogy in which he presents his philosophical position, first in *The God Who May Be* (2001), which is on the God-question in contemporary continental philosophy, secondly in *On Stories* (2002), which is on narrativity and hermeneutics, and finally in *Strangers, Gods and Monsters* (2003a), which is on how to interpret and to deal with otherness. For the bibliography of Kearney, see: <<http://finwww.bc.edu/Pl/fac/KearneyCV.pdf>> (accessed 16.06.2006).

who persuades human beings to answer his call to realize the kingdom, “[f]or if God’s loving is indeed unconditional, the realization of that loving *posse* in this world is indeed conditional upon our response” (Kearney 2006: 313).

Kearney’s work on God indeed offers a very imaginative exercise in its own right, which is stimulating and thought provoking. However, the reader is continually puzzled about where precisely Kearney stands both philosophically and theologically. Considering the latter, it would seem rather easy to point at Kearney’s very sympathetic but not unproblematic links with both political and liberation theologies, as well as pluralist theologies, which have been developed over the past decades in theological circles. Specifically intriguing is the way in which he often introduces the term ‘wager,’ both in regards to the content and its methodological approach in order to account for his position. Certainly when wagering on God and in profiling this God by reading texts from the Jewish-Christian tradition, his work appears to possess a thoroughly theological character – quasi confessional in its own right – definitely when one perceives his position from his acknowledgement to belong to the Roman-Catholic Church (though – it would seem – with some anti-institutional sentiments, and with a proviso).² When theology is biography, as Johann Baptist Metz states, then Kearney’s poetics of a possible God may well be his attempt, from an exercise of *fides quaerens intellectum*, to express and expose (his) the *intellectus fidei* – an exercise Kearney performs with a considerable freedom vis-à-vis the tradition and the Church to which he belongs.

The appeal to the ‘immunity of poetic license’ of course does not exempt one from a collegial and scholarly – both philosophical and theological – discussion of the intuitions which Kearney has presented both in the said contribution and his other writings (especially his 2001 monograph, *The God Who May Be: a Hermeneutics of Religion*). From a fundamental-theological perspective, we will engage in an inquiry of the contribution Kearney makes to the contemporary philosophical and

² “Where Catholicism offends love and justice, I prefer to call myself a Judeo-Christian; and where this tradition so offends, I prefer to call myself religious in the sense of seeking God in a way that neither excludes other religions nor purports to possess the final truth. And where the religious so offends, I would call myself a seeker of love and justice *tout court*” (Kearney 2001: 6).

theological discussion on thinking God. We will delve deeper into the intuitions, argumentation, and framework of his thinking. This will lead us to a sharpening of the philosophical focus, and the suggestion to radicalize the hermeneutical turn Kearney introduces in this discussion.³

Kearney's Two Wagers

As already mentioned, there are two 'wagers,' one concerning content and one concerning method, which are prominent in Kearney's endeavor (Kearney 2001: 1-8).

The first, labelled as the theist one, refers to Kearney's wager that God exists and that this God at best is conceived of in terms of a God 'who-may-be.' Other formulas suggested by Kearney to refer to this God are a God 'who is May-Be,' a 'possible God,' a God 'more than impossible,' with, borrowed from Nicholas of Cusa, God's first name as: *Possesst*. The God-who-may-be is the God from the kingdom to come, an eschatological God, a God of promise and of powerlessness, of justice and peace, who enables human beings to answer the call to realize the kingdom to make God enter history. God's *dunamis* is not to be understood as *omnipotentia* but as possibilizing powerlessness calling upon us to be possibilized to enter history, and make the impossible possible. The possible God is a conditional God, not in the sense that only when we want there to be a God is there a God, but because the God-who-may-be needs our answer to enter history, to make the impossible of God's *posse* possible.

