Author:

Keywords:

G044621N#56123863, Jesuits, grace, soteriology, middle knowledge, C14/19/012#55213130

Abstract:

This paper seeks to answer whether Leonardus Lessius' (1554-1623) radicality as compared to the views held by Luis de Molina (1535-1600) regarding the role of human free will in the process of salvation should be nuanced. Lessius defended the view that salvation was the result of foreseen merits (ex praevisis meritis). At first glance, Lessius' view seems to imply a causal relation between good works and salvation and to differ in that respect from Molina's per praevisionem meritorum which negates such causality. This paper demonstrates that Lessius explained his view in such a manner that its meaning at least until the early 1600s coincided with Molina's and that this was more due to pressure from within the Jesuit Order than Lessius' individual conviction. To substantiate this argument, the paper investigates the doctrine of Robertus Bellarminus (1542-1621) on free will and grace. Bellarmine held important offices within the order and played a prominent role in the debates on free will and grace in which Molina and Lessius were involved. A fuller understanding of Lessius' doctrine thus necessitates a discussion of Bellarmine's views. The same holds for the ideas Molina developed in his Concordia. After the book's appearance in 1588 and its approval by the Order, Molina's views became the reference point for Jesuits writing on grace and free will. The paper accordingly demonstrates how in the 1600s when defending his treatises De gratia efficaci and De praedestinatione angelorum et hominum, Lessius took efforts to heed the common Jesuit position inspired by an Augustinian reading of Molina. This time, however, Lessius proved more adamant in defending his personal views on predestination which differed on one crucial point from Molina's, namely that God's mere good pleasure (nudum Dei beneplacitum) is not the decisive factor in God's decision of whom to save. The paper concludes that Lessius' views in the 1600s left more room for human free will in the salvific process than the position Lessius adopted during the Louvain controversy under the pressure of his superiors.