Kearney's second wager has to do with the way in which such a God can be thought of today. A phenomenological description of this God does not suffice. What such a God stands for comes only to life when engaging in a hermeneutical retrieving of inspiring insights from some main texts of the western Judeo-Christian and philosophical, intellectual history (with a special eye for 'the metaphorizing role of hermeneutic mediation'). Thus, Kearney sketches, he says, 'the outlines of a narrative [onto-]eschatology,' which favors the possible over the actual, *posse* over *esse* – finally leading to a poetics of a possible God. Hereby, he holds to the priority of ethics over ontology. It is the very otherness of the other (coined by Kearney as the *persona* of the other), which "is the in-finite other in the finite person before me" (irreducible to the embodied

³ For a further development and elaboration of the criticisms and reflections presented in this contribution, see Boeve 2005.

person), the sign of God in the other, that ‘transfigures me before I configure it,’ and calls me to an ‘eschatological relation of one-for-the-other,’ to the realization of the kingdom to come (see Kearney 2006, *passim*). Giving the other a cup of cold water and sharing our bread is getting the Kingdom underway.⁴

These two wagers, both as regards to content and methodological approach, are the point from which Kearney takes part in the discussion with other contemporary thinkers on God and religion, and with whom he shares the following guiding question: ‘what comes after the onto-theological God of metaphysics?’ Resisting both classical onto-theology and postmodern negative theologies (with reference to J.-L. Marion, J.-F. Lyotard, and S. Žižek), Kearney devotes a considerable part of his philosophical discussion to a very sympathetic yet critical confrontation with deconstruction (J. Derrida and J. Caputo). In all three cases, he argues that his wager of the God-who-may-be is to be hermeneutically retrieved from both religious and intellectual traditions, and is the better answer to today’s questioning about God. A contemporary hermeneutics of religion should then lead beyond classical onto-theology and philosophical negative theologies, including the one implied in deconstruction.

Kearney’s Discussion with Deconstructionism: How to Decide?

Of particular interest is Kearney’s discussion with Derrida and Caputo, especially where Derrida points to a general structure of ‘messianicity,’ to be distinguished from specific historically determined messianisms. Kearney does not follow but nevertheless sees here a leap into radical atheism as well as the risk of indiscrimination: “If every other is wholly other, does it still *matter* who or what exactly the other is?” (Kearney

⁴ Kearney’s reading of the burning bush revelation of the name of God ‘*ehyeh*’ asher ‘*ehyeh*’ as ‘I am who may be,’ pressing the ethical and historical aspect of the biblical God, may well be one of the most thought provoking ways to express this intuition: “I am who may be if you continue to keep my word and struggle for the coming of justice” (Kearney 2001: 37-38). It is in this context, in profiling his proposal between onto-theology and postmodern negative theologies, that he writes that “at the chiasmus where ‘*ehyeh*’ meets ‘*einai*’ a seismic shift occurs – with God putting being into question just as being gives flesh to God” (*ibid.*, 34). The God-who-may-be is not the almighty, all-knowing, omnipresent God of onto-theology, but remains a God engaged in history, unconditionally loving and giving, calling us to the praxis of love and justice.

2001: 73). How are we still able to then discriminate between what is God and not-God? To know that it is God we desire, Kearney affirms, the God of desire needs to be recognized in identifiable signs and stories. The absolute faith and trust Derrida asks for in another without face – a ‘monstrous other’ – is blind and empty.

Here, in the discussion with Derrida, Kearney’s two wagers ‘make a difference.’ Only a hermeneutical retrieval of great texts, secular and religious, from our religious, cultural, and philosophical traditions may shed some light in the dark – the wager on method. Such a hermeneutical endeavor leads him to reaffirm his wager on content: God is desired because God desired first. There is no messianicity without particular messianism.

However, Kearney’s response to the question ‘how to decide’ is not unambiguous. He indeed shows how Derrida’s atheistic messianicity also implies a wager, a choice, a particular dealing with desire (“the messianic desire of God both is and is not outside the circle of messianism” [Kearney 2001: 78]). Desire beyond desire ultimately remains related to ‘the circle of desire.’ However, after having pointed to the difficulty of deconstruction to decide (its impossibility), how does Kearney legitimate his own choice? Why would one decide his way? Why would one read the texts Kearney wants to read, and use his hermeneutical key (i.e. a God of love and justice)? Is this merely his own predilection, his own (private?) theological turn? Does it bind anyone else? And if so, how should one deal with it? If God desires us and has shown this in a particular history, which has been witnessed to in signs and texts, how are we to decide upon which signs and texts these are? Who is the hermeneutical subject? And what is its hermeneutical community? And what is the relation they have to the tradition of signs and texts that they read and interpret? If the philosopher turns into a theologian – with reference to a particular tradition – why then not thoroughly so? And what is the ‘philosophical license’ in this regard?

This same discussion even more explicitly springs from Kearney’s comments on Derrida as regards to the impossible. For the latter, the ‘perhaps,’ the ‘peut-être,’ necessarily belongs to the structure of every experience, which is at the same time always an experience of the possible and the impossible (as that which is not predictable, expected, or anticipated). An event, in order to really be an event, is always ‘the arrival of the impossible,’ the ‘making possible of the impossible’ – and is thus involved in the aporia of the possible impossible: keeping the

present open for the other to come (as ‘radically indeterminate possible’) is the condition of everything which comes; but what comes lifts the perhaps. Kearney refers here to four examples in Derrida: decision, interpretation, invention, and pardon. All of them are only possible insofar as they involve the impossible as the unforeseen, something other to come, thus impossible as regards to what is possible by today’s accounts. Therefore, “im-possibility is not the mere contrary of possibility but rather its mark of renewal and arrival as event” (Kearney 2001: 96). It is to this aporia of the impossible as the condition of what is possible – the possible as ‘more-than-impossible’ – that Derrida links the notion of the experience of faith (the faith of deconstruction): faith in (i.e. a filiality towards) the undecidability and unpredictability of what is to happen, what is to come. For Kearney, Derrida here refers to the general “structure of *all* human experience rather than to *any specially religious* experience of a loving God” (Kearney 2001: 97). “For me,” Kearney continues, “the impossible-made-possible signals the promise of new thinking about the ‘possible God’” (Kearney 2001: 98). Here he sees no opposition but an irreducible difference with deconstruction’s discourse. For Kearney, the impossible-made-possible is not referring to the structure of experience in general (‘différance’), but to ‘a specifically *religious* experience of God.’ It does not concern only a difference in language games but also in reference. Where Derrida points to the general ‘messianic’ structure of experience, open upon the other to come,⁵ leaving matters radically open, reserving judgment, Kearney does decide for an eschatological God of justice and peace, a particular messianism. A possible God who May-Be is radically transcendent, at the same time possible and impossible, possibilizing the impossible to happen, calling upon us, engaging us in the realization of the kingdom, and finally not only a ‘can-be,’ but also a ‘should-be,’ urging our openness to the gracious coming of possible divinity.⁶

Again, Kearney points to Derrida’s atheism when dealing with the fact that Derrida does not want to develop his own thinking in a theistic way. Again, he brings in his own wager. The difference with Derrida has

⁵ “The closest Derrida’s reflection comes to religion is in the guise of a ‘messianicity without messianism,’ a form of vigilant openness to the incoming events of *all our experiences* – secular, sacred or profane; good or evil; loving or violent” (Kearney 2001: 98).

⁶ See Kearney’s own summary in Kearney 2001: 100.

to do with another language game, another referent, and a parting of ways. We, however, are left with the question as to what the relationship is between the two discourses: if it is not opposition but difference, what difference? Are both just discourses standing next to each other? For if it is a matter of choice and decision, is Derrida's discourse then not presupposed – because to choose is to 'lift the impossible.' Or is it that Kearney implicitly acknowledges that he has been chosen before choosing – choosing then in fact by answering the call of God who already addressed him ("The Shulamite loves as she is loved" [Kearney 2002: 79])? And how does he know? Where does God speak, when, and to whom? How does he differentiate between the call of God and other calls? By reading texts... but what texts? Of his own tradition(s)... which is (are)...? However, in the end, does it really matter – because all religions and great intellectual traditions would seem to speak of the same striving to the decentering of the subject in view of what is other and a longing for justice and peace. And where does this presupposition come from? In light of his respect for deconstruction, is it not too facile to claim that it is a discourse which is 'merely' different and not opposite to his own discourse?

Towards a More Radical Hermeneutics (of Religion)

Indeed, there is a 'moment of truth' at work in deconstruction, which both resists and acknowledges Kearney's approach. Caputo has pointed to this moment of truth in criticizing Kearney for his confusion of undecidability and indecision in commenting on *kehora*. The choice is not between God or *kehora*, rather it is *kehora* as the sphere of undecidability (the condition for any condition to be made) which makes a decision, a wager, faith in God, possible. With *kehora*, Caputo states, "I am describing the sphere, the desert sphere, in which any genuine decision or movement of faith is to be made, where God and *kehora* bleed into each other and create an element of ambiguity and undecidability *within which the movement of faith is made*. Without *kehora*, we would be programmed to God, divine automations hard wired to the divine being, devoid of freedom, responsibility, decision, judgement, and faith" (Caputo 2002a: 93). Therefore, it is neither the eschatological God of the Kingdom nor the monstrous *kehora*, the former beyond the latter, when one makes the wager.

However, in Kearney's defense, and on the basis of what I have said on other occasions,⁷ it would seem that in Caputo's account the decision to indecision, the decision to think religion from undecidability, has become a narrative in its own right, 'posited within' the *kehora* as it were, circling around it, making of *kehora* 'more than a name.' The discourse of Caputo's radical hermeneutics of religion seems indeed to have evolved into a philosophical piety, deconstruction turned into religion, seemingly forgetful of the ambiguity deconstruction's discourse lives from: undecidability is the condition of all decision, but it already takes a decision to philosophically posit it as that which makes decision possible. Speaking about *différance*, the other name for *kehora*, installs already the passage to language, often referred to by deconstruction in terms of betrayal and contamination.⁸

Thinking irreducible otherness, transcendence, or 'God,' after onto-theology, has often led to a negative theological account evacuating the particularity of religious and other traditions in order to protect this otherness, transcendence, or 'God.' Language becomes too rapidly qualified as betrayal or contamination, even when it is simultaneously recognized as inescapable – how not to speak? It would seem that this kind of procedure leads too easily away from the narrative structure by which people live, brackets too easily the fact that only through the particular and in constant reference to it are truth claims, meaning, references to otherness, and transcendence made. Here we side with Kearney against philosophical negative theologies when he acknowledges the importance of the hermeneutics of texts and traditions.

However, where Kearney would seem to conceive of this move in terms of a 'wager,' I would radicalize this move claiming that the radical

⁷ See, respectively, Kearney 2003b, and Boeve 2002: 455-456 (in reference to Caputo 2002b).

⁸ Despite this passion, however, Caputo is also aware of the fact that neither Derrida nor he himself escapes linguistic contamination. In the end, he avows that the distinction between the 'messianic' and diverse messianism "cannot be rigorously maintained...We are always involved with structures whose historical pedigree we can trace if we read them carefully enough...That is no less true of deconstruction itself...If we search it carefully enough, we discover that it, too, is another concrete messianism, which is the only thing livable." As for his own position, Caputo would concede that he practices a Christian deconstruction, but the one "which is very closely tied to Jesus the Jew, the Judaism of Jesus" – before its integration in Christianity (Caputo 2001: 165).

turn to the hermeneutics of particularity is the other side of deconstruction. Radical hermeneutics should not lead *away* from particularity, trying not to speak to the point at which irreducible otherness (transcendence, 'God') seems to be similar to Caputo's account of it. Instead, a radical hermeneutics leads irreducibly to particularity, to the texts and traditions, and to the way these function in religion and elsewhere. The 'moment of truth' of deconstruction then points us to the impossibility of a discourse, which, beyond particularity, deals with irreducible otherness, transcendence, or 'God.' On the contrary, we are radically referred back to the very unsurpassable particularity of our narratives, including their truth claims. A 'more' radical hermeneutics (than Caputo's) indeed makes us aware that there is always already a 'wager,' a positioning, or a being positioned, involved. Thinking is always already taking a distance from within an irreducible being involved, never getting really beyond it. Kearney's phenomenological approach 'crossing over in hermeneutics' is *already crossed* from the very beginning by hermeneutics. Because, indeed, for some among us, this being positioned is of a theological nature, referring to specific (Jewish and Christian) traditions which deal with irreducible otherness, transcendence, God.⁹ This is what I would see as the most important insight of contemporary philosophy for religion and those who reflect from religion on religion (in line with *fides quaerens intellectum*).¹⁰

⁹ And it is for this reason that Kearney's account of the God-who-may-be invites a theological discussion on a plural field of interpretations of the texts of the religious tradition from which he begins (cf. Boeve 2005, 2006).

¹⁰ This radical hermeneutical turn implies that the 'reduction' which Kearney executed in his own hermeneutical stance, his answer to the question 'where do you speak from?' (Kearney 2001: 6) should be read backwards: he longs for justice and peace because he acknowledges himself to be religious; he is religious because he is inserted into the Judeo-Christian tradition; he belongs to this tradition because he is immersed into a Christian, even a particularly Roman-Catholic, narrative (this is a narrative belonging to the family of narratives making up the internally pluralized and diversified Roman-Catholic tradition). And from the very start he is involved in its continuing hermeneutics, in dialogue, confrontation, or conflict with the other religious and intellectual discourses which one happens to encounter, thus involved in a dynamic interplay of a plurality of narratives, challenging each other to acknowledge, develop, and re-describe one's own position (one's own truth claim), arguing for it in relation, discussion, or conflict with others – thereby respectful or not of

The acceptance of the radical particularity of our narratives and reflections, and thus their radical plurality, does not necessarily lead to relativism (which is in the end only a narrative in its own right to deal with particularity and plurality). Nor does it lead to particularism or fundamentalism, withdrawing within one's narrative, absolutizing one's own truth claim against all others (as, e.g., Milbank does). Both are a means of forgetting, one could say, the 'moment of truth' of deconstruction. Narratives, including the religious ones, in all plurality and ambiguity, venture indeed a truth claim which is bound *to the very lived particularity* in which this truth claim is made, a truth claim which, therefore, is neither to be relativized in view of a quasi-transcendental hermeneutical or ethical position nor in reference to the plurality of truth claims. As a matter of fact, what distinguishes my truth claim as one among others is that it is the truth claim of the narrative from which I live. I indeed think that a narrative – mindful of 'this moment of truth,' of the very particularity of the truth claim, and of the irreducible plurality of narratives – can develop a self-understanding, a critical consciousness within the narrativity itself, which enables both living according to one's own truth claims and respecting other's truth claims (cf. Boeve 2003).

Concluding: The Particularity of Christian God-Talk

Referring a contemporary philosophical hermeneutics back to a radical hermeneutics of particularity may well be the contribution of a theological concept of religious truth to the contemporary philosophical

the challenge of particular truth claims of other narratives (challenging one over and again to reconfigure one's truth claim). I am tempted to suggest that Kearney's appeal to the philosophical license neither to be engaged in 'confessional theology' nor concerned about 'confessional orthodoxy' is itself taking a position, whether from within or against this theological tradition. He may even be trying to increase the distance from an initial involvement, attempting to relativize the irreducible link between these two and, in the same vein, attempting to get beyond it (motivated by, in Kearney's account, an ethical intuition or 'structure of religious experience' and, *mutatis mutandis*, in Caputo's a striving for 'religious purity'). This is, of course, in a world of an irreducible plurality of narratives, a legitimate move, but in fact as particular as any other one, and as much entering the dynamic interplay within and between narrative traditions and positions. This plurality has allowed Kearney to at least be very selective in his sources and to profile a (quasi-)post-traditional religious position with strong messianic tendencies in terms of the 'Judeo-Christian tradition,' rather more 'Jewish' than 'Christian.'

debate on religion. For however inspiring Kearney's hermeneutical retrieval may be, the truth claim of Christianity, which is at stake in its texts and traditions, practices, and communities, cannot be thought of without an acceptance of the radical incarnation and inscription of God into a particular history. The culmination of this event lies in the history of Jesus of Nazareth, confessed by Christians as the Christ, God's Son, the Logos incarnate, both God and human being, whose Spirit is at work in the world and in the hermeneutical efforts of the communities living in His name to recognize this activity. God's revelation is irreducibly historical, bound to the very particularity of a people, of a human being, of communities, and it is only from that particularity that it is meaningful, namely, to make a distinction between revelation in general and revelation in particular. Accepting the radicality of incarnation, the constitutive character of the incarnation in Jesus Christ, however, is not the end of hermeneutics, absolutizing the historical, but the very start of a radical theological hermeneutics. Therefore, language indeed does not need to be a contamination or a fall that would make any religious concept of truth in the end impossible and that would compel hermeneutics to leave its entanglement with particularity behind in the direction of a pure, but nonetheless untenable, religious truth claim. A hermeneutic of religion does not lead 'beyond,' let alone 'behind,' language, but to language itself: to the concrete stories, practices, texts, and traditions in which religious truth is lived and experienced. Only in these can one find both the ground and the content of their truth claim. And it is only from the awareness of the entanglement of religious truth with this concrete particularity that they are positioned in a context of religious plurality. As participants in the interreligious conversation, they venture, together with others, religious truth claims, each of which come from their own particular religious narratives and practices. This may lead to a renewed, radical hermeneutics of religion that fully takes particularity as its point of departure, and that, in order not to fall prey to the pitfalls of a closed particularism or fundamentalism, develops a critical consciousness precisely *from within* particularity. It is because of the irreducible particularity of religious truth claims that an ongoing hermeneutical process is called for, a process that, in its determination of religious truth today, no longer abandons, but holds fast to precisely this very particularity (cf. Boeve 2006).

To conclude in terms of the radical hermeneutics I am putting forward is to say that one is always already irreducibly narratively posited

even when one intends to point to the limits of narrativity. Claims going beyond this narrativity should at least take this into account. Therefore, hermeneutics radically precedes ethics, and thus also the ethics of hermeneutics. At this point, one could read Richard Kearney's approach to appear on certain accounts as neither fish nor fowl: it is neither deconstructive enough to question his priority of ethics over hermeneutics nor modern enough to oppose from this ethical a priori the undecidability of deconstruction (and not 'merely' to differ from it); it is thus not radically hermeneutical enough to question the ultimately modern presumption of the universality of his hermeneutics. Finally, he is not theologian enough to hermeneutically engage the Christian tradition from within, in its complexity as well as in its integrity, operating within it, in relation to its hermeneutical communities, to retrieve and reconfigure it – without 'seeking the immunity of philosophical license.'

Bibliography

- Boeve, Lieven. (2002). "The Rediscovery of Negative Theology Today: The Narrow Gulf between Theology and Philosophy." In: Marco Olivetti (ed.). *Théologie négative* (Biblioteca dell' 'Archivio di Filosofia,' 59). Rome: CEDAM. Pp. 443-459.
- (2003). "The Particularity of Religious Truth Claims. How to Deal with it in a So-called Postmodern Context." In: Kristin De Troyer and Christine Helmer (eds.). *Truth: Interdisciplinary Dialogues for a Pluralist Age* (Studies in Philosophical Theology, 22). Leuven: Peeters. Pp. 181-195
- (2005). "God, Particularity and Hermeneutics. A Critical-Constructive Theological Dialogue with Richard Kearney on Continental Philosophy's Turn (in)to Religion." *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 81: 305-333.
- (2006). "Negative Theology and Theological Hermeneutics: The Particularity of Naming God." In: Ingolf Dalferth, Karl Schmid, and Philip Stoellger (eds.). *Der Name Gottes*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Caputo, John D. (2001). "What Do I Love when I Love my God? An Interview with John D. Caputo" (by B. Keith Putt). In: J.H. Olthuis (ed.). *Religion With/out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo*. London: Routledge. Pp. 150-179.

- (2002a). "Richard Kearney's Enthusiasm. A Philosophical Exploration on 'The God Who May Be.'" *Modern Theology* 12: 87-94.
- (2002b). "Shedding Tears Beyond Being. Derrida's Experience of Prayer." In Marco Olivetti (ed.). *Théologie négative* (Biblioteca dell' 'Archivio di Filosofia,' 59). Rome: CEDAM. Pp. 861-880.
- Kearney, Richard. (2001). *The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- (2002). *On Stories*. London: Routledge.
- (2003a). *Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness*. London: Routledge.
- (2003b). "Khora or God?" In: M. Dooley (ed.). *A Passion for the Impossible: John D. Caputo in Focus* (SUNY Series in Theology and Continental Thought). Albany: State University of New York Press. Pp. 107-127.
- (2004). "Interreligious Discourse – War or Peace?" Lecture delivered at the Fifteenth Inter-American Congress of Philosophy and the Second Ibero-American Congress of Philosophy, on 'Toleration,' 14 January 2004, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima [http://www.pucp.edu.pe/eventos/congresos/filosofia/programa_general/miercoles/plenariamatutina/KearneyRichard.pdf >, accessed 16/6/2006].
- (2006). "Poetics of a Possible God." In: Lieven Boeve, Joeri Schrijvers, Wessel Stoker, Hendrik M. Vroom (eds.). *Faith in the Enlightenment? The Critique of the Enlightenment Revisited*. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi. Pp. 308-326.